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PREFACE
Several years ago the writer decided to come to the 
College of William and Mary for undergraduate, college training. During 
the first year he joined the Young Republicans organization at the 
college, and was active in the 1968 political campaigns. From that 
time until his departure from Williamsburg, there were few political 
campaigns in Williamsburg in which he was not active. Nearly every year 
he attended statewide Young and College Republican functions. In 
June 1972 he attended the state senior Republican Party convention 
in Roanoke, and later, the National Republican Convention in Miami 
Beach. All of this has this writer vitally aware of and concerned 
with the development of the Republican Party in the South.
A few years ago two books attracted national attention:
The Emerging Republican Majority, by Kevin Phillips, and Scammon and 
Wattenberg’s The Real Majority. The Phillips book is a development on 
a large scale of some ideas that were mentioned in passing in M. Stanton 
Evans' The Future of Conservatism. Phillips expounded the idea that 
the country is heading for a conservative revolt which would break the 
back of the Democratic coalition that governed the country from 1932 
to 1968. Phillips saw the 1968 election of Richard Nixon as ushering 
in this new era.
Phillips viewed the political history of the United States as 
divisible into neat periods of nearly complete one-party rule, broken by
iii
short terms for the other party. Each of these extended thirty-six 
years, with the opposition party holding the presidency for only eight 
years. Thus, from 1824 to 1860 the Jacksonian Democrats reigned, yet 
finally succumbed on the question of slavery. The period from 1860 to 
1896 was the first period of Republican rule. It was not a time of 
easy victories, but the victories did come. Then, from 1896 to 1932, 
came the era of nearly complete Republican dominance. This lasted until 
1932 when Roosevelt ushered in the new Democratic era. As the Civil 
War brought to an end the first period of Democratic hegemony, so the 
Great Depression ended the Republican era. Now the unrest of the 
1960s would bring the Republicans back to power.
Scammon and Wattenberg argued that no such traumatic experience
as the Civil War or the Great Depression had occurred during the
1960s to bring about the new Republican majority. The old New 
Deal coalition could still be made to work so long as the Democrats, 
liberal on economic issues, paid heed to the conservatism of the nation 
on the "social issue"--!.e,, a general term covering such topics as
crime, abortion, "busing," and most other noneconomic "domestic"
issues. The majority of the country, contrary to what the followers 
of Senator Eugene McCarthy might believe, is "unyoung, unpoor, and 
unblack." No coalition of the poor, the young, and the blacks could 
provide a majority if catered to solely.
While the books differed on many points, there were certain 
points of agreement. For the purpose of this thesis, the most important 
agreement was a consensus that the South was entering a period where it 
would become more and more Republican in national elections. In
Phillips' map of the country at the end of his book, where he plots the 
future of the nation's politics, and in the scheme of political 
geography presented by Scammon and Wattenberg, the South appears as a 
solid sea of Republicanism, replacing the old Democratic Solid South. 
While there is strong reason to doubt that local southern Democratic 
parties are as dead as the National Democratic Party appears to be in 
the South, that subject is beyond the scope of the aforementioned two 
books. They are concerned only with national politics.
As a Republican, the writer has naturally followed this 
continuing drama to see how well it has followed the script written 
for it by these authors. In searching for a thesis topic, it was 
decided that attention was warranted in this area. It is also an 
area in which the writer is interested. Therefore, a combination 
of business and pleasure has been chosen.
It is the thesis of this study that the South is moving into 
the Republican,orbit in presidential elections. Indeed, most of the 
South's electoral votes can now be safely counted by Republican 
presidential candidates. Further, the trend is toward support of the 
Republican Party in congressional elections, though at a much slower 
pace than in presidential elections. Finally, state and local 
politics will move, or perhaps "inch," in the Republican direction, 
though it will probably not be before the end of the century that these 
areas will be "safely" Republican in the majority of instances. Below 
the presidential level, then, "evolutionary," not "revolutionary," 
movement in the Republican direction may be expected. -
The writer would like to conclude this section by saying a few
vi
words about the relationship of ’’Watergate" to this thesis. Some 
pressure to include such a discussion of effects on this study has been 
felt; however, this writer has decided to pass up the opportunity to do 
so. There are several reasons for this. First, the paper ends prior 
to Watergate’s full impact and disclosure. Indeed, since the main 
point of the thesis covers presidential elections, the year 1972 
serves better than any possible date before 1976. Second, in the 
overwhelming majority of cases there just is not enough data. As a 
former professor once pointed out, "You can't have a 'trend' with only 
one election." It would take until 1980 to have enough data to detect 
a trend. Therefore, the election of 1972 concludes the writer's 
discussion.
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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to examine the political South, 
especially as it was seen by political strategist and historian 
Kevin Phillips in his The Emerging Republican Majority, in light of 
the 1972 elections, and, thus, hopefully, find out if Phillips and 
others, who have felt the South was emerging as a Republican 
stronghold, were correct. To accomplish this purpose the writer 
has examined each of the eleven states of the South individually, 
as well as in their natural groupings of "Outer South" and "Deep 
South," with particular emphasis on the more recent elections. For 
each state, for both subregions, and for the entire region, tables 
were constructed showing the year-by-year breakdown of the partisan 
positions in the governorships, United States senatorships, United 
States Congressmen, and both houses of the state legislature from 
1947 to 1973. In addition, separate tables demonstrate the growth 
of popular support for the Republican candidates for President in 
each presidential election from 1948 through 1972.
The results are varied. On the presidential level, the level 
that Phillips was most concerned about, a great growth in the 
Republican presidential voting is observable in both subregions. This 
growth began first in the Outer South, developing as early as 1952.
In the Deep South the trend did not set in until 1964.
At other levels the trend has been slower to develop, and has 
always come first in the Outer South, only later in the Deep South. 
There is a fairly strong and developing Republican contingent in the 
federal offices and the governorships. However, for the most part 
Republican growth has been relatively slow at the local levels.
The results seem to suggest that the degree of Democratic 
support is in direct proportion to the voters' apparent ability to 
control nominations to that office, and the policies of it. Thus, 
at the presidential level, the South has long since ceased to have 
veto power over Democratic nominees, and has increasingly lost its 
control over presidential policy.
Similarly, as the northern Democrats became the real power in 
Congress following the 1964 elections, the southern revolt against 
congressional Democrats began. It has not, in the main, been so 
much a matter of defeating incumbent Democrats, as replacing retiring 
Democrats with Republicans.
»In the states the same battle has raged. The governor's 
chair has appeared more remote than the legislative seat. Accordingly, 
a majority of the southern states has elected Republican governors, 
while none have produced a Republican legislature. It is, therefore, 
the state legislatures that show the highest proportion of continued 
Democratic support.
THE EMERGING REPUBLICAN SOUTH 
IS KEVIN PHILLIPS CORRECT?
INTRODUCTION
Kevin Phillips in his book has already put forward what could 
be considered a glimpse of the main thesis of this paper, what might 
be called, for lack of a better term, the cyclical theory of 
American presidential elections. Now, the earlier discussion of that 
main thesis will be expanded. The 144-year period from 1824 through 
1968 has been divided into four thirty-six year periods by Phillips. 
The first of these began in 1824 when Andrew Jackson, the plurality 
victor, was denied the presidency by the "corrupt bargain" which 
resulted in the election of John Quincy Adams. Jackson was 
successful in 1826 and again in 1832. His party, the Jacksonian 
Democrats, held the presidency from then until 1860, except for 
eight years when the Whigs captured the presidency in the elections 
of 1840 and 1848. These victories were forged, for the most part, by 
a western and southern coalition in revolt against the old "Eastern" 
and New England states.
By 1860 the Whig party was dead and the Democrats were badly 
split over the questions of slavery and the right of secession.
The Republican Party, organized only six years earlier, and named 
after Jefferson's old party, succeeded in electing Abraham Lincoln 
President. New England, aided by the increasingly populous Midwest, 
now regained the ascendency. Civil War broke out and the slavery 
question was settled decisively by the force of northern arms. The
2
3Republicans continued to win narrow victories for most of the next
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thirty-six years, but because of numerous third parties, no one was 
able to get an absolute majority of the vote. This was also the 
period when the solid South was born in answer to Yankee reconstruc­
tion. Only Cleveland's election in 1884 and 1892 marred the 
Republican string.
Then came the election of 1896. Cleveland was rejected for 
renomination as his party united behind William Jennings Bryan, the 
"Orator of the Platte." Bryan's populism proved popular in the 
West and South, but McKinley swept the nation's populous areas, and 
finished as the first president in forty years to gain an absolute 
majority. The Republicans were to maintain a solid grip on the White 
House, nearly always getting an absolute majority, until 1932.
The only break in the chain came when Wilson won against a badly 
divided Republican Party in 1912 when Teddy Roosevelt finished in 
second place on the Bullmoose ticket. Wilson, who "kept us out of 
war [ sic ]. . ." won again in 1916, but then the country returned to 
"normalcy" and Harding.
In 1929 the Great Depression began, and with it the Republican 
hegemony collapsed. Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) swept the nation 
in 1932 and went on to be reelected three times. Democrats continued 
to hold the presidency until 1968, except for the eight years under
r
Eisenhower. Then, in 1968 the wheel had turned again. Richard 
Nixon, rejected in 1960 by the narrowest of margins, was elected, 
also by a narrow margin, and reelected in 1972.
This, then, is Phillip's grand scheme of the national
4presidential elections. But what makes it work? According to 
Phillips the whole system is triggered by an interaction between the 
South and the Northeast. The South reacts, usually in tandem with 
the West, against the Northeast. This happened in 1824, in 1860, in 
1896, and again in 1968 and 1972. In 1824 the South was successful 
in ousting the Northeast from power. In 1860, and again in 1896, 
the South lost. In 1932 the South won, and in 1968 it looked as if 
it would win again. In Phillips’ view the South (and West) represent 
the radicals fighting for change in the political system, and the 
Northeast represents the status quo and those opposing change in the 
power structure of the nation. In 1896 the Northeast stood as a 
reactionary bulwark against the populism of Bryan. In 1968 it stood 
as the bulwark of New Deal style liberalism against the growing 
conservative forces of the South and West.
Phillips points out, as every politically aware person knows, 
that the South has been the backbone of the Democratic Party since 
before the Civil War whereas the Northeast has been the base of the 
Federalists, Whigs, and eventually, the Republicans. But the 
Democratic Party broke the southern hold on that party's nominating 
procedure in 1936 and shifted more and more toward a big-city 
party dominated by the Northeast. As this happened, the Democrat 
hold on the South deteriorated. This happened first, and most 
notably, at the national level, because that was where southerners 
.first lost the ability to control candidacies. The Democratic power 
at the state and local levels has been slower to evaporate because 
white southerners still retain the dominant role in choosing
5candidates at these levels.
Thus, in the majority of the South, where the White Anglo- 
Saxon Protestants (WASP) votes still predominates, the southern 
retreat from the national Democratic Party is already complete. 
According to Phillips, the Democratic Party can now hope to prevail 
only in southern areas with majority black, chicano, Latin or Jewish 
populations, for example, the "black belts," southern Texas, and 
Miami Beach, Dade County in Florida.
A note might be appropriate on the method of investigation 
employed. What the writer has to say here applies throughout this 
paper. Therefore, it is very important to pay attention to it now. 
This will prevent the necessity of asking later where unfootnoted 
charts came from and what their sources are. If these charts were 
footnoted, every number shown on them, in some cases perhaps 100 
or more, would have to be footnoted separately.
Phillips' study forms the basis of this paper. Those who 
have read it will recall that it is full of charts which purport to 
demonstrate certain facts which he is trying to prove. He has 
selected several counties and/or cities, which, he explains, are 
representative of a trend. This writer has chosen to go back to 
those counties whose performance Phillips has so thoroughly charted 
in past elections to see what happened to their vote totals in the 
1972 presidential elections to see if they performed as Phillips 
predicted. These comparisons can be found in the last subchapters 
at the end of Chapters II and III, where one finds groups of counties 
from the several states placed together under appropriate headings.
In doing this the World Almanac has been a reliable source for vote 
totals, and from these totals the writer has worked out the per­
centages. This source is very good in supplying a county by county, 
and in some cases city by city, breakdown of the vote totals. This 
book is also the source for the charts of the number of Republican 
officeholders in each state.
When this thesis proposal was first presented, some fellow 
students criticized the use of the same counties as Phillips. It 
was argued that it would prove nothing if the same counties came out 
with similar results. Therefore^ it was suggested that counties should 
be chosen by random selection and utilized to compare with Phillips' 
lists and findings. This suggestion has been rejected because the 
goal of any follow-up investigation, is to disprove, not prove, the 
previous hypothesis. If one disproves the old hypothesis using 
different data sources, he may very well wind up proving nothing. 
However, if one winds up disproving the same hypothesis using the 
same data sources, then one has accomplished something.
There is also a practical reason for doing this. When making 
a comparison, one has to use the old counties or he will have nothing 
with which to compare the voting statistics of the newly chosen 
counties. It would be like trying to compare apples and oranges. 
Drawing up a second list of counties would only make checking for 
trends more difficult. The original counties were selected because 
they represented something, for example, black belt voting. While 
it is true that a random sample is likely to produce as many black 
belt counties, they would be different ones. Lacking an intimate
7state by state, county by county breakdown of the whole region, it 
would be difficult to tell which of the new counties were black belt 
and which represented something else. Therefore, a problem in 
comparing which counties with which would arise in comparing 
voting patterns in the southern black belts. Finally, there is the 
problem that some counties are unique--Winston County, Alabama comes 
to mind as an example. It is the only traditionally Republican 
county in Alabama. Therefore, the chances of finding a suitable 
county with which to compare it by random selection would be a 
•hopeless task.
As has been pointed out, Phillips' study was concerned only 
with presidential elections. It is here, Phillips believes, that the 
trend to Republicanism has been and will continue to be the strongest. 
However, the writer has elected to use other indices to measure the 
movement at other levels, namely a breakdown of the people holding 
various offices: governors, United States (U.S.) senators, U.S.
congressmen, state senators, and state assemblymen. Once again, 
as was mentioned earlier, the World Almanac has been used as a 
source. Using almanacs back to 1948, in the case of the first three 
categories, and 1950 for the last two (it did not carry a partisan 
breakdown of state legislatures before then), fourteen tables have 
been prepared: one for the South as a whole, one for the Deep South,
one for the Outer South, and one for each of the eleven states of 
the region.
Finally, using the same source, the actual partisan vote has 
been determined for every election for president back to 1948. For
this, the following calculations have been made: actual percentages
for each election, percentages 'of total vote increases over the 
previous election, and percentage of the vote increase going to 
each party.
This thesis will consist of a preface, an introduction, and 
four chapters. Chapter I is intended to introduce the reader to the 
position of the Republican Party in the South and the state of 
southern politics in general from the period following the Civil 
War to the inception and collapse of the Dixiecrat movement. The 
Dixiecrats were the first in a series of southern third-party 
movements designed to provide an alternative for people who were 
growing fearful of the increasing liberalism of the national 
Democratic Party, but who had too much of the "conservatism" of 
tradition in them to bring themselves to jump all the way to the 
Republicans. Chapter I ends at the point at which the movement 
collapsed since at that point much of the southern electorate was in 
"suspension," caught between two parties, and it was not entirely 
clear whether tradition would win out or whether the break was 
irreparable. Only one thing was clear--that the old southern ties 
to the Democratic Party had worn very thin.
Chapter II deals with the development of the Republican 
party in the Outer South: Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee,
Florida, and Texas. This was the region that had, as early as 1928, 
shown signs of breaking with tradition and going Republican. The 
depression had brought a halt to the process, and all five states 
had remained in the Democratic column in 1948, largely due to the split
9in the anti-Truman vote. This was also the area that fell to the 
Republican forces in 1952, as the disgruntled Dixiecrats, knowing 
that their third-party ideas were impractical, closed ranks behind 
Eisenhower. It was a foregone conclusion that the subregion would 
retain its Republican predilection in 1956, but the election of 1960 
proved that Republicanism, and not merely Eisenhowerism, had come 
to stay as Virginia, Tennessee, and Florida remained in the 
Republican camp, and only the presence of Vice-Presidential Candidate 
Lyndon Johnson kept Texas Democratic.
Chapter III deals with the growth of Republicanism in the 
Deep South: South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana,
and Arkansas. This, too, will begin with the 1948 election and move 
forward. As will be seen, the Deep South, the core of the Solid 
South, persisted much longer in its third-party schemes and its 
allegiance to the Democratic Party. Whereas the Outer South had room 
for some other considerations, such as economics, the politics of 
the Deep South centered solely on the role of the Negro. It was, 
after all, a Republican Chief Justice who presided over Brown v. The 
Board of Education, and it was a Republican President who sent 
federal troops into Little Rock, It would take John Kennedy and 
Lyndon Johnson’s support for attacks on the remaining vestiges of 
segregation in the South to produce the unprecedented results of 
1964, when five of the six states voting Republican were those of 
the Deep South. However, the Deep South was not through with its 
third-party flirtations, as George Wallace's American Independent 
Party (AIP) was to prove. This left the political future of the
10
Deep South in question.
Chapter IV will attempt to summarize all that has been said 
in the second and third chapters, tying together the two strands 
into one coherent whole that will enable the reader to follow the 
development across the whole region, seeing how developments in 
one subregion fit into and reflect developments in the other. 
Starting with the smallest level, the states, the thesis will be 
built through the two subregions to the whole region.
CHAPTER I
THE DIXIECRATIC SOUTH
Section 1: Background
In discussing any topic, it is best to start with a definition 
of key terms. Therefore, this definition of the South is offered: 
the eleven states that seceded from the Union to form the Confederate 
States of America--Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and 
Virginia. Sometimes the South is defined more broadly to include 
West Virginia, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and Maryland. These are really 
border states, and, as such, are not, strictly speaking, a part 
of this topic.
There is a great deal of controversy over what to use as 
an index of Republican strength. Some suggest Party Identification; 
others1 actual recorded vote totals; yet others would count office­
holders or party registration figures. While these all merit 
consideration, they are not all equally easy to find. Party 
identification has only recently been treated thoroughly and can 
only be compared to earlier times by guesswork. Many states do not 
register people by party (Virginia, for example). Therefore, two 
standards have been chosen to measure the rise and fall of Republican 
sentiment: presidential voting figures, and total number of
Republican officeholders.
11
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The purpose of this thesis is to examine Kevin Phillips' 
findings presented in his book The Emerging Republican Majority in 
light of the experience of the last five years. This being the case, 
his ideas concerning the future of politics in the South should be 
reviewed and compared with reality. Phillips' primary axiom is 
that:
Presidential Politics ebb and flow in rational (socio­
economic) cycles and . . . can thus be projected with a fair 
degree of accuracy, . . . [ but ] . . . non-presidential
races--state and Congressional races do not necessarily (although 
they may) follow the presidential pattern.
Thus, it is primarily, although not exclusively, with 
presidential elections that this thesis is concerned. It is, after 
all, in the realm of presidential politics that Phillips must be 
proved either true or false. On the other hand, if movement toward 
Republicans at all levels can be demonstrated, it will go a long way 
toward showing a genuine groundswell for the Republicans, and not 
merely a reaction against some temporary leadership elements of the 
Democratic Party or toward the same in the Republican Party.
Therefore, this thesis will be looking carefully at the growth, or 
lack thereof, of the number of elected Republican governors, senators, 
congressmen, state senators, and members of the lower houses of the 
several state legislatures by whatever name they may be called.
Section 2: Hie Traditional South
In its grand outline the politics of the South revolves
around the position of the Negro.
V. 0. Key, Jr.
In the Civil War the so-called Black Belts supported
13
secession and war; the hill and mountain country opposed it.
Immediately following the war, the political participation of
blacks, union men, and farmers increased and the prewar and wartime
dominance of the Black Belt was broken. After the election of 1876,
however, the Black Belts regained their ascendency, and . . became
2
the bulwark of Democratic strength." In the years that followed
the Republican victory of 1876, southern leaders systematically
destroyed the Republican Party in the South. All potential political
leaders either already were, or turned, Democrat. Those who would not
3
convert were socially ostracized or economically coerced.
The reasons for the hatred of the Republicans were many. At 
first the primary reasons were emotional--a response to the recon­
struction policies of the Radical Republicans. Even after the 
emotional appeal wore off, practical reasons kept the South solidly 
Democratic. From its inception, the Republican Party had been the 
party of high tariffs, while the Democratic Party was the party of
low tariffs. The natural southern interest in low tariffs kept
4
the South in the Democratic camp.
By the 1920s the old loyalties were beginning to break down.
In 1928, with AI Smith, an Irish Catholic from New York running on 
the Democratic ticket, the South showed signs of bolting. The 
Republicans carried five southern states: Florida, North Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. Republican voting varied inversely 
with the proportion, of blacks in the population, Smith carrying the 
Black Belts, and Iloover most of the rest."* The Black Belts were
. . . the hard-core of the political South--and the backbone
14
of Southern political unity . . . .  Here . . . the problem of
governance is . . . one of the control by a small white minority
of a huge, retarded, colored population.6
Where absolute unity was needed to maintain control, the white
population could not tolerate anything that threatened to split its
vote and which might encourage bidding for black votes, thereby
threatening white rule.
The year 1928 marked the highwater mark for the Republican
Party in the South for the next quarter of a century, as the New
Deal set in returning the South to its ancestral loyalties. Table 1,
originally appearing in Key's masterpiece on southern politics, and
later reproduced in Phillips' book, demonstrates the degree to
which the presence of large numbers of blacks affected the southern
voting patterns in 1928.^
Section 3: Southern Republicans
While the Democratic Party ruled the South for nearly 
seventy-five years almost completely unchallenged, there were some 
Republicans to be found. The strongest and most established of these 
were the highlanders who inhabited the Appalachians and the Qzarks. 
When one thinks of the Republican Party in the South following the 
Civil War, one naturally thinks of the other large group of southern 
Republican voters, the blacks. Other groupings included descendents 
of the old Populists, religious minorities who had opposed slavery,
g
and transplanted Yankees.
Nevertheless, no Republican leader in the South ever seriously 
entertained the idea that his party would gain control of his state 
government during his lifetime. During the interim, Republicans
15
TABLE 1
SOUTHERN VOTING PATTERNS IN 1928
State
Counties 
50 percent 
or more black
Counties
for
Smith
Counties 
less than 
5 percent 
black
Counties
for
Hoover
Alabama 18 18 6 5
Arkansas 9 9 29 8
Florida 4 4 1 1
Georgia 48 46 11 8
Louisiana 16 16 0 0
Mississippi 35 35 0 0
North Carolina 9 9 14 13
South Carolina 25 25 0 0
Tennessee 2 2 37 26
Texas 4 4 150 137
Virginia 21 16 18 13
Total 191 184 266 187
SOURCE: Key, V. 0. Southern Politics in State and Nation,
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949. P. 319.
exerted ". . . themselves only to keep the party weak in the South,
in order that there . . . "  would be 11. . . fewer faithful to
reward . . . "  when the national party controlled the presidency.
Many came to believe that the Republican party in the South had only
two functions: ". . . delivery of convention votes and allocation
of patronage, . . . "  and actively came to dislike those who desired
a two-party system in the South. A suggestion for a presidential
Republican primary in the southern states caused a furor because it
would reduce boss control of delegations and might increase the number
of party followers. "Republican organizations in the South--save
perhaps those of Virginia and North Carolina--make little effort to
get people into the habit of voting Republican, . . . "  and, worse
yet, the national organization, until recent times, ". . . has been
no more concerned than the patronage-minded state leaders in building
9
up the party in the South."
During the 1940s there was a sharp drop in the number of 
people in the labor force needed on the farms to harvest crops.
From 1940 to 1952, on the other hand, one million new jobs were 
created in manufacturing, and a similar number in "trade." Bank 
savings deposits quadrupled; average income per capita tripled.^ 
Although arriving late, this industrial growth has changed the face 
of the South. "Expanding markets," and "cheap labor" attracted 
business from all sections of the country. The South has changed 
from an area dominated by poverty, " . . .  to one of material 
adequacy for most, abundance for many, and . . . luxury for some."
In the agriculatural realm, cattle are replacing cotton "more and
17
more."^ Many of these economic changes quickly became translated 
into changes in "political balloting." Cosman notes:
Other political changes were also taking place in the 
composition, size and quality of the electorate; in the recruit­
ment and training of candidates; in the opportunities available 
to political parties and in the constraints which the system 
imposes on them . . . .12
Section 4: Why the Southern Vote
Totals Were Low
One of the most conspicuous features of southern elections
was the very small percentages of the total available electorate that
participated in general elections from the time just before the turn
of the century when the aristocratic southern "Bourbons" won their
battle against the Populists, until the Dixiecrat revolt of 1948.
The reasons for this are complex, and not at all limited to the
voting restrictions imposed on blacks in the South. The whites of
the populist school of politics were as much the targets of the
13
disenfranchisement schemes as the blacks. Low voting percentages 
were common even in the white areas of southern cities. This was 
largely due to the effects of the poll tax on wage workers, but also 
stemmed from the impersonality of the city. For country dwellers, 
the "hometown boy" was a real flesh and blood person everyone knew, 
whereas a candidate from one of the cities was only a name in a 
newspaper--not someone to inspire a heavy turnout to try^to elect 
him.14
In addition to the better known system of the poll tax used 
by Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia; and the 
literacy test used by Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,
18
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia (Tennessee and Florida 
15having neither); party loyalty oaths provided another source of 
Democratic control. Voters in primaries, meaning Democratic 
primaries, since Republicans held none, were required to sign an oath 
to support party nominees. This was hard to enforce among mere 
voters, but if one encouraged others to bolt the party--and this was 
much the greater danger--it became known and thus easier to enforce. 
This effect was particularly great and important against office­
holders. Their defections were the worst danger of all. They could
carry sufficient prestige to swing a number of other voters. Thus
16
those with political ambitions were tied to the Democratic Party.
Another reason for the poor showing compared to other sections 
has already been the absence of a strong Republican opposition. As 
has been pointed out, no one, be he Democrat or Republican, was 
interested in building up the Republican Party in the South.
Democratic leaders and faithfuls would not be expected to be. 
Republican leaders were more interested in staying leaders.
Republican rank and file were small in numbers and uninterested in 
throwing off the southern Democratic rule. For conservative 
Republicans it was hard to imagine any Republican who would be more 
to their liking than Harry F. Byrd, Sr., or Richard Russell. While 
they might vote for a "conservative" Republican for President, there 
was little desire or need for local organization. Republicans simply 
felt satisfied with conservative Democratic rule. The liberals, on 
the other hand: (1) were few, (2) were loyal to the Democratic Party
at the national level, and (3) simply would not feel at home with the
national conservatism of the Republican Party.
As a result of all this, elections were decided in the
Democratic primaries and general elections were simply not close.
The closer the expected vote, the higher the turnout. Southern whites
were not, strictly speaking, disenfranchised. They just failed to
18
vote because of the lack of issues and election interest. As for
the blacks, there was little choice anyway between Segregationist A
and Segregationist B, even where they could manage to register to 
19vote. The mere proximity of numbers of blacks caused white unity
20
where "class divisions" might otherwise have appeared.
Key argued, "Decline in electoral interest generally operates
to a much higher degree among the less prosperous, than among the more
substantial members of the community. . . . "  Lack of education and
poverty, which always seem to result in low participation, were.
21particularly common in the South. Nowhere in the South was this 
more true than among the blacks. The majority of blacks in the South 
at the time were of the lowest social classes with comparatively 
small incomes and only little formal education. Thus, it would seem, 
even without discrimination acting to restrict their turnout, their 
voting would have been smaller than average.
Section 5: The Coming of the
Republicans
For many years following the Civil War the Deep South 
Republican parties were almost entirely Negro. Before Franklin D. 
Roosevelt it was felt that the Grand Old Party (GOP) could keep 
the northern black vote by having black southern delegates. At the
20
same time, and throughout the 1930s, some white Republicans wanted 
to adopt a "traditional southern position" on race to attract 
Democratic voters. Nevertheless, the national party depended on 
southern black conventioneers to keep the loyalty of the blacks in 
the North. As late as 1949, no less prominent a political scientist 
than Key reasoned that the real key to attracting disgruntled 
Democrats in the South and winning control of the governments of 
North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia would be for the mountain
Ci
Republicans in the South to advocate radical populist ideas. But, 
this would mean departing from the national party ideals, and, as 
such, could not be done. Therefore, he felt, no large scale party 
realignment was possible.
Roosevelt's landslide in 1936 obscured three facts that were 
ultimately to have disastrous consequences for the Democratic Party 
in the South, remaking the political face of the South. The first 
of these occurred in the Republican National Convention of 1936.
The New Deal having caused many Negro voters in the North to shift 
party allegiance from the Republican to the Democratic Party, and many 
of those who just began to vote having opted to label themselves 
Democrats, the Republican Party was no longer obliged to choose 
southern black Republicans as delegates and alternates to attract 
these northern black votes. Key reports:
In 1936, Alabama, Florida, North Carolina, Texas, and 
Virginia had no Negroes in the National Convention delegations. 
Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and 
Tennessee had a total of 43 Negro delegates and alternates.
Four years later Alabama, South Carolina, and Virginia had completely
white delegations, and the other eight states had a total of only 
0
twenty-seven Negro delegates and alternates, including . . eleven
22
from Mississippi."
The year 1936 also saw the disappearance of the southern
23
hegemony in the Democratic Party. This was accomplished when the
Democratic Party voted to rid itself of the rule requiring a two-
thirds majority to nominate presidential candidates, which had
given southerners great power in the selection of candidates for
national offices. Rooseveltfs nonsouthern strength removed to some
degree the Democrat’s need of southern votes, and he actively sought 
24
the black vote. This proved effective as the black vote went
25
Democratic for the first time in a national election. Signs of
the coming storm could be seen when South Carolina Senator "Cotton
Ed" Smith marched out of the convention and Gene Talmadge called his
"Grass roots convention" in Macon, Georgia to protest against
26
Roosevelt's policies.
Following the 1936 triumph, the New Deal pushed together
politically, the Black Belt in the South and the nation's indus-
27
trialists, both of whom opposed its pro-labor stands. The old
southern Bourbon regimes were distrustful of organized labor's 
growing influence, labor legislation challenged the South's com­
petitive advantages over the rest of the country in the "labor 
market." While the Supreme Court had vetoed such measures, there 
was some hope, but after 1937 even that disappeared. Then, in 
1938, came Roosevelt's unsuccessful attempt to purge Congress of 
his political opponents, many of whom were conservative southerners.
It was only the outbreak of World War II that prevented an earlier
28
break of the South with the Democrats.
World War II, causing sweeping changes from old patterns,
fanned the flames of the aspirations of southern blacks. "Price
controls, labor shortages, rationing, and a hundred other petty
vexations reinforced the winds of conservatism . . . ," observed
29Tindall. Particularly disliked were the World War II price
30
ceilings on cotton and tobacco. The Interior Department, under
Harold Ickes, officially abolished intradepartmental segregation and
worse yet, Roosevelt himself established a Fair Employment Practices
31Commission by executive order. In April, 1944, the United States
Supreme Court, in Smith v. Allwright, declared the whites only
southern primaries to be invalid. At that time there were roughly
250,000 blacks registered to vote in the South's eleven states. By
1947 this figure had more than doubled. Five years later, the figur
32
stood at four times the 1940 level.
These figures fail to show the wide range of differences 
between the states. Prior to Smith v. Allwright, Mississippi, 
Alabama, South Carolina, and Louisiana had less than one half of 
1 percent of their black voters registered, compared to Tennessee's 
16 percent. In the years that followed the slowest increases came, 
not surprisingly, in Tennessee, Texas, and North Carolina, the three 
leading states in percentages of blacks registered prior to the 
Smith case. An example of the kind of increases this produced may 
be seen by observing Louisiana's record. In 1942 there were 958 
Negroes registered in all of Louisiana; in 1944 there were 1,672;
23
33in 1946, 7,561. The end of the whites-only primaries helped bring
an end to one-party rule in the South. As Lubell states in his
classic The Future of American Politics:
While the Democratic party was exclusively a "white man's 
club" it retained the aristocratic glamour of the Old South. 
Voting Democratic and being respectable were synonymous, a 
feeling which was justified by the fact that the few Negroes who 
voted in the South were Republicans. The fact that almost one 
million Negroes were registered in the Democratic primaries in 
the South [ served ] as a powerful pressure upon the Southern 
whites to drive themselves out of the Democratic party.
Opening up the primaries to blacks also served as an impetus for
further white registration. For example, in the 1950 Florida primary
election 31,000 more Negroes signed up to vote, but 89,000 more
34whites did the same.
The New Deal labor allies in the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (CIO) were not going to take chances of letting the
South become a part of an anti New Deal conservative coalition.
In 1946, the war having ended, the CIO launched a drive for one
million southern members. However, an expense of six million
dollars and four year's time, the "Operation Dixie" found southern
35
unionism weaker, not stronger, than before the movement started.
Converse notes, "[ T]he emigration [ from the South ] and 
immigration [ to the South ]. . . ," following World War II, were
". . . geographically concentrated in ways that give them maximum
visibility, and in the long run may have maximum political implica­
tions." The emigrants have gone mostly from the ". . . poor and
backward interior uplands . . . ," while the immigrants have moved
36
into the coastal and "urban industrial areas." Indeed, it is to
24
such people that the development of urban centers such as Houston,
Dallas, Atlanta, Durham, Baton Rouge, and Nashville owe much of their
flavor. The centers are comfortably middle class with a fair number
of oilmen, stockbrokers, bankers, industrialists and cattlemen
who lean toward the Republicans. Many of these are relocated
Yankees who have brought not only their Republicanism and their
greater inclination to vote with them, but who also have found
37
fertile southern ground for their conservative ideas.
In February, 1948, President Truman asked Congress to pass
a civil rights program calling for a full-time Fair Employment
Practices Commission, abolition of segregation in interstate
commerce, the elimination of the poll tax, and a declaration making
38
lynching a federal crime. The 1948 National Democratic Convention 
endorsed this civil rights platform which upset southern delegates, 
and with the old party loyalty oaths no longer applying to presiden­
tial candidates in the South outside of Alabama, many southern
leaders, heretofore bound to support the whole ticket, felt free
39
to break with Truman. The result was the Dixiecrat movement which
presented a convenient bridge for many southerners to use to cross
over in two steps to voting Republican, when they were unwilling to
40
take the chilling plunge all at once.
Actually, the civil rights program was not the sole factor in
forming the Dixiecrat movement. Steamer observed:
[All ] analyses of the Dixiecrat movement indicate that the 
ideological position of the Democratic party as the home of labor, 
liberals, and welfare-staters was as much a road to rebellion as 
the fear of civil rights legislation. . . .41
25
With the National Democratic Party deciding to back civil rights for
blacks, the South began to vote according to what it believed were
. . _ 42its economic interests.
Between 1948 and 1950 the Dixiecrats received a series of
reverses, making it clear that the movement was dead. By 1950
Senator Richard Russell was prepared to endorse the idea of a very
43
strong Republican Party in the South. "The key to building a
Southern Republican following," Heard states, "had always lain
in the race for President. This provides a big drawing card around
44which other candidates can build . . . ." The old liberal-
conservative disputes in local Democratic Party politics were, even
by 1948, being converted into interparty splits in the national 
45
election. This was inevitable. Since 1945 the national Democrats 
had come to depend for ". . . s o  many of its votes on minority groups,
organized labor, and urban party machines . . . ,." that it was
inconceivable that the Roosevelt coalition could hold together 
indefinitely.^
As Key noted in his 1949 classic Southern Politics in State 
and Nation, many southerners voted (and still do) Democratic locally, 
but Republican nationally. Some just vote in the Democratic pri­
maries out of a sense of "civic duty." Often these are immigrant 
Republicans from other areas of the country who represent a substantial
reservoir of voters ". . . if the Republican organization had anything
47
to offer in the way of candidates," as Key put it. Lubell noted 
in his Future of American Politics that by far the heaviest Republican 
increases came in the urbanized states--Texas, Florida, Virginia, and
26
North Carolina--and in the cities of those states. Roanoke,
Staunton, and Winchester in Virginia also went Republican in 1948,
48
while Alexandria, Fredericksburg, and Charlottesville almost did.
Nor was it any longer taboo to admit to being a Republican in the
South. The Junior Chambers of Commerce were filled with young men
proud to be identified as Republicans. In addition, there are the
traditional Republican "Yankee Emigres" who had already busied
49
themselves establishing new southern .voting patterns.
Not only politics, but also demographics was working against 
the Democrats in the South. If, as mentioned before, it was true 
that the newly enfranchised black voters were voting Democratic, 
there were fewer areas where they constituted an available majority 
than in the past, as Table 2 shows. Thus, by the time the black vote 
in the South began to trend Democratic, the number of areas it could 
control had been greatly reduced.
Not only had the Democratization of the black vote failed to 
substantially aid the national Democratic Party in the South, but it 
had served to alienate many southern voters. A new revolution was 
beginning in the South. The Dixiecrat movement of 1948 appeared 
as only the tip of an iceberg to show what was ahead. As Lubell 
said:
Southern politics are usually pictured as a conservative- 
liberal struggle, with liberals representing the wave of the 
future, and the conservatives resisting all change. This widely 
held theory hardly explains what is going on. The strongest 
single force for political change in Dixie Land today is the 
newly developing urban middle class who, by Northern standards, 
would be classed conservative. . . . The revolution reshaping 
Dixieland has been making the South more, not less, conservative 
politically. ^ 0
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TABLE 2
COUNTIES WITH BLACK MAJORITY POPULATION
State 1900 1920 1940 1970
Total
counties
Alabama
*
22 ’ 18 18 10 67
Arkansas 15 11 9 5 75
Florida 12 5 3 2 67
Georgia 67 58 46 19 159
Louisiana 31 22 15 5 64
Mississippi 38 34 35 21 82
North Carolina 18 12 9 5 100
South Carolina 30 32 22 9 46
Tennessee 3 2 2 2 95
Texas 12 4 3 0 254
Virginia 36 23 18 7 96
Total 284 221 180 85 1,105
SOURCES: Key, V. 0. Southern Politics in State and Nation.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949. P. 29.
Murphy, Reg, and Gulliver, H. The Southern 
Strategy. Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1971. Pp. 11-12.
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There are three aspects of the "conservative revolution," as Lubell 
saw it: . . labor's failure to organize the South, urban middle
class political insurgency; and expanding 'Negro rights' in the 
intensification of the race issue." In 1951 he wrote:
Instead of a militant labor movement, the first fruits of 
increasing industrialism have been a rising urban middle class, 
which is virtually Republican in political sympathies. It is 
this new middle class, the branch plant managers and their 
college trained supervisors, merchants, doctors and lawyers, 
newspaper publishers, and realtors, all seemingly so conservative, 
who are the real political rebels in the South today.
From this middle class are coming the strongest pressures 
for two-party politics. The liberals, themselves weak, are 
actually hugging the one-party system with might and main.
Their sole hope for gaining power locally lies in the possibility 
that a premature conservative bolt will leave them to crow with 
the Democratic rooster.^
In 1969, Phillips noted the following:
The Emerging Republican majority of the Nineteen-Seventies is 
centered in the South, the West, and in the "middle American" 
urban-suburban districts. . . .  It has been the seat of every 
popular, progressive upheaval in American politics--Jefferson, 
Jackson, Bryant, and Roosevelt. . . . Together with the Heartland, 
the South is shaping up a pillar of a national conservative 
party. . . . The extraordinary 1968 debacle of the Democratic 
party--a collapse never before experienced by the Democrats 
throughout the entire region--bespoke a sharp Republican trend 
in Dixie. At the same time, liberal fragments of the South-- 
Miami, Tampa, Gulf Coast and Mexican Texas, elements of French 
Louisiana and Black Belt areas dominated by Negro electorates-- 
disassociated themselves from the emerging national conservative 
grouping.52
What happened to these areas in the interim? Wallace's effect 
on the 1968 southern showing was proclaimed by Phillips to be 
equitable with people who would later vote Republican nationally, if 
not locally. Where did they go in 1972? Has the South continued 
in its patterns described by Phillips in 1968, or was 1968 in some way 
peculiar? These are questions the writer hopes to answer in the
29
chapters which follow.
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CHAPTER II
THE OUTER SOUTH: 1948 to 1972
There are, perhaps, many ways in which one could define the 
Outer South. Of these, however, none is quite as satisfactory as 
describing it as those southern states casting their electoral votes 
for the Republican presidential candidate during at least one election 
from 1880 through 1952. Thus, the Outer South would include the 
following states: Virginia, Tennessee, Florida, North Carolina,
and Texas.
To aid in the analysis which follows, several tables have 
been prepared--one for each state; one for the entirety of the Outer 
South; and one for all of the Deep South; and one for the Whole 
South. These tables contain the following information: the party
of the Governor (D = Democrat, R *= Republican), the partisan 
congressional breakdown for both the House of Representatives and 
the Senate, and the breakdown of the state legislatures by party.
The first three begin with the year 1947, the last two with the 
year 1950. The tables were compiled from the World Almanac for 
that period. This explanation is given now so that footnoting each 
table, one figure at a time, will not be necessary.
Another set of tables has also been prepared which shows the 
vote totals for each election for President from 1948 through 1972. 
They are broken down by party, as well as being totaled to show the
33
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entire vote. Figures are also supplied showing percentage gains or 
losses over the last election for each party and for the entire vote.
In confirming, or disproving, Phillips' thesis, it is, as 
should be pointed out, only the presidential election results that 
are important. But the other data may help in understanding the depth 
of change, and the likelihood of its reversal. There are those who 
feel that the loss of southern votes by the Democrats is only a 
temporary aberation. Thus, Eisenhower's twin victories occurred 
because of his enormous popularity. Nixon did win votes, but rather 
Kennedy lost them because of his Catholicism. .The proof for these 
first two statements is supposed to be Johnson's victories in the 
Outer South in 1964, while the loss of the Deep South is explained 
as temporary due to the racial appeals of Barry Goldwater. The 
1968 results are said to confirm this since Goldwater's states 
(South Carolina excepted) swung behind George Wallace. The rest of 
the South went Republican because Wallace drew sufficient Democratic 
votes away from Humphrey to assure Nixon a victory. Had Wallace not 
been in the race, it is explained, these voters, being Democratic 
party identifiers, would have supported Humphrey. As for 1972, it 
was aberrant because McGovern was a complete fiasco throughout 
the nation. The following demonstrates a survey of the Outer South 
states.
Virginia has traditionally been one of the three southern 
states (North Carolina and Tennessee being the other two) where the 
Republican Party has been an actual political force.'*' (See Table 3.) 
Nevertheless, until the late 1940s there was an absence of interparty
Year
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
io ­
ns
9
9
9
10
10
10
13
12
11
11
11
11
11
8
8
9
8
16
16
16
20
24
TABLE 3
PARTISAN BREAKDOWN 1947 TO 1973 
FOR VIRGINIA
Gov­
er­
nor Senate House
Da 0Rb— 2D OR— 9D
D OR— 2D OR— 9D
D OR— 2D OR— 9D
D OR— 2D OR— 9D
D OR— 2D OR— 9D
D OR— 2D OR— 9D
D OR— 2D 3R— 7D
D OR— 2D 3R— 7D
D OR— 2D 2R— 8D
D OR— 2D 2R— 8D
D OR— 2D 2R— 8D
D OR— 2D 2R— 8D
D OR— 2D 2R— 8D
D OR— 2D 2R— 8D
D OR— 2D 2R— 8D
D OR— 2D 2R— 8D
D OR— 2D 2R— 8D
D OR— 2D 2R— 8D
D OR— 2D 2R— 8D
D OR— 2D 2R— 8D
D OR— 2D 4R— 6D
D OR— 2D 4R— 6D
House of 
State Dele-
Senate gates
3R— 37D 6R— 94D
3R— 37D 6R— 94D
3R— 37D 6R— 94D
2R— 38D 8R— 9 2D
2R— 38D 8R— 92D
3R— 37D 7R— 9 ID
3R— 37D 7R— 9 3D
3R— 37D 6R— 9 3D
3R— 37D 6R— 93D
3R— 37D 6R— 94D
3R— 37D 6R— 94D
3R— 37D 6R— 94D
3R— 37D 6R— 94D
2R— 38D 4R— 96D
2R— 38D 4R— 96D
2R— 38D 5R— 94D
2R— 38D 4R— 95D
3R— 37D H R — 89D
3R— 37D 11R— 89D
5R— 35D 11R— 89D
5R— 35D 11R— 89D
6R— 34D 14R— 86D
36
TABLE 3— Continued
Year
Gov­
er­
nor Senate House
State
Senate
House of 
Dele­
gates
Total
Repub­
licans
1969 D OR— 2D 5R— 5D 6R— 34D 15R— 85D 26
1970 R OR— ID 5R— 5D 6R— 34D 15R— 85D 27
1971 R OR— ID 6R— 4D 6R— 33D 15R— 75D 28
1972 R OR— ID 6R— 4D 7R— 33D 24R— 75D 38
1973 R 1R— 0D 7R— 3D 7R— 33D 25R— 7ID 41
D— Democrat.
— Republican.
competition throughout most of the state, even in presidential elec­
tions. The large mountain Republican vote could have been used as 
a basis for forming a substantial opposition party in statewide and
local races if party leaders had been so inclined, but they were not
2
interested in much except Washington patronage. Only in the "fight-
3
ing ninth" district was there genuine two-party competition. Here,
genuine mountain Republicans obliged the Democratic candidates to
campaign fairly strongly, and controlled wide areas of southwest
4
Virginia even before the Eisenhower era.
In 1946 the Republican Party of Virginia, for the first time,
employed a "full time" Executive Director, in preparation for the
1948 election. He began to prepare the local party organizations for
the contest eighteen months in advance of the election. This came
as a result of a new group entering the party who were actively
5
interested in contesting elections.
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As pointed out earlier, 1950 saw the end of the Dixiecrats as a 
viable political force in the South. At the time Table 3 begins, 
Republicans held only nine seats in the state legislature. The two 
U.S. Senate seats, all of the House seats, and the governor's chair 
were safely in Democratic hands. In the 1951 elections, the 
Republicans picked up one state senator.
In 1952 Eisenhower swept through Virginia, more than doubling 
Dewey's 1948 totals (172,070 to 348,037). Stevenson, too, increased his 
absolute figures over Truman, but slipped from Truman's 48.2 percent to 
43.4 percent. Of the new voters entering the Virginia electorate 
between 1948 and 1952, 72.2 percent voted for the Republican presi­
dential candidate. Three new Republican Congressmen, the first in 
many years, won election, capturing seats in the Sixth, Ninth, and 
Tenth districts. Two vacancies in the House of Delegates went to the 
Democrats. Nevertheless, in 1953 the Republican Party in Virginia 
achieved a hold on more elective offices than they would again until 1964.
In the 1953 governor's race, the Republicans, fresh from
Eisenhower's smashing victory of the year before, had high hopes. In
that election, the Republican candidate Ted Dalton took 44 percent of
the vote, coming closer to victory than any Republican candidate of
this century had before, and closer than anyone else would again until
6
A. Linwood Holton. However, any hopes for Republican statewide vic­
tories, which had seemed so bright after Ted Dalton's narrow defeat in 
1953, " . . .  were shattered by the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education 
decision. That decision revived race as Virginia's primary political 
i s s u e . D a l t o n ' s  percentage in 1957, after the Brown decision, and 
after Eisenhower's, move against Little Rock, fell from 44 percent to
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37 percent. Nevertheless, by 1959, the victor, Governor Almond, was
o
forced to capitulate and announce "massive resistance" dead.
In 1954 another Republican seat in the House of Delegates 
became vacant, and was eventually filled by a Democrat. In Congress, 
Pat Jennings defeated Republican Congressman William Wampler in his 
reelection bid in the Ninth District. The Brown decision had done 
much to place the local southern Republican Party back where it was 
before 1952. Even Eisenhower's massive repeat triumph in 1956 did 
little to revive the party. It was more or less a personal triumph 
and Stevenson's loss--with the lowest Democratic percentage in this 
century, and an actual overall decrease in votes from 1952--was more 
or less a personal debacle.
From the (temporary) highpoint of 1953, the Republicans were 
forced to fight a holding action to avoid further losses. No new gains 
were made during the rest of the 1950s, and, in 1959, one-third of 
their state legislative seats were lost in a statewide version of the 
1958 congressional debacle. In 1961, however, the Republicans began 
to climb back by making a one-seat gain in the House of Delegates. In 
1954 and 1957 a Republican President had been blamed by the South for 
the Brown decision, and the intervention at Little Rock. In 1962 it 
was the Democratic President John F. Kennedy who nationalized the 
Mississippi National Guard, and sent some of its units and Regular Army 
troops to force integration on "Ole Miss." In August of 1963 came the 
March to Washington in support of the Kennedy administration's Civil
Q
Rights Bill. In November of 1963, one new Republican state senator, 
and seven new Republican members of the House of Delegates were elected 
in Virginia. The deluge of Republican sympathy that was to inundate the
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Deep South a year later had already begun to manifest itself in Virginia.
The presidential election in 1960 in Virginia proved that the 
two Eisenhower sweeps had not been flukes. Virginia again went 
Republican. Richard Nixon improved his vote total by 16,000 over 
Eisenhower's 1956 showing, although his percentage was not as high, 
only 52.7 percent. Kennedy's total of 362,327 was nearly 95,000 votes 
better than Stevenson's, but still fell more than 40,000 votes short 
of Nixon.
When in January of 1964 the Twenty-Fourth Amendment took 
effect, barring the poll tax as a voting requirement in federal elec­
tions, it signaled an upturn in the projected vote for the 1964 
Presidential election. More than 35 percent more voters came to the
polls in 1964 than in 1960;^^ nearly equalling the 1948 to 1952
12
increase of 47.8 percent. Black votes proved crucial to Democratic
victories in both 1964 and 1965. With 90 percent plus black support,
Lyndon Johnson was able to defeat Barry Goldwater in Virginia by a
scant 77,000 votes, with black voters numbering 160,000. In the 1965
governor's race, Godwin came out 57,000 votes ahead due to a 75 per-
13
cent plus vote among black voters. But times were changing in 
Virginia. Godwin was destined to be the last of the Byrd machine 
governors. The rift in the Virginia Democratic Party had begun in 1964 
when the state Democratic Convention bolted the influence of Senator 
Harry F. Byrd, Sr., and endorsed President Johnson for reelection.
This was an open challenge to Senator Byrd's "golden silence" doc­
trine. Under the direction of Sidney Kellam of Virginia Beach, Johnson
was to become the only presidential Democratic victor in the Old
14Dominion since 1948.
In 1966, the rift developed into near civil war. Both Senate
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seats were up, as well as all ten House seats. Because of the resig­
nation of Senator Byrd in 1965, his son, who had been appointed to 
replace him, had to face election for the remainder of the term. The 
other seat, held by A. Willis Robertson, was due for reelection. Both 
Byrd and Robertson met stiff primary opposition from the liberal wing 
of the party. Byrd won narrowly, but Robertson's old age (seventy- 
nine) proved a handicap allowing "moderate" William B. Spong, Jr. to 
emerge the winner by a scant 611 votes.^
Nor was this all. The Byrd organization suffered another set­
back when Delegate George Rawlings pulled off a surprising 645-vote 
victory over nationally known Eighth District Congressman Judge 
Howard W. Smith, Chairman of the Rules Committee. This victory proved 
of little personal benefit, however, as Rawlings was easily defeated 
by William Scott, a Republican, in the general election. For Smith, 
like Robertson, age had been an important factor. He and his sup­
porters joined with the normal Republicans in the district to give 
Scott a 57 percent margin. Nor was that all the Republicans had to 
celebrate. In the "fighting ninth," former Congressman William Wampler 
regained his old seat in Congress defeating incumbent Pat Jennings, who 
had gained himself somewhat of a reputation for being something of a
I fi
liberal and a political maverick. At the same time, two new faces 
joined the Republican delegation in the State Senate. These were 
joined in 1967 by another new state senator and three new Republican 
members of the House of Delegates.
The outcome of the 1968 elections in Virginia was somewhat 
suspense-filled, due to the very strong third-party candidacy of 
George Wallace. Although most of Wallace's support was supposed to 
be from rural, southside Democratic Party identifiers, who had been,
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in past elections, the bedrock of the Democratic Party in Virginia,
it was widely argued that, in Wallace's absence, these voters would
have gone for Nixon over Humphrey. But Wallace was present. Who would
win by his presence? Whom would he hurt the most? That is hard to say,
but Nixon carried the Old Dominion, increasing his vote totals by
109,000 over Goldwater's figure, and 186,000 over his own 1960 figure.
Humphrey finished with 442,387 votes, 80,000 votes ahead of Kennedy,
but 116,000 votes behind Johnson, and more important, 148,000 votes
behind Nixon. Wallace finished third with almost a quarter of the votes.
Although Wallace support failed to reach expected levels in
southside, his margins in the Tidewater cities were surprisingly high.
Indeed, the votes he siphoned from Humphrey here were responsible for
the size of his loss. Wallace actually did better in Norfolk than in
17
conservative Henrico County.
Nevertheless, the results of 1968 were marred by the lack of
a clear majority for Nixon. The degree of Republican strength was
seriously questioned. The 1968 election thus set the stage for the
1969 governor's race. The Republican candidate was again Linwood
Holton. Every spot on the Democratic ticket was being contested
in the primary. With the defeat of the regular Byrd machine
candidates in the primary, "Conservatives . . . announced themselves
to be Republicans . . . ," and went forth to work for the candidates
of their new political home. Not a few "independents" and new
Republicans made large donations to Holton's campaign. Holton
18emerged the victor with 52.5 percent of the vote.
Many have attributed the feud within the Democratic Party for 
Holton's victory. The University of Virginia's late Ralph Eisenberg
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concluded otherwise:
It is too simple a conclusion to argue that Battle's loss 
resulted solely from the splintering of the Democratic Party and 
as such was merely an aberation of Virginia's historic Democratic 
dominance. Holton's triumph followed too many successes in 
Presidential and Congressional elections for the argument that 
it was a personal triumph to be convincing. . . .^
The move to Linwood Holton came from both ends of the 
Democratic political spectrum. Some of Henry Howell's followers, 
disappointed at his defeat in the primary, moved to Holton. But 
another large segment came from the ranks of Democratic conserva­
tives. Thus, Lubell reports in his The Hidden Crisis in 
American Politics that one Richmond housewife who had voted for 
Wallace in 1968 told him shortly after the election, "'I'm glad he 
didn't get in. He's so headstrong. I regret not voting for Nixon.
I'm beginning to lean Republican.1" In the 1969 race, Wallace 
neighborhoods split, voting for Holton for Governor, and Reynolds 
for Lieutenant Governor. As Lubell puts it:
The younger Wallace backers often have little sense of party 
identification. Their shift to Nixon on election eve was marked.
. . . Over the long run . . .  a Republican appeal to their 
individualistic economic drive would probably provide a more ^q 
lasting basis of political identification than the race issue,
Of course, the most important component of Holton's strength 
was the traditional and recently Republican urban-suburban vote. It 
is noted that:
The Republican performances in Virginia's suburbs had steadily 
improved over the years. The suburban vote had been an important 
ingredient in President Nixon's triumph in Virginia in 1968, and 
it was very adeptly exploited by Virginia Republicans in 1969.^1
In 1970 Virginia entered what might be termed the era of the 
independent. Her senior Senator Harry Flood Byrd, Jr. declared that
he no longer considered himself a Democrat, possibly in fear of 
another close primary fight, possibly in response to Holton's victory 
The Democratic Primary attracted only minimal excitement as George 
Rawlings, conqueror of Judge Smith four years earlier, gained the 
nomination. At the same time, the Republican convention split over 
whether to nominate a candidate at all. Only Holton's prestige 
proved sufficient to force a favorable vote on the issue. Many 
Republicans went to work for Senator Harry Byrd rather than their 
own candidate Ray Garland. The White House was appalled that anyone 
had been nominated. The result was all that could have been expected 
the Senator breezed to an easy reelection, carrying nine of ten 
congressional districts. The Republican finished a dismal third.
The only bright spot came when Kenneth Robinson captured the Seventh 
District seat, giving the Republicans a clear majority of six of the 
ten congressional seats from Virginia, the first time in this century 
any southern state in the Outer South had done so.
When in 1971 Lieutenant Governor Reynolds died suddenly, an 
election was called to fill the vacancy. Both parties called con­
ventions to nominate candidates--the first time in many years the 
Democrats had not used a primary to select a candidate. State 
Senator Henry Howell, a liberal Democrat from Norfolk, announced his 
candidacy for the post as an independent. The Democrats nominated 
George Kostel, an obscure state legislator of uncertain ideology.
At the Republican Convention George Shafran, a "Holton Republican," 
overcame the challenge of conservative George Mason Green to gain the 
nomination. Conservatives of both parties could agree only on not
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wanting Henry Howell. Whom they did want was largely a matter of 
personal choice, centering around the question of who was believed 
to have the better chance of victory. Without a name like Byrd's in 
the race, this was not clear. When the votes were counted, Howell 
emerged the winner by a narrow margin over Kostel, with Shafran run­
ning a poor third. But all was not lost. The elections added a new 
Republican State Senator, and many new members of the House of 
Delegates.
With two consecutive third-place finishes for Republican 
candidates, the situation looked bad for Republican chances in 
statewide elections. Only one man wanted to take a chance to run 
against incumbent Senator Bill Spong. That man was Bill Scott,
Eighth District Republican Congressman. Scott had been thrown into 
the Tenth District when the Democratic legislature redistricted 
Virginia. This left Scott with the choice of moving, running in a 
primary against Joel Broyhill, the Tenth's incumbent Republican 
Congressman, retiring, or running into nearly certain defeat by 
taking on Spong in the Senate race. Scott chose the last alternative. 
No one else wanted the job. Indeed, Joel Broyhill refused the efforts 
of a "Draft Broyhill" group.
Meanwhile, within the party, all was not well. Holton, as 
party leader, was blamed for the two consecutive losses, both by 
wide margins, that the party had suffered. Conservatives felt that 
no candidate should have been run in 1970; that Byrd was (1) unbeat­
able, and (2) completely acceptable anyway. It was more important, 
they felt, to avoid defeat than to run a candidate. Holton felt that
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the party must be saved from the menace of having the Byrd machine 
take it over, while conservatives argued that an allegiance with the 
Byrd machine would result in a new coalition capable of governing 
the state. In 1971 all wings of the party had wanted a candidate run, 
but conservatives had wanted Mason Green, not George Shafran. Green, 
they felt, was clearly identifiable as a conservative, and could 
have run a much stronger race. They felt that both losses were due 
to the fact that neither candidate, Garland or Shafran, was a con­
servative, rather than to the fact that both were Republicans. 
Accordingly, they wanted a change of party leadership. Since 
Governor Holton could not be touched, the chosen victim was Warren 
French, party chairman, and a leading Holton strategist. His 
opponent was Richard Obenshain, a young (thirty-six in 1972), articu­
late conservative Richmond lawyer, and Holton’s 1969 Attorney 
'General running mate.
Thus, the stage was set for the Roanoke convention. According 
to the rules of the convention, delegations were forbidden from 
employing ’’unit rule." Several key blocks of Obenshain supporters 
were from "instructed delegations," however. These were groups which 
had received "instructions" from the mass meetings at city, county, 
or precinct levels back home to vote a certain way on a certain vote, 
in this case, for Obenshain as party chairman. Realizing this,
French had offered to withdraw from the contest shortly before the 
convention. The Governor, however, convinced him to stay in.
At the convention, Holton supporters claimed that "instructed 
delegations" were in effect on unit rule. The chair so ruled. The
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ruling of the chair was immediately appealed. O n ‘that vote hung the 
election. The chair was overruled by a very wide margin. The final 
vote was anticlimactic. Obenshain won easily. The Republican 
Party had become the Party of the Right in Virginia. Scott was 
nominated without opposition. A conservative candidate easily won 
the National Committeeman’s post. Mrs. Cynthia Newman, a Holton 
follower, was permitted to retain her post, as National 
Committeewoman so that party unity could be maintained.
The Democratic State Convention, also held in Roanoke, com­
pleted the political shift. As the Republicans elected to make a 
definite and clear shift to the right, the Democrats elected to give 
the voters a clear choice by shifting to the left. Joseph Fitzpatrick, 
a long-time associate of liberal independent Democrat Henry Howell, 
became party chairman. George Rawlings became National Committeman, 
and Ms Ruth Charity of Danville completed the liberal sweep.
"Moderate" Bill Spong was renominated for the Senate.
The Senate race was expected to be an easy victory for Spong, 
who had run ahead of Harry Byrd, Jr. when they both ran in 1966.
Spong tried to show the people that he had been progressive, but not 
radical. Bill Scott kept hammering away at his theme that Spong 
did not fit in with the rest of the Virginia delegation, producing 
a scorecard of the very Conservative Americans for Constitutional 
Action to prove it. Perhaps Spong's biggest error was in not taking 
Scott seriously. What many consider to be the turning point in the 
campaign came when Spong, who until that time had refused to admit 
that he would vote for McGovern for President, admitted to a student,
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following a speech at Ferrum Junior College, that he would indeed vote 
for McGovern. Spong reportedly thought that no reporters were listen­
ing. It was the most costly miscalculation of his career. After this
story broke, even the endorsements of most of Virginia's most prom­
inent newspapers helped little. It confirmed the suspicions of many 
voters. Bill Scott proved that a conservative Republican could win as 
he swept the state, carrying seven of ten-congressional districts.
On the presidential front, Richard M. Nixon drew nearly a 
million votes in defeating his opponent, Democrat George McGovern by 
over 400,000 votes, a better than two-to-one margin. McGovern's
30.9 percent was less than Humphrey's, while Nixon's 69 percent
exceeded the combined totals for both Wallace's and his own 1968 per­
centages. McGovern's total vote was less than Humphrey's had been four 
years earlier. In addition to the six seats already held, Republicans 
picked up southside Fourth Congressional District when one-time 
Democratic State Chairman Watkins Abbitt retired (see Table 4).
Havard notes:
The increasing size of the electorate made it more and more 
difficult for the organization, and later for the Democratic 
party to Win elections, as the growing proportions of urban votes 
caused fundamental changes in the political balance.
The constructive product of the enlarged electorate was the 
rapid development of the Republican party. It must be concluded 
that there was more than a coincidence between the large turnouts 
and Republican successes. . . . Undoubtedly spurred by Senator
Byrd's "golden silence" and conservative Democratic defections to 
Republican candidacies, the early Republican presidential vic­
tories legitimized Republican voting habits for many Virginians 
and aided the development of the Republican party organizations.
[ Emphasis added. ]
The new suburban vote proved more Republican than any other
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TABLE 4
VIRGINIA PRESIDENTIAL VOTING
Year
Repub­
licans
Demo­
crats
Inde­
pen­
dents
Repub­
licans
(%)
Demo­
crats
(%)
Inde­
pen­
dents
(%)
1948 172,070 200,786 43,393 41.3 48.2 10.4
1952 349,037 268,677 • • • 56.5 . 43.4 0.0
1956 386,459 267,760 42,964 55.4 38.4 6.1
1960 404,531 362,327 « • • 52.7 47.2 0.0
1964 481,334 558,038 • • • 46.3 53.6 0.0
1968 590,319 442,387 320,372 43.6 32.6 23.7
1972 982,792 439,546 • • • 69.0 30.9 n o
area of the state, except the Shenandoah Valley. Moreover,
". . . rising proportions of the total metropolitan vote were
suburban.” While the central cities began to dominate Democratic
22primaries, the suburbs dominated the November elections.
Traditionally, Tennessee, like Virginia, has been one of the
23few southern states with more than minimal Republican support.
24
Indeed, Key referred to it as ”a double one-party state.” At the 
time this study was started in 1947-1948, Tennessee was the only 
southern state to have a Republican delegation in Congress (see 
Table 5). In eastern Tennessee the mountain Republicans regularly 
vote straight Republican tickets, and even at that early date
49
TABLE 5
PARTISAN BREAKDOWN 1947 TO 1973 
FOR TENNESSEE
Year
Gov­
er­
nor Senate House
State
Senate
State
House
Total
Repub­
licans
1947 D OR— 2D 2R— 8D 4R— 29D 18R— 79D 24
1948 D OR— 2D 2R— 8D 4R— 29D 18R— 79D 24
1949 D OR— 2D 2R— 8D 4R— 29D 19R— 80D 25
1950 D OR— 2D 2R— 8D 4R— 29D 19R— 80D 25
1951 D OR— 2D 2R— 8D 4R— 29D 19R— 80D 25
1952 D OR— 2D 2R— 8D 4R— 29D 19R--80D 25
1953 D OR— 2D 2R— 7D 5R— 28D 18R— 8ID 25
1954 D OR— 2D 2R— 7D 5R— 28D 18R— 8ID _ 25
1955 D OR— 2D 2R— 7D 5R— 28D 19R— 80D 26
1956 D OR— 2D 2R— 7D 5R— 28D 19R— 80D 26
1957 D OR— 2D 2R— 7D 6R— 27D 21R— 78D 29
1958 D OR— 2D 2R— 7D 6R— 27D 21R— 78D 29
1959 D OR— 2D 2R— 7D 5R— 28D 17R— 82D 24
1960 D OR— 2D 2R— 7D 5R— 28D 17R— 82D 24
1961 D OR— 2D 2R— 7D 6R— 27D 19R— 80D 27
1962 D OR— 2D 2R— 7D 6R— 27D 19R— 80D 27
1963 D OR— 2D 3R— 6D 6R— 27D 21R— 78D 30
1964 D OR— 2D 3R— 6D 6R— 27D 21R— 78D 30
1965 o D OR— 2D 3R— 6D 8R— 25D 24R— 75D 35
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TABLE 5— Continued
Year
Gov­
er­
nor Senate House
State
Senate
House of 
Dele­
gates
Total
Repub­
licans
1966 D OR— 2D 3R— 6D 8R— 25D 24R— 75D 35
1967 D 1R— ID 4R— 5D 8R— 25D 41R— 58D 54
1968 D 1R— ID 4R— 5D 8R— 25D 41R— 58D 54
1969 D 1R— ID 4R— 5D 13R— 20D 49R— 49D 67
1970 D 1R— ID 4R— 5D 12R— 20D 49R— 49D 66
1971 R 2R— 0D 4R— 5D 13R— 19D 43R— 56D 63
1972 R 2R— 0D 4R— 5D 13R— 19D 43R— 56D 63
1973 R 2R— 0D 5R— 3D 13R— 19D 49R— 50D 70
a
D— Democrat.
bR— Republican.
controlled local governments and sent their representatives to the
25
state legislature. Tennessee was one of the states of the 1928 
"Hoovercratic” South. Dry Protestant Democrats augmented the normal 
Republican vote against Smith. Urban areas like Nashville went 
Republican and even Chattanooga and Memphis were more Republican than 
surrounding rural areas.^
Table 6 depicts rather graphically the slow growth of 
Republican voting in Tennessee from 1892 to 1928, and the effect of 
the depression on Republican fortunes. From 1892 to 1932 West 
Tennessee gained only slightly, while middle Tennessee was the
TABLE 6
SLOW GROWTH OF REPUBLICAN VOTING IN 
TENNESSEE FROM 1892 TO 1928
Region 1892
(%)
1928
(%)
Gain
(%)
1932
(%)
Loss
(%)
East Tennessee 57.8 63.3 5.5 51.5 -11.8
Middle Tennessee 30.8 38.3 7.5 22.8 -15.5
West Tennessee 32.5 34.1 1.6 15.6 -18.5
biggest gainer, edging out Republican East Tennessee. But in 1932
the West suffered the largest loss with the East still retaining a
\ 2 y
slim majority for Hoover.
Despite a large reserve of Republican strength in the East, 
little success was met in statewide races. In 1952, Heard explained 
this lack of success:
The pusilanimous campaigns of Republican candidates reveals 
the reluctance of the party hierarchy to have its hegemony of 
party affairs upset. Especially in Tennessee, Republican 
candidates recite the shoddy treatment they have received at the 
hands of party officials. They speak as though they had two 
fights, one within their own party and one against the Democrats. 
Candidacy for state office, asserts one venerable Tennessee 
Republican, is used as a sidetrack by the professionals to take 
care of overambitious u p s t a r t s . ^
As the figures of the opening table show, Tennessee 
Republicanism was in pretty much of a static state, at least from 1947 
to 1962. Throughout that entire period the First and Second 
Congressional Districts of East Tennessee remained solidly Republican,
52
as did four to six seats of the State Senate and seventeen to twenty- 
one seats of the Lower House of the legislature. True, there were 
slight variations--the Republicans picked up -one State Senate seat 
in each of Eisenhower's two races and suffered a significant, but 
temporary, loss of legislative strength in the nationally disastrous 
year of 1958, but as a whole, the situation remained remarkably 
static.
In the Presidential races, Truman managed a plurality victory 
in 1948, defeating Dewey 49.4 percent to 37 percent, and managing a 
68,000-vote margin. Both of Eisenhower's victories were extremely 
tight, finishing with a bare 3,000-vote margin in 1952, and winning
with a mere 50.1 percent. In 1956, due to the presence of an
independent candidate, Eisenhower managed only a 49.2 percent plural­
ity and a margin of under 6,000 votes.
Surprisingly, it was neither of the two Eisenhower elections
that moved Tennessee clearly out of the Democratic orbit. That task
remained for Richard Nixon to complete. Even the presence of 
Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus on a third-party line did not detract 
from Nixon's showing. Nixon won a higher percentage, 53 percent, than 
Eisenhower had managed in-either 1952 or 1956. While Kennedy drew 
only 25,000 more votes than Stevenson had in 1956, the Republican 
total increased by 94,000 votes. Republican strength in the legis­
lature, which had reached a low point following the 1958 election, 
increased by one in the upper house, and two in the lower.
In 1962, after two years of the return of the Democrats to 
power, the Republican surge continued forward. Two more seats in the
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lower house of the legislature fell to the Republicans, boosting their 
levels equal to the high point following Eisenhower’s 1956 victory.
For the first time during the period of this study, a Congressional 
seat switched hands when William Brock won a close race in the 
Third District.
The year 1964 has been generally conceded not to have been a 
Republican year anywhere outside of the Deep South. While failing 
to carry Tennessee, the first time a Republican candidate had failed 
to do so since 1948, Goldwater's total vote was higher than either 
of Eisenhower's, although it was down considerably from Nixon's 1960 
figure. Nevertheless, the loss of the presidential race probably 
postponed the gain of at least one, if not both, of the Senate seats 
which were contested in 1964. However, if it were not a Republican 
year in the federal elections, such was not the case in the state 
contests. Two new state senators were elected and three new house 
members.
The Republican revolution, begun in 1960, and somewhat 
sidetracked in 1964, pushed forward dramatically in 1966. Following 
a bitter primary fight between incumbent Senator Ross Bass, and 
Governor Frank Clement, through which Clement secured the Democratic 
senatorial nomination, Republican Howard Baker, a staunch conservative 
and a racial moderate, emerged the victor in the general election by 
nearly a 100,000-vote margin. For the second time in the decade a 
House seat changed hands as the Ninth District (Memphis) elected 
Republican Dan Kuykendall. There were seventeen new Republicans who 
won election to the lower house in the legislature, nearly doubling
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the number present.
The 1968 election continued to show the newly discovered 
unpopularity of the Democrats. Nixon won the state with a slight 
plurality (even though his vote total was less than Goldwater's—  
making 1968 the second election in a row in which the Republican vote 
had fallen) over, not Democrat Hubert Humphrey, who finished third, 
but American Independent Party candidate George Wallace. In addition 
to the presidential victory, Republicans elected five new state 
senators and eight new members to the state house. They now attained 
an even split in the lower house of the state legislature and about 
40 percent membership in the upper house.
Table 7 helps explain the changing source of Republican 
strength in Tennessee. While West Tennessee had suffered the heaviest 
losses of Republican support between 1928 and 1932, it also rebounded 
better than either of the.other two regions. As Havard puts it:
The change in the Western Division may be one of the most 
pronounced changes in the South. What is perhaps more problem­
atic for West Tennessee and the state's political leaders, is 
whether their remarkable change in the area is becoming well 
enough institutionalized to afford the Republicans a new and 
reasonably secure party b a s e . ^ 9
The 1970 elections offered mixed results in Tennessee as in 
the nation as a whole. For the first time in twelve years strength 
was lost in the legislature. The precarious balance was lost in the 
lower house, as the Republicans lost six seats leaving them at a 
forty-three to fifty-six disadvantage. However, both statewide 
races--the Governorship and the Senate seats previously held by 
Albert Gore--fell to the Republicans. Dr. Winfield Dunn of Memphis
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TABLE 7
PRESIDENTIAL REPUBLICAN VOTE PERCENTAGES 
IN TENNESSEE BY REGION
Comparison
Region 1928 1932 1968
1968 to 
1928
1968 to 
1932
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
East Tennessee 63.3 51.5 59.1 - 4.2 7.6
Middle Tennessee 38.3 22.8 36.5 - 1.8 13.7
West Tennessee 34.1 15.6 46.8 12.7 31.2
became the new Governor, and William Brock the new Senator, thus 
giving the Republicans their first, and as yet, only two-man 
Senate delegation from the South,
This brings 1972 as the first year that Tennessee had a 
presidential primary. Under the ground rules delegates and alternates 
to the national conventions were supposed to be bound by the outcome 
of the primaries--at least on the first ballot. This was the 
Tennessee state law. Under convention rules, however, the delegations 
to the convention of the Democratic Party had to reflect the popula­
tion as a whole, in several key categories: women, blacks, and
youth being the most important.
Alabama Governor George Wallace swept the Democratic primary with 
approximately 70 percent of the vote, thus entitling him to the
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entire Tennessee convention vote on the first ballot. However, 
followers of South Dakota Senator George McGovern, who were much 
more adept at stacking conventions in Tennessee than in producing 
primary votes, and who were much more concerned about playing by the 
convention rules of the Democratic National Convention than in obeying 
the state laws of Tennessee, were not people to be deterred by minor 
technicalities. Several of them decided that Tennessee's laws were 
not applicable to them, at least not when they were in Florida. 
Therefore, they "did their own thing" and voted for the candidate of 
their choice, George McGovern. In the days before television, they 
might have been able to get away with it without the voters back home 
finding out. However, they chose to disregard Tennessee's laws over 
nationwide television.
While it would not be fair to say this was the sole reason 
for the result, this activity certainly did not do Senator McGovern 
any good. The result was a complete disaster: Richard M. Nixon
812,484; George McGovern 355,841 (see Table 8). Expressed in 
percentages, that comes to: Nixon 69.5 percent; McGovern 30.4
percent. Equally important, Senator Baker won reelection, and 
Republicans solidified control over the congressional delegation. 
Tennessee lost one seat as a result of the 1970 census. The four 
previously elected Republicans all returned and a fifth Republican, 
Robin Beard, was elected for the first time, thus giving the 
Republicans an absolute majority of five out of eight of Tennessee's 
congressmen. Tennessee thus joins Virginia as the only two southern
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TABLE 8
TENNESSEE PRESIDENTIAL VOTING
Year
Repub­
licans
Demo­
crats
Inde­
pen­
dents
Repub­
licans
(%)
Demo­
crats
(%)
Inde­
pen­
dents
(%)
1948 202,914 270,402 73,815 37.0 49.4 13.5
1952 446,147 443,710 • • • 50.1 49.8 0.0
1956 462,288 456,507 19,820 49.2 48.6 2.1
1960 556,577 481,453 11,304 53.0 45.8 1.1
1964 508,965 635,047 • • • 44.4 55.5 0.0
1968 472,592 351,233 424,792 37.8 28.1 34.0
1972 812,484 355,841 • ' • • 69.5 30.4 0.0
states withi a Republican majority in Congress.
In 1949 Key reported that "Florida has a large migrant
Republican population which has not been well activated by the
Republican organization. . . ." With sufficient initiative, Florida
Republicans could parlay the presidential "pulling power" into a
30
strong state party. However, Table 9 amply demonstrates there 
was not one Republican U.S. Senator, Congressman, state senator, 
member of the state house, or governor in Florida before 1952, and 
the Republicans in Florida were far from a dynamic organization.
One of the problems, as Key noted, was that the Republican 
following was spread too thin over the state. In Florida, Dewey
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TABLE 9
PARTISAN BREAKDOWN 1947 TO 1973 
FOR FLORIDA
Year
Gov­
er­
nor Senate House
State
Senate
State
House
Total
Repub­
licans
1947 D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 38D 1r — 94D 1
1948 D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 38D 1R— 94D 1
1949 D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 38D 1R— 94D 1
1950 D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 38D OR— 95D 0
1951 D * OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 38D OR— 95D 0
1952 D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 38D 3R— 9 2D 3
1953 D OR— 2D OR—  8D 1R— 37D 5R— 90D 6
1954 D OR— 2D OR— 8D 1R— 37D 5R— 90D 6
1955 D OR— 2D 1R— 7D 1R—  37D 5R— 90D 7
1956 D OR— 2D 1R—  7D 1R—  37D 6R— 89D 8
1957 D OR— 2D 1R— 7D 1R— 37D 6R— 89D 8
1958 D OR— 2D 1R— 7D 1R— 37D 6R— 89D 8
1959 D OR— 2D 1R— 7D 1R— 37D 3R— 9 2D 5
1960 D OR— 2D 1R— 7D 1R— 37D 3R— 9 2D 5
1961 D OR— 2D 1R— 7D 1R— 37D 7R— 88D 9
1962 D OR— 2D 1R— 7D 1R— 37D 7R— 88D 9
1963 D OR— 2D 2R— 10D 1R—  37D 5R— 90D 8
1964 D OR— 2D 2R— 10D 2R— 43D 16R— 109D 20
1965 D OR— 2D 2R— 10D 2R— 4 ID H R — 101D 15
59
TABLE 9— Continued
Year
Gov­
er­
nor Senate House
State
Senate
House of 
Dele­
gates
Total
Repub­
licans
1966 D OR— 2D 2R— 10D 2R— 4 ID 11R— 101D 15
1967 R OR— 2D 3R— 9D H R — 37D 37R— 8ID 51
1968 R OR— 2D 3R— 9D 2OR— 28D 4OR— 78D 64
1969 R 1R— -ID 3R— 9D 16R— 32D 42R— 77D 63
1970 R 1R—  ID 3R— 9D 16R— 32D 42R— 77D 63
1971 D 1R— ID 3R— 9D 15R— 33D 38R— 8ID 57
1972 D 1R— ID 3R— 9D 15R—  3 3D 38R— 8ID 57
1973 D 1R— ID 4R— 11D 14R— 35D 43R— 77D 68
D— Democrat.
b
R— Republican.
managed 29.7 percent of the vote against Roosevelt in 1944. At the 
same time he took 29.8 percent in Arkansas. But in comparing the 
difference, Dewey did not get a majority in Florida, not even in 
one county, and in only twelve of sixty-seven counties drew as much 
as 35 percent. In Arkansas four counties produced Republican 
majorities, and eighteen of the remaining seventy-one gave Dewey 
35 percent plus. Arkansas had a small concentration of Republican
strength which could guarantee a base of support which Florida, at the
•, i j  31 time, lacked.
In 1950 the modern Florida Republican Party got its beginning,
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when a young Harvard Law School graduate by the name of William Cramer
seized control of the Saint Petersburg Republican organization. Under
his direction Republican candidates took control of a majority of
local offices and the seats in the legislature. In 1954 Cramer became
the district's congressman. Not long thereafter, the Republicans
had nearly complete control of Broward, Orange, and Sarasota counties 
32
as well.
At the beginning of the 1952 campaign, the Republican National
Executive Committee announced that it would " . . .  make the most
determined drive in [ its history ] . . .  to crack the solid
South." They announced their readiness to fight on for twenty years,
33if necessary, in order to attain their objective. In Florida, at 
least, the effort paid off. Eisenhower's vote nearly tripled Dewey's 
1948 showing, as he beat Stevenson 544,036 to 444,950. Eisenhower 
thus drew 55 percent--more than twenty percentage points more 
than Dewey. Nevertheless, few gains came at the local level. The 
victory was merely a personal triumph.
Florida Republicanism, after its first victories in the early 
1950s, managed pretty much of a holding action for the next decade 
with only slight increases in the lower house of the legislature 
until 1958. The 1950 Democratic senatorial primary between Claude 
Pepper and George Smathers witnessed a shift in the balance of power 
in the state's Democratic Party. Pepper had also been well-known as 
one of the South's most liberal congressmen, but by 1950, liberalism 
was going out of fashion in Florida as Smather's victory over the 
incumbent proved. Thus, following the (Republican) Warren Supreme
Court decision in the Brown case in 1954, the 1957 Little Rock 
incident, the passage of the Republican 1957 Civil Rights Act, in 
addition to the nationwide effects on the Republican Party of the 
recession in 1958, it was little wonder that Republican fortunes 
were running so low.
It was only in the Presidential contests that Florida showed 
continual Republican growth. Eisenhower's 1956 vote was nearly 
100,000 votes ahead of his tremendous 1952 showing. His 57.2 percent 
showing was comparable with his national percentage. In 1960 
Richard Nixon became the first Republican to carry Florida and lose 
the nation. Despite a tremendous increase in Democratic turnout for 
Kennedy--his total exceeded Stevenson's 1956 figure by nearly 270,000 
votes--Kennedy still fell more than 46,000 votes short of victory.
The Republicans added a second seat in the Florida congres­
sional delegation in 1962, and shortly thereafter began to grow in 
legislative support. Much of this increase was due to an increase 
in the number of candidates run which, in turn, was due to an increase 
in the size of the legislature itself. In 1963 the number of 
Republican candidates elected increased by over 100 percent and went 
up again in 1967. In 1964 the number of Republicans in the Florida
House rose to eleven. It rose again to thirty-seven in 1966, and
34
to forty in 1967.
Florida swung temporarily out of the GOP column in 1964 as 
Goldwater narrowly lost Florida by a mere 43,000 votes. Lyndon 
Johnson's 51.1 percent showing was a full ten percentage points 
behind his nationwide figures.
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The year 1966 was a big year for Florida Republicans. A
third Congressman, J. Herbert Burke, was elected to the House of
Representatives, nine new state senators and twenty-six new members
were elected to the state house. Also, 1966 saw Claude Kirk win the
Republican nomination for Governor and the subsequent election, thus
becoming Florida's first Republican governor of this century. But
Kirk did not limit himself to statewide goals. He wanted to become
the Republican Vice-Presidential Candidate in 1968. He began to
spend up to two-thirds of his time outside the state trying to gain
support for that objective. Further, Kirk, in his attempt to gain
control of the Florida Republican party, alienated the Cramer faction.
Much of the funds he raised, supposedly for the Republican Party,
35
went to his own vice-presidential campaign. «
Unhappily for the party, the Kirk years produced a wide split
in the party between the Kirk faction, supported by U.S. Senator
Edward Gurney, and the William Cramer faction. The wounds could not
be healed. Kirk's people convinced G. Harrold Carswell, a rejected
Nixon nominee for the Supreme Court, to run for the Senate seat
being vacated by retiring Spessard Holland, and, in retaliation,
Cramer put up a candidate against Kirk. The result was a complete
debacle in 1970. The Republicans lost the Senate seat, the governor's
36
chair, and a number of other offices.
Republican fortunes thus suffered a considerable downturn 
from 1968 when Nixon had taken Florida by a significant 210,000-vote 
margin over Humphrey, who barely edged out Wallace for second place, 
and Congressman Gurney had captured the Senate seat of retiring Senator
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George Smathers. Thus, things did not augur well for 1972. With 
the victories of Lawton Chiles for Senator and Rubin Askew for 
Governor, both of whom were viewed as moderate-to-liberal, the 
chances looked very good for Democratic frontrunner Muskie in 
Florida in 1972 against incumbent Richard Nixon. However, /with the 
vote splintered among a number of candidates, George Wallace took 
the March 14th Primary with 42 percent. George McGovern, the 
eventual party nominee, finished very nearly dead last with 6 percent 
of the vote, running just behind John Lindsay (7 percent), and just 
ahead of Shirley Chisholm (4 percent).
In the summer of 1972, both major parties held their 
conventions in Miami Beach, Florida. George McGovern won the 
Democratic nomination; Richard Nixon, as expected, walked away with 
renomination by the Republicans. From that point on the only 
question was what the margin of victory would be. As it turned out, 
Nixon drew a larger percentage than the combined Nixon and Wallace 
figure for 1968 in beating McGovern by more than 1,000,000 votes.
His 1,751,433 was more than three times Eisenhower's 1952 figure, 
and represented a nearly ten-fold increase over Dewey's 1948 figure, 
while McGovern's vote total did not even equal that of John Kennedy 
in 1960. In addition, a fourth Republican was elected to the House 
of Representatives.
How can this Republican trend that set in about the time of
the 1966 elections be explained? One author presents the information
37
contained in Table 10 as a partial response to this question. These 
figures show Republican registration, Democratic registration, and
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TABLE 10 
PARTY REGISTRATION IN FLORIDA
Year
Republican Democratic
Repub­
licans 
as per­
cent of 
Demo­
crats
(%)
Regis­
tration Change
Regis­
tration Change
1950 60,665 . . . 1,006,580 • « t 6.0
1952 116,794 + 56,129 1,215,085 +208,505 9.6
1956 210,797 + 94,003 1,384,447 +169,362 15.2
1960 338,390 +127,593 1,656,023 +272,576 20.4
1964 458,156 +119,766 2,009,842 +353,719 22.9
1966 465,605 + 7,449 1,964,533 - 45,309 23.7
1967 472,966 + 7,361 1,966,371 + 1,838 24.1
1968 619,062 +146,056 2,090,787 +124,416 29.6
1970 711,090 +  96,028 2,024,387 - 66,400 35.1
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the changes in each since the previous reported figure, and the 
Republican registration expressed as a percentage of the Democratic 
registration. Before 1966 the Democrats always increased their 
registration, in absolute figures, more than the Republicans did. 
Since 1966, however, the Republicans have been consistently regis­
tering a greater number of new voters in Florida in absolute numbers.
Presidential politics in Florida from 1952 to 1968 have been 
dominated by what has been termed a conservative "horseshoe." This 
area which:
. , . starts at Fort Lauderdale and Palm Beach, goes up 
the east coast to Daytona Beach, then across to Orlando, then to 
the west coast at St. Petersburg, and then down the west coast 
to Fort Myers and Naples . . . , ^ 8
could be seen as early as the now famous Democratic Senatorial
primary of 1950. In that election, Pepper carried the northern
". . . panhandle, and the extreme Southern end of the state as well
39
as Tampa and Pensacola." Smathers carried the urban horseshoe.
The horseshoe was not needed in 1972. Nixon carried every county in
the state, including normally heavily Democratic Dade. But for
future Republican candidates, who may not have a George McGovern to
run against, it will be a comfort to realize that the greatest
concentrations of Republican voters is in the rapidly growing areas
40
of the horseshoe; thus, probably assuring Republican control for
the foreseeable future.
But what of nonpresidential elections? As Lubell notes:
In many of the urban areas there is now an overall majority 
which favors moderate conservatism. But what does the term mean 
in Florida? It means, in addition to economic conservatism, 
some resistance to integration, but not to the point of support
for a Eugene "Bull" Connor, . . .  or a Wallace. But the 
conservative vote is now divided as to actual party affiliation. 
Almost all the Republican vote is conservative. In the Democrati 
party, on the other hand, the major share of the urban vote is 
liberal.
However, as Wallace's primary victory showed, there is still 
considerable conservative support among the state's Democratic voters 
particularly in rural areas. The result seems likely to assure that 
Republicans will consistently nominate conservatives, while. Democrats 
may have ideologically pitched battles in their primaries. If the 
Republicans can hold their own voters in line, and pick up enough 
Democratic defections, they can look forward to success. Table 11 
examines the distribution of party strength in the presidential 
elections.
North Carolina-similar to the two other states discussed,
Virginia and Tennessee— has always had a substantial number of local
Republicans. The party has consistently been a real political party.
The "Mountain Republicans" in the western half of the state have
long been a threat to Democratic hegemony in the hill country. Since
at least 1920, North Carolina had the strongest Republican Party in
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the South— at least until the late 1960s. North Carolina was one 
of the southern states that went for Hoover in 1928 when the normally 
substantial Republican vote was swelled by a large number of 
Democratic defections. Urban areas, such as Durham and Winston-
43Salem, went heavily Republican.
Throughout the 1940s the Democratic Party in North Carolina 
had been a little more liberal than in neighboring states. North 
Carolina enjoyed a good record in the field of race relations, but in
TABLE 11
FLORIDA PRESIDENTIAL VOTING
Year
Repub­
licans
Demo­
crats
Inde­
pen­
dents
Repub­
licans
(%)
Demo­
crats
(%)
Inde­
pen­
dents
(%)
1948 194,280 281,988 89,755 34.3 39.8 15.80
1952 544,036 444,950 • • • 55.0 44.9 0.00
1956 643,849 480,371 • • 9 57.2 42.7 0.00
1960 795,476 748,700 • • • 51.5 48.4 0.00
1964 905,941 948,540 • • • 48.8 * 51.1 0.00
1968 886,804 676,794 624,207 40.5 30.9 28.50
1972 1,751,433 690,440 • • • 71.7 28.2 0.00
the 1950s a battle for control of the party emerged between the 
liberal and conservative wings. In 1950, the North Carolina 
senatorial primary offered voters a clear choice between incumbent 
Senator Frank P. Graham, former president of the University of North 
Carolina, and a member of the President's Commission on Civil Rights; 
and Willis Smith, past president of the American Bar Association, and 
a well-known moderate conservative. Graham narrowly missed the 
necessary clear majority in the first primary. In the interim 
period, the race issue was introduced in a big way. Smith emerged the 
victor in the second primary.
In the 1952 primary battle for Governor, there was again a
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liberal-conservative contest. Herbert Olive was the candidate of
t
liberal Governor Kerr Scott. He was defeated by ailing, former
Senator William Omstead. The newly elected govenor was to serve only
44
twenty-three months in office before his death.
Upon the deaths of both Senator Smith and Senator Hoey,
Governor Omstead appointed State Senator Alton Lennon to fill one
post, and State'Supreme Court Judge Sam Ervin to fill the other.
In 1954, ex-Governor Kerr Scott defeated Lennon for renomination.
Terry Sanford, later a governor, first gained statewide prominence
45
as Scott's campaign manager in that race.
All during the period, the local Republican Party was showing 
signs of following the presidential coattails. Although Eisenhower 
never carried North Carolina (the only Outer South state that went 
for Stevenson), he did increase his vote totals by 300,000 votes 
over Dewey's 1948 figure, and in 1956 fell only 15,000 votes short 
of the mark.
Before the 1952 election North Carolina had ten Republicans in 
the lower house of the state legislature; four new members were 
pulled in on presidential coattails. In 1954, possibly due to the 
Brown decision, and possibly due to the normal mid-term lull, this 
number was again reduced to ten. Despite a stronger Eisenhower 
showing in 1956, the number rose by only three in that year's 
elections. In the elections of 1958 North Carolina participated 
in the general trend against the Republicans, reducing their represen­
tation to only four, probably from a combination of factors including 
Little Rock, the 1957 Civil Rights Act, the recession, and normal
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mid-term losses (see Table 12).
The story was pretty much the same in the state senate.
Although no new Republican senators won in 1952, one Republican lost 
in 1954, thus lending support to the idea that it was the Brown 
decision, and not normal processes balancing themselves, which had been 
the cause. Two new seats were won in 1956, but both disappeared in 
1958.
In other elections there was little variation. Republican
Charles Jonas carried the Charlotte House seat by riding Eisenhower's
"mountain coattails" in 1952, and held it throughout the decade.
An analysis of the Republican vote for the period shows two
main sources of Republican strength. One was, of course, the
traditional Republican areas. The other was the metropolitan areas.
In 1948 Dewey had taken 33 percent of the vote in the cities and
suburbs. In 1952 Eisenhower took a bare majority of 50.1 percent;
in 1956 he walked away with 55.5 percent of the city vote. Even
46
Richard Nixon held on to a 51.1 percent majority in 1960. The
urban vote actually ran ahead of the percentages in traditional
Republican areas in 1952, and only narrowly behind in 1956 and 1960.
These figures do much to debunk the idea that the Eisenhower votes
47were somehow a "fluke" or a personal tribute to "the General."
In 1960 Nixon's coattails proved even longer than Eisenhower's 
in North Carolina. Nixon pulled a larger percentage than Eisenhower 
had in 1952, and a total of 80,000 votes more than he had in 1956.
Where Eisenhower had pulled in no more than five new state legislators
with him, Nixon's coattails added eleven new members to the lower
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TABLE 12
PARTISAN BREAKDOWN 1947 TO 1973 
FOR NORTH CAROLINA
Year
Gov­
er­
nor Senate House
State
Senate
State
House
Total
Repub­
licans
1947 D OR— 2D OR—  12D 2R— 48D 13R— 107D 15
1948 D OR— 2D OR— 12D 2R— 48D 13R— 107D 15
1949 D OR— 2D OR— 12D 2R— 48D H R — 109D 13
1950 D OR— 2D OR— 12D 2R— 48D 11R— 109D 13
1951 D OR— 2D OR— 12D 2R— 48D 10R— 110D 12
1952 D OR— 2D OR— 12D 2R— 48D 10R— 110D 12
1953 D OR— 2D 1R— 11D 2R— 48D 14R— 106D 17
1954 D OR— 2D 1R— 11D 2R— 48D 14R— 106D 17
1955 D OR— 2D 1R— 11D 1R— 49D 10R— 110D 12
1956 D OR— 2D 1R—  11D 1R— 49D 10R— 110D 12
1957 D OR— 2D 1R— 11D 3R— 47D 13R— 107D 17
1958 D OR— 2D 1R— 11D 3R— 47D 13R— 107D 17
1959 D OR— 2D 1R— 11D 1R— 49D 4R— 116D 6
1960 D OR— 2D 1R—  11D 1R— 49D 4R— 116D 6
1961 D OR— 2D 1R— 11D 2R— 48D 15R— 105D 18
1962 D OR— 2D 1R—  11D 2R— 48D 15R— 105D 18
1963 D OR— 2D 2R— 9D 2R— 48D 21R— 99D 25
1964 D OR— 2D 2R— 9D 2R— 48D 21R— 99D 25
1965 D OR— 2D 2R— 9D 1R— 49D 14R--1G6D 17
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TABLE 12— Continued
Year
Gov­
er­
nor Senate House
State
Senate
House of 
Dele­
gates
Total
Repub­
licans
1966 D OR— 2D 2R— 9D 1R—  49D 14R— 106D 17
1967 D OR— 2D 3R— 8D o 7R— 43D 26R— 94D 36
1968 D OR— 2D 3R— 8D 7R— 4 3D 26R— 94D 36
1969 D OR— 2D 4R— 7D 12R— 38D 29R— 9ID 45
1970 D OR— 2D 4R— 7D 12R— 38D 29R— 91D 45
1971 D OR— 2D 4R— 7D 7R— 43D 24R— 96D 35
1972 D OR— 2D 4R— 7D 7R— 4 3D 24R— 96D 35
1973 R 1R— ID 4R— 7D 14R— 36D 35R— 85D 55
D— Democrat. 
^R— Republican.
house, and one new member to the upper house of the state legislature.
The growth of presidential and gubernatorial Republicanism
has depended on the Republican candidate's ability to hold the
traditional mountain Republican voters and add the urban and middle-
class voters. Interparty competition for the presidential and
congressional seats came as early as the late 1940s, but it was not
until 1960 that the Republicans made a serious bid for the governor- 
48ship. In two successive primaries in 1960, Terry Sanford captured 
the Democratic gubernatorial nomination. But for the young Kennedy 
follower that was only the first hurdle. The other came in November
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when he defeated his Republican opponent with 54.4 percent of the
- 49 vote.
In 1962 a peculiar thing happened. For the first time 
during this study, the Republicans actually picked up representation 
in an off-year election.- Not even in 1950 had that occurred; six 
new members were elected to the lower house of the legislature, and 
a new Republican, James Broyhill, a brother of Joel Broyhill,
Tenth District Virginia Republican Congressman, carried the North 
Carolina Tenth Congressional District.'
Except for Texas, Lyndon Johnson's home state, North Carolina 
gave the Democratic nominee more support in 1964 than any state in 
the South with 800,139 (56.1 percent) of the votes. Goldwater's 
figure declined by 31,000 votes from Nixon's 1960 level. Nor was 
that all; seven seats were lost in the lower house and one in the 
upper house in the state legislature. The Democratic gubernatorial 
candidate Dan Moore, who had refrained from active support for the 
Johnson-Humphrey ticket out of fear for the results at the polls, 
need hardly have concerned h i m s e l f . O n l y  Harry S. Truman had done 
better since 1948.
The year 1966 proved itself to be a good year in North 
Carolina just as it did throughout the Outer South--and, indeed, 
nationally--for the Republican Party. The number of Republican 
officeholders, in the levels of government being observed, more than 
doubled. Republicans took six new seats in the state senate, thus 
giving them the largest number of state senate seats they held in 
recent times. Additionally, twelve seats .were picked up in the
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state house, more than offsetting their 1964 losses, and also 
establishing a new high. A third congressman joined the Republican 
congressional delegation when James Gardner won a closely contested 
race.
In 1968, North Carolina returned to the Republican column 
for the first time since 1928. Nixon ran better than ten percentage 
points and 150,000 votes ahead of Humphrey, who finished in third 
place in North Carolina behind both Nixon and Wallace. As had his 
predecessor Dan Moore, Democratic gubernatorial candidate Robert W. 
Scott, son of former Governor Kerr Scott, ran his race disassociating 
himself as much as possible from the national Democratic ticket. 
Unlike 1964, when this had been an unnecessary precaution, it proved 
the margin of difference as Scott beat back the tough challenge of
Congressman Gardner in the general election with a small 52.7
• • -  51 percent majority.
Two new Republican faces appeared in Congress. Wilmer 
"Vinegar Bend" Mizell, well-known as a professional baseball pitcher, 
carried the Fifth District which includes the city of Winston-Salem, 
and Earl Ruth, the Mayor of Salisbury, captured the newly created 
Eighth District which includes some of the state’s most heavily 
Republican counties. At the state legislative level, three new
9
members were elected to the lower house, and five new members were 
elected to the state senate by the Republicans. In the 1970 election, 
however, five Republican members in each house failed to return.
Havard reported:
Of the 31 house and senate seats which. Republicans held in
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the 1971 General Assembly, 16 were in the Piedmont Crescent 
[ which includes the counties of Gaston, Mecklenburg, Cabarrus, 
Rown, Davie, Davidson, Forsyth, Guilford, Alamance, Orange,
Durham, and Wake ], nine others in counties adjoining the 
crescent, and only six in the traditionally Republican counties.
. . . In the 1970 election Republicans elected 22.4% of 
county commissioners, and among the 22 county governments dom­
inated by the Republicans, 6 were in the Piedmont Crescent, 
including the metropolitan counties of Mecklenburg, Forsyth, 
and Guilford.52
Altogether in 1971 Republicans held 266 elected offices including
M. . . 2 4  sheriffs, 90 county commissioners, 64 school board members,
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and 31 state legislators."
In 1968 the Republicans had made a breakthrough in North 
Carolina. In 1972 everything fell together perfectly for the 
GOP. Nixon carried the state with 70.6 percent of the vote and a* 
more than 600,000-vote margin. At the same time state Republican 
Party Chairman James E. Holshouser, Jr. became the new governor.
The Senate race, however, provided the real excitement. The Democratic 
incumbent, B. Everett Jordan, who was seventy-four in 1972, and who 
had run a surprisingly weak race in 1966, was being challenged by 
Fourth District Congressman Nick Galifiankis of Durham. Galifiankis 
had been becoming more and more liberal since his first election in 
1966, and had barely survived two "cliff-hangers" in his reelection 
bids of 1968 and 1970. The loss of Chapel Hill, a liberal bastion 
in his district, following the redistricting, made his position in 
the house highly tenuous, and there was much doubt he could win again. 
Therefore, he decided to gamble everything on a primary race against 
Jordan. However, Jordan himself had been moving rapidly left, perhaps 
in an attempt to cuf the rug out from under Galifiankis' feet.
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Clearly Jordan's advanced age proved a handicap, perhaps the decisive
factor. At any rate, Galifiankis had his work cut out for him
staying to the left of Jordan. His success at doing so in beating
Jordan probably accounted for his undoing.
The Republican nominee was Jesse Helms, a Raleigh newscaster.
There was no doubt where he stood on the issues. Many conservatives
predicted that if he won he would be the most conservative man in
either house of Congress, and that included Barry Goldwater, Strom
Thurmond, and John Tower. The question was the extent to which his
Republican label would prove a handicap in North Carolina. Another
serious question was how much Administration support he could get
when he went around criticizing Nixon for being too liberal. The
answers came in November. Helms became the first Republican Senator
from North Carolina in modern times.
With everything else going Republican, it would be curious
if the legislature did not also register gains for the GOP. It did.
Republicans doubled the number of state senate seats they held and
added almost 50 percent to their house delegation.
Because of the large Democratic margins in statewide races,
until recently, many people who are "ideological Republicans" have
failed to register under that party label so that they could have a
say in Democratic primaries which have usually chosen the ultimate
victor. With elections becoming closer, and with a new presidential
primary, it is possible that many of these people will switch their 
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registrations. (See Table 13.) ,
Texas is the most western state in the South. As such, it
TABLE 13
NORTH CAROLINA PRESIDENTIAL VOTING
Year
Repub­
licans
Demo­
crats
Inde­
pen­
dents
Repub­
licans
(%)
Demo­
crats
(%)
Inde­
pen­
dents
(%)
1948 258,572 459,070 69,652 32.8 58.3 8.8
1952 558,107 652,903 • • • 46.0 53.9 0.0
1956 575,062 590,530 • t • 49.3 50.6 0.0
1960 655,420 713,136 • • • 47.8 52.1 0.0
1964 624,844 800,139 • • • 43.8 56.1 0.0
1968 627,192 464,113 496,188 39.5 29.2 31.2
19/2 1,051,707 437,311a • • • 70.6 29.3 0.0
3.
It is interesting to note that Senator McGovern's vote total 
is the lowest Democratic figure on the Table, even being surpassed by 
Truman's 1948 figure. Indeed, one would have to go back to 1928 to 
get a lower figure for a Democratic candidate.
has always had far fewer blacks than the other southern states. 
However, it has a considerable number of Mexican. Americans--a reminder 
of the days when Texas was a part of Mexico. Together, these two 
groups total about 27 percent of the population and make up the 
backbone of support for the national Democratic Party. Texas, like 
the other states in the Outer South, bolted the Democratic Party in 
1928 to cast its electoral votes for Hoover. East Texas, where most 
of the state's Negroes live, supported Smith, while West Texas went
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for Hoover. Of the "white counties" staying Democratic, most were
as a result of large Mexican votes. As in more recent years, the
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cities trended more heavily Republican than the countryside.
In 1948 Truman swept Texas in a big way, pulling a 65.8
percent majority--his largest margin in the South--and winning by
more than 400,000 votes. In 1952, however, the Texas Republican
Party began to stir and try to organize for victory. The growth of
Texas immigrant Republican population, plus the victory of the
supporters of Governor Shivers, the so-called "Shivercrats," over the
"loyalists" in the state Democratic Party battle, resulted in a
56
Republican "miracle." Eisenhower's vote was more than three
times Dewey's 1948 figure, having increased by more than 800,000
votes. Despite Stevenson's 200,000 plus increase over Truman's
1948 figure, he ran nearly twenty percentage points behind Truman.
Havard concludes:
Thus, conservatives in Texas . . . had really two organiza-
tions--the Republicans being the more conservative of the two, 
and the majority faction among the Democrats consisting of a 
coalition of conservatives and moderates. . . .
The Republicans by themselves would not have been sufficient. The
active support of Governor Shivers, spurred on by Eisenhower's support
for state control of offshore oil fields, was required to turn the
trick.
Despite the tremendous increase in presidential Republicanism 
in 1952, no gains at all were registered in legislative campaigns. 
Indeed, the one seat Republicans had held in the state House of 
Representatives was lost in 1952. The victory had been strictly a
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personal one for Eisenhower in Texas. Strangely enough, the only 
Republican gain of the decade came in the 1954 campaign when, despite 
heavy odds, one Republican managed to enter the House of 
Representatives. Even a second top-heavy Eisenhower majority in 
1956 produced no results. (See Table 14.)
In 1960 the story was somewhat different. The Democratic 
Vice-Presidential Candidate was Texas Senator Lyndon Johnson. 
Moreover, the power and prestige of Shivers had waned. Nevertheless, 
the race was very, very close. Both parties polled over 1,100,000 
votes, with the Kennedy-Johnson ticket narrow winners with 50.6 
percent of the vote.
In the early 1960s, breakthroughs began to appear. When 
running for Vice-President, Johnson, who did not believe in taking 
chances, succeeded in having the law changed in Texas to allow him 
to run for reelection to the Senate at the same time. His opponent, 
conservative-Republican college professor John Tower, ran a surpris­
ingly strong race, but lost. Having won both posts, Johnson had to 
resign from one. He was replaced in the senate seat by a conser­
vative Democrat. John Tower was again the Republican nominee in
1961. He benefitted from the "double exposure," and a large 
defection of liberal Democrats, in being elected the first Republican 
Senator from the South in modern times.
Starting in 1962, in Texas, there was a sharp upturn in the 
number of Republican candidates for state legislature, approaching 
50 percent. The Republican state organization had hired one paid 
staffer to concentrate on trying to find legislative candidates in
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TABLE 14
PARTISAN BREAKDOWN 1947 TO 1973 
FOR TEXAS
Year
Gov­
er­
nor Senate House
State
Senate
State
House
Total
Repub­
licans
1947 D OR— 2D OR— 21D OR— 31D OR— 150D 0
1948 D OR— 2D OR— 2 ID OR— 3 ID OR— 150D 0
1949 D OR— 2D OR— 2 ID OR— 3 ID OR— 150D 0
1950 D OR— 2D OR— 21D OR— 3 ID OR— 150D 0
1951 D OR— 2D OR— 2 ID OR— 31D 1R— 149D 1
1952 D OR— 2D OR— 2 ID OR— 31D 1R— 149D 1
1953 D OR— 2D OR— 2 2D OR— 31D OR—  150D 0
1954 D OR— 2D OR— 2 2D OR— 3 ID OR— 150D' 0
1955 D OR— 2D 1R—  2 ID OR— 3 ID OR— 150D 1
1956 D OR— 2D 1R--21D OR— 3 ID OR— 150D 1
1957 D OR— 2D 1R— 21D OR— 3 ID OR— 150D 1
1958 D OR— 2D 1R--21D OR— 3 ID OR— 150D 1
1959 D OR— 2D 1R— 21D OR— 3 ID
#
OR— 150D 1
1960 D OR— 2D 1R— 21D OR— 31D OR— 150D 1
1961 D OR— 2D 1R— 21D OR— 3 ID OR— 150D 1
1962 D 1R— ID 1R— 20D OR— 3 ID OR— 150D 2
1963 D 1R— ID 2R— 2 ID OR— 31D 7R— 143D 10
1964 D 1R— ID 2R— 2 ID OR— 31D 7R— 143D 12
1965 D 1R— ID OR— 2 3D OR— 31D 1R— 149D 2
TABLE 14— Continued
Year
Gov­
er­
nor Senate . House
State
Senate
House of 
Dele­
gates
Total
Repub­
licans
1966 D 1R— ID OR— 2 3D OR— 3 ID 1R— 149D 2
1967 D 1R— ID 2R— 2 ID 1R—  30D 3R— 147D 7
1968 D 1R— ID 2R— 2 ID 1R— 30D 3R— 147D 7
1969 D 1R— ID 3R— 20D 2R--29D 8R— 142D 13
1970 ,D . 1R— ID 3R— 20D 2R— 29D 8R— 142D 14
1971 D
nH11P3H 3R— 20D 2R— 29D 10R— 140D 16
1972 D 1R— ID 3R— 20D 2R— 29D 10R— 140D 16
1973 D 1R— 1D 4R— 20D 4R— 27D 17R— 133D. 26
£
D— Democrat.
R— Republican.
1962. As a result, seven members were elected to the lower house.
For the first trt.me since 1954 a new Republican was elected to the 
national House of Representatives. Texas Republicans looked like they 
were on the move.
On November 22, 1963 a shot rang out in Dallas, Texas, which 
was to make Lyndon Baines Johnson the President of the United 
States. The victims were John F. Kennedy and the Republican Party 
of Texas. In the 1964 elections the incumbent, Lyndon Johnson of 
Texas, swept his home state winning by more than 700,000 votes.
Both Republican Congressmen and all but one of the Republican
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delegation to the Texas House of Representatives were defeated.
In 1966 the Texas Republican Party was resurrected. John
Tower was running for reelection. Because of the need for funds for
59
that race the number of legislative candidates was cut in half.
Tower increased his victory margin from a mere 51 percent to a healthy 
56 percent; two new Republican Congressmen were elected--George 
Bush from Houston, and Bob Price from the Panhandle. Two seats in 
the lower house, and, for the first time, one in the upper house, 
of the state legislature fell to the Republicans.
With this new life breathed into the Texas Republican Party, 
hopes were high for 1968. In that year, Texas provided a very close 
race. Despite running 22 percent behind Johnson's 1964 vote 
percentages, and despite the strong Republican upswing, Humphrey 
managed to hold onto Texas, the only state he was to carry in the 
once solidly Democratic South. Unlike previous Republican presiden­
tial candidates, Nixon, even in losing, did prove to have some 
coattails. There were five new Republicans elected to the lower 
house, and one new Republican to the upper house in the state 
legislature. James Collins was elected as a new Republican 
Congressman from Dallas.
In 1970 Texas Republicans were gunning for Democratic Senator 
Ralph Yarborough, one of the South's most liberal Senators. 
Unfortunately for the Republican candidate, Houston Congressman 
George Bush, so were the conservative Democrats. Yarborough failed 
to survive the primary, losing to Lloyd Bentsen, a moderately 
conservative former congressman. Bush, very popular in his home area
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of Houston where no Democrat had been willing to run against him in 
1968, had planned to attack Yarborough's anti-war record and present 
him as a liberal before the conservative Texas voters. Now he found 
himself faced not with liberal Yarborough, but with conservative 
Lloyd Bentsen, who declared that the only way Bush could get
. . to the right of me is by going clear off the edge of the 
earth." Bentsen, who enjoyed the support of both Johnson and John 
Connally, kept hammering away at his theme "Texas needs a Democrat 
in the Senate." Bush was left without an issue except that of 
party, and for a Republican in Texas that would not work. His 
loss came as little of a surprise. In other races, William Archer 
replaced Bush as Republican Congressman from Houston, and two new 
Republicans gained seats in the Texas House of Representatives.
By 1972 Eisenhower's two victories had been relegated to the 
position of "ancient history" in light of three straight Democratic 
triumphs in Texas. Still, Richard Nixon remained very determined to 
take Texas and its twenty-six electoral votes--the biggest single 
block in the South. To achieve this objective he entered into an 
"unholy alliance" with former Texas Governor John Connally.
With the aid of the Johnson-Connally moderates, who had 
supported Humphrey in 1968, Nixon easily carried the Lone Star 
State. His victory margin was over 1,000,000 votes as he became the 
first presidential candidate to go over the 2,000,000 mark in 
Texas. His 66.2 percent exceeded both Truman's 1948 figure and 
Johnson's 1964 percentage. McGovern's 1,091,970 was the lowest 
Democratic figure since 1956, and his 33.7 percent was over seven
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percentage points behind Humphrey's 1968 showing. (See Table 15.)
Alan Steelman, a Republican from Dallas, won the newly created
Fifth District seat. In the Thirteenth District, where Democrat
6
Graham Purcell and Republican Bob Price were thrown together by 
redistricting, Price emerged the victor. In elections to the legis­
lature, seven new Republicans were elected to the house and two more 
to the state senate.
The beginning of a new political order in the South was 
hinted at as early as 1936. Because of the magnitude of Roosevelt's 
victory, this was hidden. It was not until 1948 that things once 
again began to stir in the Outer South, after a twenty-year lull.
(See Tables 16 and 17.) Even then the Dixiecrats were still 
essentially loyal Democrats who just considerd Harry Truman's 
civil rights planks more than they could stand. It was not until 
the complete death .of the Dixiecrats as a viable third party that 
change begins again. What the Dixiecrats did was to get people to 
think of voting for someone other than a Democrat in the South.
Thus, in the Outer South about 10 percent of the voters were shaken 
loose from their old ties to the Democratic Party. But' it was not 
until 1950 that they began to complete the transition to "presidential 
Republicanism." One would, thus, probably have to trace the origins 
of the new era to that year. Two liberal Democratic incumbents, 
Senators Frank Graham of North Carolina and Claude Pepper of Florida, 
were denied renomination at that time in their party primaries.
Lubell describes the cause of this as "trial runs of a Republican-
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Southern political alliance."
84
TABLE 15 
TEXAS PRESIDENTIAL VOTING
Year
Repub”
licans
Demo­
crats
Inde­
pen­
dents
Repub­
licans
(%)
Demo­
crats
(%)
Inde­
pen­
dents
(%)
1948 282,240 750,700 106,909 24.7 65.8 9.4
1952 1,102,878 969,228 • • • 53.2 46.7 0.0
1956 1,080,619 859,958 14,591 55.6 43.9 0.4
1960 1,121,699 1,167,932 18,169 48.6 50.6 0.7
1964 958,566 1,663,185 5,060 36.2 63.3 0.4
1968 1,227,844 1,266,804 584,269 39.8 41.1 19.0
1972 2,147,970 1,091,970 . . . 66.2 33.7 0.0
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TABLE 16
PARTISAN BREAKDOWN 1947 TO 1973 
FOR OUTER SOUTH
Year
Gov­
er­
nor Senate House
State
Senate
State
House
Total
Repub­
licans
1947 OR— 5D OR— 10D 2R— 56D 9R— 183D 38R— 525D 49
1948 OR— 5D OR— 10D 2R— 56D 9R— 183D 38R— 525D 49
1949 OR— 5D OR— 10D 2R— 56D 9R— 183D 37R— 526D 48
1950 OR— 5D OR— 10D 2R— 56D 8R— 184D 38R— 526D 48
1951 OR— 5D OR— 10D 2R— 56D 8R— 184D 37R— 527D 47
1952 OR— 5D OR— 10D 2R— 56D 8R— 184D 40R— 524D 50
1953 OR— 5D OR— 10D 6R— 55D* 11R— 181D 43R— 52ID 60
1954 OR— 5D OR— 10D 6R— 55D llr— 181D 43R— 5 2 ID 60
1955 OR— 5D OR— 10D 7R— 54D 10R— 182D 40R— 524D 57
1956 OR— 5D OR— 10D 7R— 54D 10R— 182D 41R— 523D 58
1957 OR— 5D OR— 10D 7R— 54D 13R— 179D 46R— 517D 66
1958 OR— 5D OR— 10D 7R— 54D 13R— 179D 46R— 517D 66
1959 OR— 5D OR— 10D 7R— 54D 10R— 182D 30R— 532D 47
1960 OR— 5D OR— 10D 7R— 54D 9R— 183D 28R— 534D 44
1961 OR— 5D OR— 10D 7R— 54D 11R— 181D 45R— 517D 63
1962 OR— 5D OR— 9D 7R— 54D 11R— 188D 46R— 518D 65
1963 OR— 5D 1R— 9D 11R— 50D H R — 188D 57R— 505D 80
1964 OR— 5D 1R--9D 11R— 50D 13R— 186D 68R— 494D 93
1965 OR— 5D 1R— 9D 9R— 5 2D 14R— 186D 69R— 483D 93
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TABLE 16— Continued
Year
Gov­
er­
nor Senate House
State
Senate
State
House
Total
Repub­
licans
1966 OR—  5D 1R— 9D 9R--52D 1AR— 185D 60R— A92D 8A
1967 1R— AD 2R— 8D 16R— A5D 32R— 16ID 88R— A6AD 139
1968 1R— AD 2R— 8D 16R— A5D A2R— 15ID 123R— A29D 18A
1969 1R— AD 3R— 7D 18R— A3D A9R— 1AAD 133R— A19D 20A
1970 2R— 3D 3R— 6D 19R--A2D A8R— 1A5D 133R— A19D 205
1971 2R— 3D AR— 5D 20R— AID AAR— 1A9D 139R— A13D 209
1972 2R— 3D AR— 5D 20R— AID AAR— 1A9D 139R— A13D 209
1973 3R— 2D 6R— 3D 23R— 38D AAR— 1A9D 139R— A13D 215
aD— Democrat.
— Republican.
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TABLE 17 
OUTER SOUTH PRESIDENTIAL VOTING
Year
Repub­
licans
Demo­
crats
Inde­
pen­
dents
Repub­
licans
(%)
Demo­
crats
(%)
Inde­
pen­
dents
(%)
1948 1,110,076 1,962,946 383,524 32.1 56.7 11.1
1952 3,000,205 2,779,368 • ♦ • 51.9 48.0 0.0
1956 3,148,277 2,210,738 77,375 57.9 40.6 1.4
1960 3,533,693 3,473,543 29,473 50.2 49.6 0.2
1964 3,469,650 4,884,016 5,060 41.5 58.4 0.0
1968 3,804,751 3,201,331 2,449,828 40.2 33.8 25.9
1972 6,746,236 3,015,108 * • • 69.1 30.8 0.0
As proof of his contention that there was more than a
coincidence between anti Graham and anti Pepper forces and 
Republican-Dixiecrat strength, Lubell cites the following 
figures. In Wilmington, North Carolina, the two precincts Dewey 
won in 1948, and the eleven precincts where Dewey and the Dixiecrats 
had combined totals exceeding Truman's, were all lost by Graham.
In Guilford County Graham lost seventeen precincts. Of these, 
thirteen had gone for Dewey and two others had produced larger 
totals for Dewey and the Dixiecrats together than for Truman
alone. Dewey won all ten Florida counties--Pepper lost— also he won
the twelve Dewey precincts in Jacksonville, all fourteen Dewey
precincts in. Tampa, and twenty of twenty-two precincts in Miami.
Pepper also lost all three Dixiecrat counties and thirty-five of the
thirty-eight precincts in Miami where the combined Dewey-Dixiecrat
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vote topped Truman's.
Lubell concludes:
Not race, but economics explains Charlotte's anti Graham vote, 
. . . Graham's worst showing in the city, hardly 257o, came from 
Myers Park, unquestionably the most culturally progressive part 
of Charlotte. . . .62
T indal1 remarks:
The election of 1952 marked a turning point in Republican 
fortunes; the beginnings of a Southern Republicanism that 
would contest elections, first at the presidential level, then 
at state and local levels, evolving gradually into a credible 
opposition party everywhere, except the inner core of the Deep 
South. The candidacy of the "nonpolitical11 Eisenhower in 
1952 made it respectable, even modish to vote Republican in 
the South.63
He* continues:
Traditionally, the Republican vote peaked at high altitudes, 
and in the mountain strongholds Eisenhower overwhelmed Stevenson.
. . . But an avalanche of Republican votes swept down the 
mountainsides into the foothill cities and on beyond into the 
flatland black belts. There the Dixiecrats of 1948 had loosened 
the inhibitions against bolting the Democrats and the candidacy 
of a "nonpolitical" hero eased the reluctance to vote 
Republican.64
Eisenhower's 1952 victory was not only a personal triumph, 
but, in the words of Cosman, ", . . also reflected the translation of
socioeconomic change into changing patterns of political balloting,
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especially in the larger cities." While he ran well throughout
the region, he received his largest margins in the cities, " . . .  and
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within the cities, from the more prosperous white urbanites."
Bartley puts it this way:
The presidential election of 1952 clarified developing 
trends and demonstrated the fact that, while Southern 
voter sentiment was swinging to the right, the racial 
reaction was centered in the Deep South, . . . .  Like their 
Northern peers, Southern business conservatives were con­
cerned about Communism, Corruption, and Korea, and liked 
the "good Government" brand of conservatism that Eisenhower 
personified.66
Again, to quote Tindall:
To some extent it represented an issue vote against 
Democratic policies; to some extent in 1952, and increasingly 
in subsequent elections, a status vote. Republicanism became 
the style and the fashion of the "conservative chic" swept 
through the white suburbs. . . . The most overwhelmingly 
Republican were the upper income white residential areas.
The areas most heavily for Adlai Stevenson were the black 
precincts and, to a lesser degree, the low income white 
precincts.67
Governor Byrnes of South Carolina, in speeches before the
Georgia and Virginia legislatures, assailed Truman and his civil
rights ideas. Byrnes warned that now was the time to put "principle
above party." "No other man did so much to make Republicanism
68respectable in the South. . . . "
While Eisenhower's vote was nearly three times that of 
Dewey's in 1948, the movement on the subpresidential level was minute. 
The largest gains occurred in the Congressional House elections where 
the Republican Outer South delegation was tripled. On the state 
level practically nothing happened, and those gains that were made in
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1952 were as rapidly lost in 1954.
In 1956 still further urban gains were made by Eisenhower, 
offsetting losses in rural areas due to displeasure with the Brown 
decision. Metropolitan centers yielded a median advantage of 7.2 
percent in Republican votes over rural counties. In the small towns, 
he did less well than in the large cities, buttmuch better than in 
the rural areas. In the region as a whole, Republican sentiment 
rose faster than the rest of the areas. While it is true that 
much of the gain came from large numbers of Yankee Republican 
Emigres, it is equally true that a great many native-born southerners 
were changing voting behavior.^
As the political participation of blacks, union members, and 
small farmers increased, the dominance of the black belts was 
broken, and division developed. The "Eisenhower victories" of 1952 
and 1956, Grantham observes, can be seen more clearly as Republican
victories, albeit only at the presidential level. "Republican
a
successes represent what Key calls 'the political fulfillment of 
demographic and economic trends South of the Potomac.'" While 
the number of presidential Republicans was on the rise during the 
1940s, the ". . . election of 1952 was the event that set off the 
explosive forces long building up there." The 1956 election assured 
there would be no going b a c k . ^
Despite the landslide nature of Eisenhower's 1956 victory 
in the Outer South, little gains were made during the entire decade 
of the 1950s in lower levels. Southerners seemed to want a Republican 
president, but were content, for the most part, to keep their local
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Democratic officeholders in office. The only notable gain that 
occurred was in the national House of Representatives, and that was 
almost all achieved in 1952. Indeed, there were actually less
Republican officeholders, in the five categories sampled in 1960
than there were in 1950fif one totals all the areas together.
In 1960 Nixon pulled out a thin majority in the region as a
whole, winning 50.2 percent of the Outer South's vote. At the lower
levels, he showed enough coattails despite the closeness of the vote, 
to return Republican officeholder levels almost back to the peak 
levels under Eisenhower. Possibly this was due to a belief on the 
part of some southerners at least that they had now become complete 
presidential Republicans and a desire to make their other voting 
conform to their presidential voting. In 1961 John Tower became the 
region's first Republican U.S. Senator, and surprisingly from Lyndon 
Johnson, the Democratic Vice-President's home state. In 1962 the 
increase in gain of Republican officeholders in the region began to 
quicken.
The 1964 election saw the Outer South once again revert,to 
its old Democratic voting habits in reaction to Barry Goldwater. 
Still, there was nothing too unusual about that, as even such hard­
core Republican states as Maine, Vermont, and New Hampshire were 
also turning to Johnson. Republican growth at the lower levels also 
stalled and even fell back slightly during the 1964-1965 period.
But the Republican Party came bouncing back from the depths 
of 1964. From a low point just before the 1966 elections the number 
of Republican officeholders in the five categories more than doubled
by 1968, and after the 1968 elections achieved a level almost five 
times that of their 1960 level. Florida elected a Republican 
governor in 1966, and Tennessee added a Republican Senator the same 
year. Also in the 1968 elections the Outer South's congressional 
delegation nearly doubled. Republican gains at the state legislative 
levels were not very far behind.
In 1968 Nixon carried the region as a whole, losing only 
Texas to Humphrey. For the first time the number of elected 
Republicans in the five categories broke the 200 level. The following 
year, Virginia followed Florida's lead in electing a Republican as 
its chief executive. The Republican Party had begun to move.
But thereafter, the pace of Republican growth slowed. The 
Republican organization in Florida came apart at the seams, and the 
governor's chair was lost and Republicans failed to pick up the 
senate seat in 1970. In Tennessee, however, Republicans made a 
major breakthrough, taking both the governor's mansion and the 
other Senate seat. Meanwhile, sensing the changing winds of southern 
politics, Virginia's Senior Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr. announced 
his intention to run for reelection as an independent. He smashed 
two opponents, one Democrat and one Republican, in the general 
election, and polled an absolute majority in a three-way race.
In 1972 the stage was set for what could have been a big year 
for southern Republicans on all levels. George Wallace had pulled 
something more than 20 percent of the electorate probably permanently 
out of the Democratic orbit in the Outer South's presidential 
politics in 1968. This added on to the 10 percent the Dixiecrats had
pulled out should have given the Republicans a solid majority of 
about 60 percent of the region's voters in any event. But with the 
emergence of George McGovern as the Democratic standard bearer, that 
figure swelled to close to 70 percent. With this impetus the 
Republicans should have swept everything in sight, but they did not. 
The major gains occurred at the statewide and congressional levels. 
North Carolina elected a new Republican governor and a new 
Republican Senator. Virginia, too, responded by electing a Republican 
to the Senate. Republicans controlled both the Virginia and Tennessee 
congressional delegations. But at the local level practically nothing 
happened. The legislatures remained almost unchanged.
In retrospect by the time of the close of the study, 
Republicans had held governorships in every state in the Outer South 
except Texas, controlled two congressional delegations, and held a 
majority of the region's senate seats. Gains at the local level had 
been only modest, only about 20 percent of the state senate seats, 
and a quarter of the state house seats.
The importance of the growth of urbanism, wealth, and 
increased voter registration to presidential Republicanism during 
this time period has been touched upon. Tables 18, 19, and 20 
demonstrate these changes.
Where did the votes come from that made up the Republican 
successes? Phillips divides this part of the region into several 
categories: Black Belt, Traditional GOP, Metropolitan areas, and
Texas Mexican-American Vote. The data from the 1972 election will 
be compared with that given by Phillips for preceding elections
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TABLE 18
PER CAPITA INCOME IN THE OUTER SOUTH
Percentage of the national average
State 1948 1968 Change
(%) (%) (%)
Florida 81.8 93.2 1 .4
North Carolina 68.0 77.9 9.9
Tennessee 66.0 75.4 9.4
Texas 83.8 88.5 4.5
Virginia 79.0 .89.7 10.7
SOURCE: Havard, William C. The Changing Politics of the South, 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1972.
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TABLE 19
GROWTH OF URBANISM IN THE OUTER SOUTH
State
Percentage urban
1950
(%)
1960
(%)
1970
(%)
Change
(%)
Florida 48 67 67 19
North Carolina 22 31 37 15
Tennessee 42 50 52 10
Texas 47 65 67 20
Virginia • • • 50 58 8
SOURCE: Havard, William C. The Changing Politics of the South.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1972.
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TABLE 20
VOTER REGISTRATION IN THE OUTER SOUTH
State
Black * White
1960
m
1964
(%)
1970
(%>
1970
(%)
Tennessee 58.9 69.6 76.5 88.3
Florida 38.9 63.8 67.0 94.2
North Carolina 38.1 46.8 54.8 79.6
Texas 34.9 57.7 84.7 73.7
Virginia 22.8 45.7 60.7 78.4
SOURCE: Havard, William C. The Changing Politics of the
South. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press,
1972.
in Tables 21, 22, 23, and 24.
From all that has been discussed to this point about the 
Outer South, it would seem that the theory was correct, that it 
may now be considered solidly Republican in presidential contests. 
Again, the other national offices are running somewhat behind the 
presidential level in development. Congress was the next level to 
develop, really beginning to move only about a decade behind the 
presidential level, or in other words about 1962. By 1966 Republican 
power was beginning to sift into every level, with the state 
legislatures still the least developed. But this is to be expected.
TABLE 21
DEMOCRATIC SHARE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE
IN THE BLACK BELT
1928 1932 1948 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968
Change 
1932- 
1972 1972
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Gadsden, Florida 76 95 51 60 63 54 47 36 39 -56
Madison, Florida 74 88 52 57 67 64 43 29 28 -60
Bertie, North
Carolina 84 98 96 90 88 87 78 45 39 -59
Halifax, North
Carolina 85 95 87 80 77 79 65 32 32 -63
Fayette, Tennessee 90 96 13 53 33 32 47 40 39 -57
Haywood, Tennessee 92 95 49 72 73 56 49 30 39 -56
San Jacinto, Texas 63 98 66 68 57 71 83 54 55 -43
Waller, Texas 57 93 50 46 39 49 68 49 33 -60
Brunswick, Virginia 79 96 49 60 43 66 42 38 41 -55
Dinwiddie, Virginia 74 90 64 59 49 64 51 30 36 -54
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TABLE 22
REPUBLICAN SHARE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE 
IN TRADITIONAL REPUBLICAN AREAS
Change
1932-
1928
(%)
1932
(%)
1948
(%)
1952
(%)
1956
(%)
1960
(%)
1964
(%)
1968
(%)
1972
(%)
1972
(%)
Avery, North
Carolina 89 73 75 79 81 80 64 86 86 +±3
Floyd, Virginia 77 60 73 72 71 70 62 79 78 +18
Sevier, Tennessee 93 77 84 87 87 85 70 89 88 +11
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TABLE 23
REPUBLICAN SHARE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE3
IN METROPOLITAN AREAS
Change
1932-
1928
(%)
1932
(%)
1948
(%)
1952
(%)
1956
(%)
1960
(%)
1964
(%)
1968
(%)
1972
(%)
1972
(%)
Dade, Florida 61 34 47 49 51 40 48 66 63 +29
Broward, Florida 65 34 64 69 72 59 56 71 73 +39
Duval, Florida 65 24 52 48 50 46 51 67 72 +48
Pinellas, Florida 75 42 65 71 73 64 45 73 71 +29
Mecklenburg, North
Carolina 55 22 57 57 62 55 48 71 70 +48
Guilford, North
Carolina 63 32 51 53 60 . 58 47 70 70 +38
Forsyth', North
Carolina 67 36 51 52 65 58 49 71 69 +33
Buncombe, North
Carolina 57 32 45 52 54 55 38 69 72 +40
Wake, North
Carolina 49 25 27 39 40 41 42 79 71 +46
Shelby, Tennessee 40 14 63 48 49 48 47 65 67 +53
Davidson, Tennessee 53 25 44 41 39 46 36 67 63 +38
Knox, Tennessee 48 48 59 62 60 61 50 73 73 +25
Hamilton, Tennessee 65 38 44 55 53 56 51 72 74 +36
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TABLE 23— Continued
1928 1932 1948 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968
Change 
1932- 
1972 1972
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Dallas, Texas 61 19 50 63 65 62 45 66 70 +51
Harris, Texas 56 16 52 58 61 52 40 61 62 +76
Tarrant, Texas 69 14 40 58 60 . 55 37 58 62 +48
Bexar, Texas 48 16 46 56 58 46 33 49 61 +45
El Paso, Texas 50 20 29 58 55 48 37 53 54 +34
Norfolk, Virginia 59 33 49 54 54 44 36 59 60 +27
Richmond, Virginia 51 28 53 60 62 60 43 52 58 +30
£
Figures for 1948 include the States Rights Party and figures 
for 1968 include the American Independent Party.
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TABLE 24
REPUBLICAN SHARE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE3
IN TEXAS, MEXICAN-AMERICAN
1928 1932 1948 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968
Change 
1932- 
1972 1972
(%) (%) (%) <%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Duval 26 3 3 17 32 18 7 5 16 +30
Starr 10 5 8 17 17 7 14 25 43 +38
Zapata 6 8 40 46 42 28 12 21 48 +40
Jim Hogg 29 11 19 23 31 15 10 14 47 +36
cl
Figures for 1948 include the States' Rights Party and figures 
for 1968 include the American Independent Party.
It had been reasoned before that the presidential level was to be the 
first to fall away from Democratic control, because it would be the 
first sphere in which the South would realize its growing impotence 
within the Democratic Party. Realizing that they could no longer 
have an effect on the nominating process within the Democratic Party, 
or on its national platforms, the old loyalty was removed. Congress 
was the next level to begin shifting, probably due to the greater 
numbers, more frequent elections, and the need for smaller numbers 
to win congressional elections. It is, after all, easier to command 
a majority in just one district than across a state. Next, the 
Republicans moved in the statewide races, the governnorships, and 
senatorships, and only slowly at the state legislative level. Part 
of the reason for the shift which may continue over the long run
102
and which will result in majorities at all levels, is that there is 
a certain internal conflict within a man who believes himself a 
Democrat, but who consistently votes for Republican presidential 
candidates. After a while he must move to considering himself an 
independent. And the longer this goes on the smaller the pull of 
loyalty to his old party will be. Eventually it no longer would 
make sense to vote for executives of one party, but give them 
representatives of another party to have to work with so that they 
can never achieve anything. When there are sufficient political 
battles between Republican governors, and Democratic legislatures, 
then the shift will become complete and the legislatures will shift 
as well. As with Congress, it is doubtful that many incumbents will 
be defeated. This rarely happens. Rather it will be shown that as 
Democrats retire, they are being replaced by Republicans.
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CHAPTER III
THE DEEP SOUTH
The Deep South states form the heart of the old Democratic 
South. Up until 1964 only one of them, Louisiana, had ever given 
its electoral votes to a Republican candidate since Reconstruction, 
and then only in one election--1956. Even the "wetness" and 
Catholicism of A1 Smith, the tremendous popularity of General 
Eisenhower, and the Catholicism of Kennedy had not proved sufficient 
to dislodge these states from the Democratic column. Then came 1964 
and Barry Goldwater. While the Outer South, like the rest of the 
nation, voted Democratic--Vermont doing so for the first time since 
the formation of the Republican Party~-the Deep South threw aside 
tradition, a very powerful factor anywhere and especially so in this 
region, and voted for Goldwater. The Republican candidate carried 
five of the six states of the region: Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, and South Carolina, missing ronly Arkansas.
Goldwater’s success in the Deep South has been compared to 
A1 Smith’s success in the cities in 1928. Both candidates were 
badly defeated nationally--in the case of Smith by what proved to 
be "the last hurrah" of a decaying, and soon to be dead, Republican 
majority coalition--in the case of Goldwater what may later prove 
to have been the final fling of the once dominant Roosevelt coalition 
of New Deal days. In 1928, Smith carried the cities, but little
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heed was paid to the omen in light of his disastrous defeat. It 
was precisely these same cities that delivered many of the electoral 
votes that were needed to put Franklin Roosevelt in the White House.
In 1964 the loss of the Deep South caused little stir among Democratic 
sages who considered Goldwater's achievement only a temporary aber- 
ation, solely the result of his "extremist" positions. They failed 
to look beyond to see the underlying factors producing the break.
In 1968 the Deep South again turned away from the Democrats 
and into the waiting arms of George C. Wallace. But, for the first 
time in history, both sections of the South turned away from the 
Democrats at the same time, as most of the Outer South followed 
Richard Nixon into the Republican camp. While Wallace carried the 
Deep South states of Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, and 
Mississippi, Nixon carried Florida, Virginia, Tennessee, and the two 
Carolinas. Only Texas remained loyal to the Democrats, and then only 
by a very narrow margin.
Many Democratic pundits--those who looked* on the Goldwater 
defections as a temporary aberation--viewed the 1968 results as 
confirmation of their contention that the loss of the Deep South was 
only temporary. Without Wallace they reasoned, rightly or wrongly, 
the heavy Democratic registration in the Deep South would have 
guaranteed those electoral votes for Humphrey. It remained for
t "
1972 to disconfirm that belief.
Before 1948 South Carolina had been one of the South's most 
Democratic states, never giving the presidential candidate of that 
party less than seven-eighths of its popular vote in this century.
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In 1948, however, the situation was somewhat different. The governor 
of that state, Strom Thurmond, was a candidate for President on the 
third-party Dixiecrat ticket. Thurmond swept the entire state, 
polling 72 percent of the vote. In the next three presidential 
elections the Democrats again captured South Carolina. However, in 
those three races, they never managed to muster even 52 percent of 
the vote.^ Thus, there had been a permanent shift of something 
more than a quarter of the state's voters. (See Table 25.)
In 1948 Governor Dewey had managed to poll only 5,386 votes,
or 3.7 percent of the total number cast. As southern discontent with
the racial policies of the Truman administration increased, and as
it became increasingly clear that a third-party attempt would do
little good, many southerners decided to support Eisenhower.
Because the loyalty pledge had been abandoned at the 1952 Democratic
National Convention, such people as South Carolina's Governor James F.
Byrnes could feel free to bolt the party to work for Eisenhower. The
2
result was a near victory for Eisenhower in 1952. The General 
failed by less than 5,000 votes.
This was purely a personal triumph for Eisenhower, though, 
as the table shows. No Republicans were carried into office on his 
coattails in South Carolina, as they were elsewhere, nor were any 
to be elected for the rest of the decade. Indeed, 1952 was the high 
point of Republican support during the 1950s. Following the 
unpopular (in South Carolina) Brown decision of the Warren Court, 
Eisenhower, while sweeping the rest of the nation easily, finished 
in third place in the presidential voting in South Carolina in 1965,
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TABLE 25
PARTISAN BREAKDOWN 1947 TO 1973 
FOR SOUTH CAROLINA
Year
Gov­
er­
nor Senate House
State
Senate
State
House
Total
Repub­
licans
1947 D OR— 2D OR—  6D OR— 46D OR— 124D 0
1948 D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 46D OR— 124D 0
1949 D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 46D OR— 124D 0
1950 D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 46D OR— 124D 0
1951 D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 46D OR— 124D 0
1952 D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 46D OR— 124D 0
1953 D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 46D OR— 124D 0
1954 D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 46D OR— 124D- 0
1955 D OR— 2D OR—  6D OR— 46D OR— 124D 0
1956 D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 46D OR— 124D 0
1957 D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 46D OR— 124D 0
1958 D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 46D OR— 124D 0
1959 D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 46D OR— 124D 0
1960 D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 46D OR— 124D 0
1961 D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 46D OR— 124D 0
1962 D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 46D 1R— 123D 1
1963 D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 46D OR— 124D 0
1964 D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR—  46D OR— 124D 0
1965 D 1R— ID OR— 6D OR— 46D OR— 124D 1
Ill
TABLE 25— Continued
Year
Gov­
er­
nor Senate House
State
Senate
State
House
Total
Repub­
licans
1966 D 1R— ID 1R— 5D OR— 46D OR— 124D 2
1967 D 1R— ID 1R— 5D 6R— 40D 17R— 107D 25
1968 D 1R— ID 1R— 5D 6R— 40D 17R— 107D 25
1969 D 1R— ID 1R— 5D 3R—  4 3D 3R— 12ID 8
1970 D 1R— ID 1R— 5D 3R— 43D 5R— 119D 10
1971 D 1R— ID 1R— 5D 2R— 4 2D H R — 113D 15
1972 D 1R--1D 1R— 5D 2R— 42D 11R— 113D. 15
1973 D 1R— ID 2R— 4D 2R— 44D 21R— 103D 36
a ^
D— Democrat.
— Republican.
running behind Stevenson, and a third-party candidacy of Virginia 
Senator Harry F. Byrd. In 1960, Richard Nixon ran another tight 
race, running 20,000 votes ahead of Eisenhower's 1952 figures.
The final percentages were Nixon 48.7 and Kennedy 51.2.
With the Republicans out of power, it was up to the Democratic 
Administration under John Kennedy to show what it could do about South 
Carolina's number one issue--the race question. John Kennedy was in 
a rather precarious political position. Had he lost the southern 
states he carried in 1960, he would not have been President. On the 
other hand, without major black and liberal white support in the
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North, he could not carry the big city states in that region that 
most presidential aspirants consider the sine qua non of victory.
When faced with this dilemma, Kennedy had to make a decision. His 
decision was to count heavily on the power and prestige of his running 
mate Lyndon B. Johnson to keep his fellow southerners in line, 
while he himself proceeded with a liberal civil rights program. It 
is doubtful how successful this strategy would have been if John 
Kennedy had had to face reelection. This is, however, a moot point, 
because he was "relieved” of that problem. Lee Harvey Oswald, a 
pro Castro Marxist, assassinated Kennedy, perhaps in an attempt to 
preserve Castro's hold on Cuba (quite pointless, it would seem 
in retrospect, since the U.S. had no further plans to attack 
Cuba, under Kennedy, without further provocation).
When John Kennedy died, Lyndon Johnson became the first 
southerner to sit in the White House since Woodrow Wilson, a native 
of Virginia. Goldwater strategists soon realized that it would take 
a miracle to put into action the battle plan that they had intended 
to use against Kennedy and make it work. All hope of victory was 
gone, but most seemed to feel it was better to go down with Barry 
than to let anyone else get the nomination. Probably the best 
comparison could be made with that of Roosevelt and the Progressive 
Party in 1912. In both cases victory was far less important than 
the great moral crusade being brought forward to be viewed by the 
American public who were to be educated. Strangely, Lyndon Johnson, 
the southerner, the first southern President in years, was the first 
Democratic nominee to lose the Deep South to a Republican. Goldwater
increased Nixon's 1960 figures by ten percentage points and 120,000 
votes in South Carolina.
Despite the great swell in the number of "presidential 
Republicans," the GOP had little to show for its pains. No new
$
Republicans had been elected to office. The only gain that Republicans 
could claim was the conversion of Democratic Senator and former 
Dixiecratic presidential candidate Strom Thurmond, to the Republican 
cause, the first, and, as yet, only Republican Senator from the Deep 
South. There was good cause, therefore, to believe that in South 
Carolina at least, the Goldwater triumph had been only a temporary 
setback for the Democratic Party.
However, cause for cheering was short-lived. The following 
year, 1965, Democratic Congressman Albert Watson, stripped of his 
seniority by Democratic caucus because of his support for Barry 
Goldwater's 1964 drive,1 followed Thurmond's lead by declaring himself 
a Republican, resigning his seat, running in the subsequent special 
election under the label of his new party, and winning. This success 
proved that, perhaps, party labels were wearing thin in even the 
Deep South. In the following year, 1966, further proof was added 
when Republicans captured seventeen seats in the lower house of the 
state legislature and six in the state senate.
In 1968, the election was different from other recent 
presidential elections in South Carolina. (See Table 26.) What 
made the difference was the presence of George Wallace on the ballot 
and the effects of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. The most constant 
source of Republican and independent voting from 1948 to 1964 in
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TABLE 26
SOUTH CAROLINA PRESIDENTIAL VOTING
Year
Repub­
licans
Demo­
crats
Inde­
pen­
dents
Repub­
licans
(%)
Demo­
crats
(%)
Inde­
pen­
dents
(%)
1948 5,386 34,423 102,607 3.7 24.2 72.0
1952 168,082 173,004 • • « 49.2 50.7 0.0
1956 75,700 136,372 88,509 25.1 45.3 29.5
1960 188,558 198,124 • • • 48.7 51.2 0.0
1964 309,048 215,700 • i « 58.8 41.1 0.0
1968 254,062 197,486 215,430 38.0 29.6 32.3
1972 463,366 187,375 • • • 71.2 28.7 0.0
»
South Carolina had been the "Coastal Plains" counties (excluding
Aiken, Charleston, Lexington, and Richland--the "urbanized" areas).
The twenty counties of the Piedmont region were the best Democratic
counties. In the cities, Greenville gave heavy Republican support
every year from 1952 to 1964, while Charleston and Columbia did so
every year but 1956, when the conservative vote split between
Eisenhower and a third-party bid under Harry Byrd. In 1968 this
pattern turned 180 degrees. Humphrey did relatively better in the
Coastal Plains region while Nixon and Wallace swept the Piedmont,
Nixon carried an absolute majority of the vote in Greenville and
3
Columbia, and a plurality in Charleston.
115
At the same time, however, it should be noted that 1968 was 
not the kind of year for Richard Nixon in South Carolina that 1964 
had been for Barry Goldwater. Nixon's percentage was more than 
twenty points behind Goldwater1s. Indeed, had 20,000 Nixon votes 
switched to Wallace, the Alabama Governor would have carried the 
state. All but three of the Republican members in the lower house 
lost their seats, as did half of the Republican state senators 
elected in 1966. In the final analysis, it was probably the strong 
support of Strom Thurmond that kept South Carolina from going to 
Wallace, and saved it for Nixon.
In 1970 Republicans picked Congressman Watson as their 
gubernatorial nominee, while the Democrats chose Lieutenant Governor 
John West. For the first time in memory the Republican candidate 
had a fighting chance of victory. West squeaked by with 52 percent 
of the vote. The Republicans lost one state senate seat, but 
increased their house holdings to eleven seats. More importantly, 
Floyd Spence, a Republican, managed to retain Watson's old seat in 
Congress for the GOP.
It was really only in 1972 that the Republicans were able to 
get everything together for a good year across the board. Nixon, 
without Wallace in the race, ran over 200,000 votes ahead of his 
1968 figures, while McGovern was not aided in the least--his figure 
declined by more than 10,000 votes from Humphrey's already low 
levels. Nixon carried every county in the state in accumulating
71.2 percent of the vote--more than the combined Nixon-Wallace 
percentages of four years earlier. Thurmond, too, romped to an easy
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victory— much easier than many had predicted. There were ten new 
Republicans elected to the state legislature, while Edward Young 
captured the Sixth Congressional District seat held by seventeen- 
term Congressman John McMillan until his primary defeat in 1972.
When, following the renomination of Harry Truman in 1948, 
many southerners temporarily withdrew from the party to nominate 
Governor Thurmond of South Carolina on the Dixiecrat line, a few 
southern Democratic parties even went so far as to deny Truman any 
place on the ballot. Many in Georgia would have liked to follow 
suit. However, acting Governor M. E. Thompson, a political opponent 
of the powerful Talmadge family, acted to call a special legislative 
session to ensure President Truman a place on the Democratic line 
on the ballot. Truman won the state, but Thompson was not so lucky.
He was defeated for the gubernatorial nomination by Herman Talmadge 
who maintained the Talmadge tradition of appealing to white voters 
who opposed such racially liberal policies as Fair Employment
4
Practices Commission (FEPC), and other Truman civil rights planks.
The Republican Party demonstrated steady growth in the 
presidential elections of the 1950s. From a third place finisher 
with under 20 percent in 1948, the party increased its voting 
percentages to 30 percent in 1952, 33 percent in 1956, and 37 percent 
in 1960. As in much of the rest of the South, the urban vote was the 
key to this growth. In 1952 Eisenhower took Savannah and Augusta,
Chatham and Richmond counties. In 1956 he added Columbus and 
Muscogee counties. In both years his urban percentages had been 
40.5 percent. In 1960 Nixon upped this figure to 48.5 percent, nearly
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equal to Kennedy's.
Meanwhile, the local Republican Party had been able to make 
slight inroads by riding Eisenhower's coattails. A new Republican 
member was elected to each house of the Georgia legislature in 1952. 
Although both of these were immediately wiped out in the 1954 
elections--victims of the Brown decision--the loss was only temporary 
as 1956 saw them replaced by a Republican gain of one in.the state 
senate, and three in the lower house. (See Table 27.)
Georgia Republicans managed to hold their own throughout the 
remainder of the decade; two Republican seats became vacant in 1961 
and 1962, one being filled by a Democrat. In the 1962 elections, 
however, Republican strength hit new heights, this time without the 
aid of coattails. They added three new members to their lower house 
delegation and a new state senator. In 1963 a third state senator was 
added, while two of the four Republican members of the house were 
defeated.
In 1964 Barry M. Goldwater became the first Republican to
$
carry Georgia. He received 54.1 percent of the vote. There was a 
great deal of ’’racial voting." It is estimated that Goldwater 
carried 66 percent of the white vote and virtually none of the 
black vote. Much of the credit for the Goldwater victory should go 
to the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Except for Fulton County, Goldwater 
carried all of the urban counties, drawing 53.7 percent of their 
v o t e s ( S e e  Table 28.) The 1964 elections also gave Georgia its 
first Republican Congressman in modern times as "Bo" Calloway, a 
multimillionaire textile king, carried Georgia's Third District.
Year
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
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TABLE 27
PARTISAN BREAKDOWN 1947 TO 1973 
FOR GEORGIA
Gov- Total
er- State State Repub-
nor Senate House Senate House licans
D OR— 2D OR— 10D 1R— 5 3D 1R— 204D 2
D OR— 2D OR— 10D 1R— 53D 1R— 204D 2
D OR— 2D OR—  10D OR— 54D OR— 205D 0
D OR— 2D OR—  10D OR— 54D OR— 205D 0
D OR— 2D OR— 10D OR— 54D OR— 205D 0
D OR— 2D OR— 10D OR— 54D OR— 205D 0
D OR— 2D OR— 10D 1R— 53D 1R— 204D 2
D OR— 2D OR— 10D 1R— 53D 1R— 204D 2
D OR— 2D OR— 10D OR— 54D OR— 205D 0
D OR— 2D OR—  10D 1R— 53D 3R— 202D 4
D OR— 2D OR— 10D 1R—  5 3D 3R— 202D 4
D OR— 2D OR— 10D 1R— 5 3D 3R— 202D 4
D OR— 2D OR— 10D 1R— 5 3D 3R— 202D 4
D OR— 2D OR— 10D 1R—  5 3D 3R— 202D 4
D OR— 2D OR— 10D 1R—  5 3D 2R— 202D 3
D OR— 2D OR— 10D 1R— 53D 1R— 203D 2
D OR— 2D OR— 10D 2R— 5 2D 4R— 201D 6
D OR— 2D OR— 10D 3R— 5 ID 2R— 203D 5
D OR— 2D 1R— 9D 9R— 5 ID 23R— 203D 33
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TABLE 27— Continued
Year
Gov­
er­
nor Senate House
State
Senate
State
House
Total
Repub­
licans
1966 D OR— 2D 1R— 9D 9R— 44D 23R— 182D 33
1967 D OR— 2D 2R— 8D 8R— 44D 22R— 182D 32
1968 D OR— 2D 2R— 8D 8R— 45D 22R— 183D 32
1969 D OR— 2D 2R— 8D 6R— 48D 26R— 168D 34
1970 D OR— 2D 2R— 8D 7R— 48D 26R— 169D 35
1971 D OR— 2D 2R— 8D 6R— 50D 22R— 173D 30
1972 D OR— 2D 2R— 8D 6R— 50D 22R— 173D 30
1973 D OR— 2D 1R— 9D 8R— 48D 28R— 151D 37
aD— Democrat. 
^R— Republican.
Republican representation in the legislature increased dramatically, 
climbing to twenty-three in the house, and nine in the state senate.
In 1966 the name of Lester Maddox burst onto the Georgia 
political scene. Maddox had run twice before for political office, 
both times unsuccessfully. In the 1961 Atlanta mayoral election 
Maddox lost to Ivan Allen, Jr., losing the city’s majority black 
precincts 31,224 to 179, thus losing 99.4 percent to 0.6 percent 
in those areas.^ In 1962 he lost the primary for Lieutenant 
Governor. Of the six candidates in the 1966 primary, four were 
conservatives, one a moderate, and one a liberal. Ellis Arnall, 
although liberal, was well known as a former governor, and was expected
to win. He was very well financed and had a good record in the state. 
However, he failed to secure enough votes (getting only 29 percent) 
to avoid a runoff. His opponent was to be Lester Maddox, a man with 
little formal education and only moderate finances. As has been
g
pointed out, Maddox also had the reputation of being a loser.
But much had changed since 1962. Maddox had received much
publicity when he sold his Atlanta restaurant rather than obey the
1964 Civil Rights Act requirement that he integrate. His reputation
for being a teetotaler and a deeply religious man may have cost him
votes in sophisticated Atlanta, but it endeared him to the rest of
the state. Maddox carried 137 counties and 54.3 percent of the 
9
vote. In the general election Maddox was faced with the opposition 
of Republican Congressman Bo Calloway, and a large write-in effort 
in behalf of Arnall. Calloway actually received a 3,000-vote 
plurality. However, due to the large number of write-ins and a 
lack of a clear majority, the election was thrown into the General 
Assembly, where Maddox prevailed.^ One seat in each house of the 
legislature changed hands, as did Calloway's Third District congres­
sional seat. However, Republicans Ben Blackburn and Fletcher 
Thompson won the Fourth and Fifth District congressional seats based 
in Atlanta.
In 1968 the Republican vote receded to the lowest point since 
1952. However, with George Wallace on the ballot, this gave the 
national Democrats little to cheer about. Hubert Humphrey fared 
much worse than even Johnson had four years earlier. If one may 
honestly add Wallace and Nixon votes together, as Phillips is wont to
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do, it can be seen that the combined anti Great Society vote ran to
73.2 percent--a considerable change from 1952.^ No new Republicans 
entered Congress, and two Republicans lost seats in the state senate, 
but four new Republicans gained seats in the state house.
In 1970 Governor Maddox was unable to succeed himself.
The primary-victor, and winner of the general election, was peanut 
farmer Jimmy Carter. Maddox became Lieutenant Governor. The four 
state house seats picked up in 1968 were lost again. Nevertheless, 
the retention of twenty-two house seats out of a smaller total number 
of seats, demonstrates the lasting effects of the 1964 sweep.
In the opening days of 1971, Senator Richard B. Russell, 
twice a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination, 
respected as a statesman throughout Washington, and long a leader 
of the southern senatorial bloc, died. Governor Carter's replacement 
for Senator Russell, David Gambrell, immediately became a target for 
all the anti Carter forces within the Democratic Party in Georgia. 
When he ran for election, Gambrell was forced into a runoff primary 
with the eventual winner, Sam Nunn. Nunn had the backing of a 
rather diverse group including both Lester Maddox and black leader 
Julian Bond, both of whom opposed Carter. Republican Fletcher 
Thompson, a conservative Republican Congressman from Atlanta, hoped 
to be able to take advantage of the Democratic feuding to win the 
seat. He proved unsuccessful in this effort, however, as he narrowly 
lost the 1972 general election. Thompson's own seat in the House 
of Representatives reverted to Democratic control.
As was expected, Richard Nixon easily won Georgia's electoral
votes in the presidential election. Nixon ran nearly 350,000 votes 
ahead of his 1968 levels, polling over 69 percent. McGovern ran 
almost four percentage points ahead of Humphrey's figures, despite 
the fact his vote totals were actually less than Humphrey's. Many 
Wallace voters sat out the 1972 election, but almost all of those 
who did vote appear to have voted for Nixon. (See Table 28.) 
Republicans added two new state senators, and six new members to 
their house delegation.
In 1948 when much of the South bolted the national Democratic 
Party, Alabama followed suit. Harry Truman, the candidate of the 
national party, not only failed to get the Democratic line on the 
November ballot, but did not appear at all. In a contest between 
Dewey, the candidate of the "Northeast Establishment" of the 
Republican Party, and Dixiecrat Strom Thurmond, the candidate of the 
Deep South, the outcome was a foregone conclusion, with the only 
possible source of wonder being the margin. Thurmond ultimately 
polled 80.7 percent of the vote, not as high as Roosevelt had been 
accustomed to, but higher than any winning percentage since.
In 1952 there no longer existed the Dixiecrat alternative.
The Republican nominee, General Eisenhower, was personally very 
popular, but the Democrats were particularly sensitive to the growing 
signs of rebellion in the South. No southerner, not lucky enough 
to inherit the presidency, as Johnson was to do in 1963, could win 
the presidential nomination as Richard Russell had so well proved, 
but it was hoped that the selection of John Sparkman, a Senator from 
Alabama, as the vice-presidential nominee, would help pacify the South.
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TABLE 28 
GEORGIA PRESIDENTIAL VOTING
Year
Repub­
licans
Demo­
crats
Inde­
pen­
dents
Repub­
licans
(%)
Demo­
crats
(%)
Inde­
pen­
dents
(%)
1948 76,691 254,464 85,055 18.4 61.1 20.4
1952 198,979 456,823 • • • 30.3 69.6 0.0
1956 222,778 444,388 • • • 33.3 66.6 0.0
1960 274,472 458,638 = . . 37.2 62.7 0.0
1964 616,600 522,557 • • • 54.1 45.8 0.0
1968 380,111 334,440 535,550 30.4 26.7 42.8
1972 729,221 321,650 • • • 69.3 30.6 0.0
Both parties increased their vote totals by more than 100,000 votes 
(if one takes Thurmond's 1948 showing as the 1948 Democratic vote 
in Alabama), with the result being a comfortable, if somewhat 
reduced, margin of 64.8 percent.
Even before Eisenhower's 1952 campaign Alabama had a token 
Republican in its lower house. Even the drawing power of Senator 
Sparkman had been insufficient to remove him. However, in May of 
1954, the Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Earl Warren, an 
Eisenhower appointee, handed down the group of decisions in school 
desegragation cases referred to under the joint title of the Brown 
decision. In the fall of 1954 Alabama voters returned an all
124
Democratic delegation to the state legislature. It would not be 
until 1963 that another Republican would sit in the Alabama 
legislature.
In 1956 Eisenhower improved his 1952 showing, pulling to 
within 100,000 votes of Stevenson. This was the first time since 
1928 that a Republican candidate had come within the 100,000 
vote figure. Nevertheless, there was still a considerable margin 
separating the two parties. And, a set of electors running on an 
uncommitted line drew about 20,000 votes.
In 1960 Richard Nixon further improved the Republican 
showing, increasing the party's percentage to 42 percent. His 
237,981 votes marked the first time a Republican candidate had 
received 200,000 votes in a presidential election in Alabama. As 
Eisenhower had been the first Republican since 1928 to get closer 
than 100,000 votes to his Democratic opponent, Nixon bettered that 
mark moving to within 90,000 votes. Still, the Democratic percentage 
had been nearly the same in’ both elections--57.3 percent in 1956 and
57.2 percent in 1960.
It was in 1961 that the Republicans began to organize in
Alabama in earnest. Soon every county was organized. The first
real test of the new machinery came in the 1962 Senate race when
Republican Jim Martin ran against incumbent Lister Hill. Martin
missed by the narrowest of margins, reversing the normal voting
patterns, by doing best in the black belt and worst in the traditional
areas of Republican "strength." At the same time, Republicans
12
entered eighteen legislative races and won two.
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Much money and effort had gone into this endeavor. For the 
first time in history Alabama Republicans had, in 1962, elected not 
to send money raised in Alabama to the "more important" races being 
fought by Republicans in the North, rather choosing to keep it in 
Alabama. Further, they asked for three full-time "field men" from 
the national committee to use in the state's elections. As Strong 
concludes, "Clearly, refusal to [ send money to the national organi­
zation ] is the first step toward a substantial grass roots party
13in the state. . . ."
But, 1962 was just the beginning. In preparation for the
1964 presidential race, "a permanent professional staff" was organized
14
in 1963 by the state's Republicans. It is doubtful that the effort 
was necessary, however. With the passage of the Johnson-backed 
1964 Civil Rights Act, and the Republican nomination of "hard­
core" conservative Barry Goldwater, the result was as inevitable as 
any election can ever be said to be. Goldwater polled more votes 
than any other candidate for president had ever polled in Alabama-- 
more, indeed, than the combined figures for Eisenhower and Stevenson 
in 1952. His 69.5 percent represents the largest winning percentage 
in Alabama for a presidential contest for any year after 1948 and 
prior to 1972. In Alabama, at least, white bloc voting was clearly 
visible. In white precincts in the cities, Goldwater carried 76 
percent and up. Republicans gained five of the eight congressional 
seats, narrowly missing a sixth, the Fifth District, where its
candidate polled 47 percent. Many other minor offices were captured
15in the Goldwater tidal wave.
Republican spirits were high in 1966. They fielded candidates 
in an unprecedented number of races--Senator, six of eight house 
seats, eight-five state house of representatives, and twenty-wix 
of the thirty-five state senate seats. Jim Martin ran for Governor. 
Out of all this hope, work, and expense emerged only three successful 
house candidates where there had been five (these represented 
Birmingham, Mobile, and Montgomery--urban areas of comparative 
Republican strength), and one state senator.^ Martin's old house 
seat was lost, but only one of the other four Republican incumbents 
lost. (See Table 29.)
Before getting to the 1968 race for president, it should be 
recalled that George Wallace had been elected Governor of Alabama in 
1962 as something of a segregationist on racial matters, and a 
populist elsewhere. Indeed, in Alabama, one might almost say he was 
a complete populist, without treating racial matters separately.
Being unable, legally, to succeed himself in 1966, he successfully 
ran his wife Lurleen, to take his place. Everyone understood that 
she would be only a figurehead. She won. His Alabama base of 
operations thus secured, Wallace set forth to do battle with the 
"pointy-headed intellectuals" and other such enemies of Alabamians.
The mere appearance of Wallace on the ballot in Alabama 
guaranteed the outcome, just as much as Goldwater's appearance had 
four years earlier. Wallace polled more votes than the combined 
totals for Goldwater and Johnson in 1964--indeed, more than the 
combined totals of any previous election in Alabama history.
Humphrey's 196,579 votes was the lowest figure for a Democratic
Year
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
TABLE 29
PARTISAN BREAKDOWN 1947 TO 1973 
FOR ALABAMA
Gov­
er­
nor Senate House
D OR— 2D OR— 9D OR— 35D ■ 
%
1R— 105D
D OR— 2D OR— 9D OR— 35D 1R— 105D
D OR— 2D OR— 9D OR— 35D 1R— 105D
D OR— 2D OR— 9D OR— 35D 1R— 105D
D OR— 2D OR— 9D OR— 35D 1R— 105D
D OR— 2D * OR— 9D OR— 35D 1R— 105D
D OR— 2D OR— 9D OR— 35D 1R— 105D
D OR— 2D OR— 9D OR— 35D 1R— 105D
D OR— 2D OR— 9D OR— 35D OR— 106D
D OR— 2D OR— 9D OR— 35D OR— 106D
D OR— 2D OR— 9D OR— 35D OR— 106D
D OR— 2D OR— 9D OR— 35D OR— 106D
D OR— 2D OR— 9D OR— 35D OR— 106D
D OR— 2D OR— 9D OR— 35D OR— 106D
D OR— 2D OR— 9D OR—  35D OR— 106D
D OR— 2D OR— 9D OR— 35D OR— 106D
D OR— 2D OR— 8D OR— 35D 2R— 104D
D OR— 2D OR— 8D OR— 35D 2R— 104D
D OR— 2D 5R— 3D OR—  35D 2R— 104D
State State
Senate House
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TABLE 29— Continued
Year
Gov­
er­
nor Senate House
State
Senate
State
House
Total
Repub­
licans
1966 D OR— 2D 5R— 3D OR— 35D 2R— 104D 7
1967 D OR— 2D 3R— 5D 1R— 34D 4R— 102D 8
1968 D OR— 2D 3R— 5D 1R— 34D 4R— 102D 8
1969 D OR— 2D 3R— 5D 1R— 34D OR— 106D 4
1970 D OR— 2D 3R— 5D 1R— 34D OR— 106D 4
1971 D OR— 2D • 3R— 5D OR— 35D 2R— 104D 5
1972 D OR— 2D 3R— 5D OR— 35D 2R— 104D 5
1973 D OR— 2D 3R— 4D OR— 34D 2R— 100D 5
3.
D— Democrat. 
^R— Republican.
candidate since 1928 (if 1948 is excluded when there was no such 
candidate). Nixon's figure, too, was small, being exceeded by 
every Republican candidate since Eisenhower in 1952. (See Table 30.)
But, if Wallace did well in Alabama, he failed in his national 
objective of deadlocking the presidential election and throwing it 
into the House of Representatives. This failure seems to have had 
the effect of driving him back to the world of two-party politics. 
Wallace succeeded in regaining the Governor's chair in 1970, and in 
1972 started campaigning actively for the Democratic presidential 
nomination. Whether he ever seriously believed he could win the
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TABLE 30 
ALABAMA PRESIDENTIAL VOTING
Year
Repub­
licans
Demo­
crats
Inde­
pen­
dents
Repub­
licans
(%)
Demo­
crats
(%)
Inde­
pen­
dents
(%)
1948 40,930 • • • 171,443 19.2 0.0 80.7
1952 149,231 275,075 • • « 35.1 64.8 0.0
1956 195,694 290,844 20,323 38.6 57.3 4.0
1960 237,981 324,050 4,367 42.0 57.2 0.7
1964 479,085 209,848 • • • 69.5 30.4 0.0
1968 146,923 196,579 691,425 14.1 18.9 66.9
1972 692,480 215,792 • • • 76.2 23.7 0.0
nomination is doubtful. More probably he hoped for a deadlock at 
the convention and the chance to play balance of pwer, perhaps in 
return for the vice-presidential nomination. Whatever the case, 
he failed in his objective as George McGovern emerged with sufficient 
convention votes not to have to compromise with anyone.
Alabama voters were treated to a spectacle of raw political 
power during the platform fight at the Democratic National Convention. 
McGovern supporters, so long the "outs,11 proved unwilling to compro­
mise anywhere. They had the votes and they knew it. Their doctrine 
would be pure no matter what it cost in November. In a dramatic 
performance, Wallace appeared before the convention to argue for some
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planks he wished in the platform. He warned the convention of the 
dangers of not adopting his proposals. Very few of those assembled 
paid heed to him. In Alabama, however, they watched and listened.
The outcome of the fall elections in Alabama was as to be 
expected. Nixon swept the state, polling 76.2 percent of the vote-- 
higher even than Goldwater's 1964 figure, and nearly equal to 
Strom Thurmond’s 1948 margin. His total vote exceeded even Wallace's 
1968 figure, and he ran 475,000 votes ahead of McGovern. Despite 
the fact that Alabama lost one house seat by redistricting, all 
three Republicans were returned to Congress, contrary to what many 
had predicted, that the lost seat would be at the expense of one 
of them.
It was in 1948 that the prestige of the national Democratic 
Party began to wane in Mississippi. Strom Thurmond got his highest 
percentage in Mississippi, in that year, just as Goldwater was to do 
in 1964, breaking the 87 percent mark. In comparison, Dewey drew 
only 5,043 votes (2.6 percent) and Truman 19,384 (10 percent). Only 
in 1952 and 1956 did Mississippi back the candidate of the national 
Democrats before going to an independent slate in 1960, Goldwater 
in 1964, and Wallace in 1968.^
When the Supreme Court handed down the Brown decision in 
1954, it set the stage for Democratic politics for the next ten 
years. In the 1955 Democratic gubernatorial primary, the main issue 
was who could best preserve segregation. Of only secondary importance 
was the influence of "Big Labor." One candidate accused the other 
of being the "labor candidate." Havard says, "Liberalism was
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becoming a despised word throughout the state . . . ," and support
for labor and integration, as•everyone knew, were the hallmark of
liberalism. Segregation and labor remained the big issues in 1959
as well. In 1963 another issue was added: who supported John Kennedy
and why--with each candidate in the Democratic primary trying to
accuse the other of being a Kennedy man and each trying to deny it.
In 1967 with 190,000 black voters on the registration rolls, most
due to the 1965 Voting Rights Act, overt racism dropped from the
political lexicon. The eventual winner, Congressman John Bell
Williams, while maintaining his Democratic registration, emphasized
his support for Goldwater (in a state voting better than 87 percent
for Barry Goldwater), and his subsequent martyrdom at the hands of
18the Democratic congressional caucus.
The Republican Party began to stir in Mississippi only in
1960 and came fully to life in 1963 when its gubernatorial candidate
19broke the 38 percent mark; and two Republicans were actually 
elected to the lower house of the legislature. (See Table 31.)
In 1964 Mississippi not only turned in the highest Goldwater 
percentage in the nation, but also elected Prentiss Walker, its first 
Republican Congressman in modern times. All of the hopes of 1964 
were dashed in 1966, however, as four Republican candidates went
down to defeat in house races, and Walker lost a bid to unseat
Senator Eastland. In 1967 the entire Republican delegation in the
state legislature went down to defeat.
Nevertheless, times were changing in Mississippi. Even here, 
time refused to stand still. In 1967 a poll of Mississippi voters
Year
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
TABLE 31
PARTISAN BREAKDOWN 1947 TO 1973 
FOR MISSISSIPPI
Gov-
er- State State
nor Senate House Senate House
D OR— 2D OR— 7D OR— 49D OR— 140D
D OR— 2D OR— 7D OR— 49D OR— 140D
D OR— 2D OR— 7D OR— 49D OR— 14 OD
D OR— 2D OR— 7D OR— 49D OR— 140D
D OR— 2D OR— 7D OR— 49D OR—  140D
D OR— 2D OR— 2D OR— 49D OR— 140D
D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 49D OR—  140D
D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 49D OR— 140D
D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 49D OR— 140D
D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 49D OR— 140D
D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 49D OR— 140D
D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 49D OR— 140D
D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 49D OR— 140D
D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 49D OR— 140D
D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 49D OR— 14 OD
D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 49D OR— 140D
D OR— 2D OR— 5D OR— 49D OR— 14OD
D OR— 2D OR— 5D OR— 5 2D OR— 122D
D OR— 2D 1R— 4D OR— 5 2D 2R— 120D
TABLE 31— Continued
Year
Gov­
er­
nor Senate House
State
Senate
State
House
Total
Repub­
licans
1966 D OR— 2D 1R— 4D 1R— 5 ID 2R— 120D 3
1967 D OR— 2D OR— 5D 1R— 5 ID 2R— 120D 33
1968 D OR— 2D OR— 5D OR— 52D OR— 122D 3
1969 D OR— -^2D OR— 5D OR— 52D OR— 122D 0
1970 D OR— 2D OR— 5D OR— 52D OR— 122D 0
1971 D OR— 2D OR— 5D 3R— 49D 1R— 12ID 4
1972 D OR— 2D OR— 5D 3R— 49D 1R— 12ID 4
1973 D OR— 2D 2R— 3D OR— 52D OR— 121D 2
a
D— Democrat.
— Republican.
showed 39 percent terming themselves Independents, an extraordinarily 
high figure. Most of these seemed to resemble Republicans elsewhere, 
when one examines their socioeconomic history. They tended to be 
better educated, better paid people, holding good jobs. As a whole 
they were "city" dwellers and relatively young compared to Democratic 
partisans. They were also more "conservative on the issues of 
domestic and foreign policy than identifiers with either party." 
Because these respondents, identifying themselves as Independents, 
tended to resemble national Republicans in their socioeconomic 
background, and because of their negative image of the Democratic
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Party, they may represent future Republicans in Mississippi, espe­
cially as the stigma of being a Republican declines within the 
state. Havard argues:
. . . [ And ] despite their hesitancy to identify as
Republicans, the regular Democrats may be forced to do so. The 
national party seems well on its way of denying them any bene­
fits from identifying themselves as Democrats. If the national 
Republicans offer hope for the disenchanted, the numbers of 
leaders and followers identifying themselves as Republicans 
is likely to change radically. . . .20
Change, however, takes time, especially in Mississippi. The 
1968 elections, while clearly demonstrating George Wallace's strength, 
showed several other results. The effect of the 1965 Voting Rights 
Act was clearly evident. Hubert Humphrey, a northerner, drew over 
150,000 votes--nearly three times the number fellow southerner 
Lyndon Johnson had four years earlier, and, indeed, more votes than 
any Democratic nominee since Stevenson in 1952. At the same time, 
Nixon's vote totals plummeted from the Goldwater heights. (See 
Table 32.)
In the 1970 elections Mississippi elected three new Republican 
state senators and one Republican to the state house. It began to 
look like the change was beginning to set in. In 1972, Mississippi 
lost seventy-four years of congressional seniority when two of its 
long-time congressmen chose to retire at the same time. Thomas 
Abernathy, Democratic Congressman for thirty years, Chairman of the 
Cotton Subcommittee of the Agriculture Committee; and William Colmer, 
Chairman of the powerful Rules Committee, and an incumbent since the 
time of Franklin Roosevelt's first presidential victory; both decided 
that the strain had become too much for them and retired. A third
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TABLE 32 
MISSISSIPPI PRESIDENTIAL VOTING
Year
Repub­
licans
Demo­
crats
Inde­
pen­
dents
Repub­
licans
(%)
Demo­
crats
(%)
Inde­
pen­
dents
(%)
1948 5,043 19,384 167,538 2.6 10.0 87.3
1952 112,966 172,566 • • • 39.5 60.4 0.0
1956 60,685 144,498 42,966 24.4 58.2 17.7
1960 73,561 108,362 116,248 24.6 36.3 39.0
1964 356,528 52,518 • • • 87.1 12.8 0.0
1968 88,516 150,644 415,349 13.5 23.0 63.4
1972 502,330 125,739 • • • 79.9 20.0 0.0
Democratic Congressman Charles Griffin, an incumbent of only four 
years, and not seeking retirement, nevertheless lost in a surprising 
upset. Abernathy's seat went to David Bowen, a Democrat. Republican 
Thad Cochran was the victor over Griffin, and Colmer's Administrative 
Assistant, Trent Lott, ran successfully as a Republican for his 
boss's old seat, with Colmer's full endorsement. Thus, Mississippi 
now had two Republican Congressmen.
In the general elections for president in Mississippi in 
1972, the result, from what has been said previously, was easily 
predictable. Richard Nixon polled his best showing in Mississippi 
with approximately 80 percent of the vote. His 502,330 votes nearly
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equalled the combined totals for Wallace and himself in 1968. McGovern 
ran 25,000 votes behind Humphrey.
In Louisiana, from 1932 to 1944, the Democratic percentage
of the vote fell from 88.6 percent of the vote to ’’only" 80.6 percent.
In making an analysis, a comparison of the 1940 vote with that of
1944 is instructive. The northwest and central sections of the state
raised their Republican vote shares by 15 percent to 27 percent.
This area, representing one-third of the parishes, is overwhelmingly
Protestant, with a high concentration of Negroes. At the same time,
the largely Catholic and largely white southeastern section, which
had heretofore been slightly more Republican than the rest of the
state, upped its support for Roosevelt, probably in response to clear
U.S. support for France, by 5 percent. In 1948 the central and
northeast sections went heavily for Thurmond, and in several parishes
the Democrats finished last. In 1956 Eisenhower was to carry this
21
area with 65 percent of the vote.
While presidential Republicanism has been common in Louisiana, 
Table 33 shows the local Republican Party has been the slowest to 
develop anywhere in the South--even slower than Mississippi1s .
Part of the explanation may be in Louisiana’s uniqueness. One 
thinks immediately, of course, of the French Catholic versus 
Protestant English split. While it is true that Louisiana has more 
Catholics than any other southern state, Louisiana also has a higher 
proportion of its population engaged in nonfarm employment than any 
other southern state. Even as early as 1948, 90 percent of its work 
force was engaged in nonagricultural employment, ahead, even, of the
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TABLE 33 
LOUISIANA PRESIDENTIAL VOTING
Year
Repub­
licans
Demo­
crats
Inde­
pen­
dents
Repub­
licans
(%>
Demo­
crats
(%)
Inde­
pen­
dents
(%)
1948 72,657 136,344 204,290 17.5 32.9 49.5
1952 306,925 345,027 • • • 47.0 52.9 0.0
1956 329,047 243,977 44,520 53.2 39.5 7.2
1960 230,980 407,339 169,572 28.5 50.4 21.1
1964 509,225 387,068 • « • 56.8 43.1 0.0
1968 257,535 309,615 530,300 23.4 28.2 48.3
1972 746,493 371,998 . . . 66.7 oo o 0.0
national average.
Louisiana's disenchantment with the national Democratic 
Party had been building for some time. As early as 1943, Governor 
Jones offered his opinion that the Solid South should cease support 
for Democratic presidential candidates. He stated that he thought 
the South had gotten better treatment from the Republicans. The 
following year the Shreveport Times endorsed Dewey to protect the 
Constitution and the Republic, pointing out that Roosevelt constantly 
referred to the "'New Deal' or 'we'" and never the Democratic Party. 
It was not, however, until four years later that Louisiana broke to 
support the Dixiecrats. Even liberal Governor Earl Long could not,
23
or would not, speak out for Truman.
In 1952 Louisiana returned temporarily to the Democratic
column as Stevenson mustered a slim 53 percent majority, down
considerably from Roosevelt's last victory of 81 percent. In 1956
Louisiana became the only Deep South state to go Republican, giving
Eisenhower 53 percent. He managed to poll 56 percent of the city
vote--the first time they had backed a Republican candidate in
24
Louisiana. Democratic fortunes had hit a new low.
In 1951 the Republicans had one Parish Committee formed out
of a possible sixty-four. There were forty State Central Committee
members out of a possible 101. By 1957 the year following Eisenhower'
victory, these figures were up to twenty-two of sixty-four committees
25
and all 101 Central Committee seats were filled.
Although many people have tried to project Republican and
Democratic differences from religious differences, the true basis for
the ongoing Republicanism in Louisiana, as in the rest of the South,
is concentrated in the "urban-industrial" parishes in the state.
These parishes cast roughly 50 percent of the state's presidential
vote in 1960, and nearly 60 percent of the Republican totals. This
urban Republican trend has bordered on the miraculous, having only
26
been derailed by occasional third-party attempts since 1948.
(See Table 34.)
In 1960 the Democrats once again emerged victorious as the
anti Democratic vote was split two ways. Kennedy's Catholicism
enabled him to poll an absolute majority with 50.4 percent of the 
27
statewide vote. An examination of the vote in the four Catholic
Year
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
>—
LS
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
TABLE 34
PARTISAN BREAKDOWN 1947 TO 1973 
FOR LOUISIANA
Gov-
er~ State State
nor Senate House Senate House
D OR— 2D OR— 8D OR— 39D OR— 100D
D OR— 2D OR— 8D OR— 39D OR— 100D
D OR— 2D OR— 8D OR— 39D OR— 100D
D OR— 2D OR— 8D OR— 39D OR— 100D
D OR— 2D OR— 8D OR— 39D OR— 10 OD
D OR— 2D OR— 8D OR— 39D OR— 100D
D OR— 2D OR— 8D OR— 39D OR— 10OD
D . OR— 2D OR—  8D OR— 39D OR— 100D
D OR— 2D OR—  8D OR— 39D OR— 100D
D ' OR— 2D OR— 8D OR— 39D OR— 10OD
D OR— 2D OR— 8D OR— 39D OR— 100D
D OR— 2D OR— 8D OR— 39D OR— 100D
D OR— 2D OR— 8D OR— 39D OR— 100D
D OR— 2D OR— 8D OR—  39D OR— 101D
D OR— 2D OR— 8D OR— 39D OR— 105D
D OR— 2D OR— 8D OR— 39D OR— 105D
D OR— 2D OR— 8D OR— 39D OR— 105D
D OR— 2D OR— 8D OR— 39D OR— 105D
D OR— 2D OR— 8D OR— 39D OR— 105D
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TABLE 34— Continued
Year
Gov­
er­
nor Senate House
State
Senate
State
House
Total
Repub­
licans
1966 D OR— 2D OR— 8D OR— 39D OR— 105D 0
1967 D OR— 2D OR— 8D OR— 39D OR— 105D 0
1968 D OR— 2D OR— 8D OR— 39D OR— 105D 0
1969 D OR— 2D OR— 8D OR— 39D OR— 105D 0
1970 D OR— 2D OR— 8D OR— 39D OR— 105D 0
1971 D OR— 2D OR— 8D 1R— 38D 1R— 103D 2
1972 D OR— 2D OR— 8D 1R— 38D 1R— 103D 2
1973 D OR— 2D 1R— 7D OR— 39D OR— 105D 1
aD— Democrat. 
^R— Republican.
parishes of Cameron, Evangeline, Saint James, and Saint John the 
Baptist shows clearly what happened. In 1956 the first two had gone 
for Eisenhower, and the last two for Stevenson with about 60 percent 
of the vote. In 1960 all four of these parishes went over 80 percent 
for Kennedy.^
In 1964 Louisiana again returned to the Republican camp, 
carrying for Senator Goldwater with 57 percent of the vote, the 
highest percentage anyone had drawn in Louisiana since 1944. The 
Republican candidate for Governor, Charlton Lyons, a Shreveport 
businessman, proved a tough campaigner. Having scored major gains
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in the cities, he polled 39 percent, the largest GOP vote for governor
29
in modern Louisiana history. Still, the victory remained in all 
things a personal triumph for Goldwater as Louisiana, alone of all 
the Deep South states carried by Goldwater, showed no Republican 
gains at all.
The 1968 presidential race was hard fought in Louisiana.
'’Sammy" Downs of Alexandria, executive counsel for the governor,
managed the Wallace campaign. New Orleans state senator Mike
O'Keefe ran Humphrey's. A host of dignitaries, including ex-governors
Jones, Kennon, and Noe, Democrats all, and Administrative Assistant
to the Governor, Carlos Spaht, were backing Nixon. All acknowledged
Wallace to be the front runner. In the end, Wallace emerged the
30
victor, but lacked a clear majority, polling only 48 percent.
In 1968 the eight urban parishes (Caddo, Ouachita, Rapides,
East Baton Rouge, Lafayette, Calcasieu, Jefferson, and Orleans) 
provided about 79 percent of the Republican voters (since the
t
Republicans have only 2 percent of Louisiana's registered voters,
this is not as significant as it may, at first, seem) and provided
about 60 percent of Nixon's totals for the state in the election.
This was roughly the same percentage as in 1960.
Table 35 breaks down the vote in just one of these areas.
Baton Rouge shows where the primary strength of the three candidates
lies. Nixon's 54 percent demonstrates genuine Republican sympathy
in the upper-income, urban, white areas. If one totals the latter
two categories, it will be noted that Humphrey received only 13 percent
31
of the urban white vote. Clearly, the Democratic candidate's
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TABLE 35 
TYPE OF PRECINCT
Candidate Black
Upper class 
white
White
labor
(%) (%) (%)
Humphrey 96 18 12
Nixon 1 54 18
Wallace 3 28 70
greatest strength was in the black areas. Surprisingly, Wallace did 
better than Nixon in the black precincts, but Wallace's strongest 
support came from precisely the areas one would expect to find 
it--the white laboring class.
For a time it looked as if the Republican Party in Louisiana 
was going to be born dead. Hope came alive again, however, when 
one Republican was elected to each house of the state legislature 
in the 1970 elections. With the nomination of Senator McGovern 
hope increased. Nixon swept the state polling two-thirds of the 
vote. The first Republican Congressman in modern times was also 
elected.
Arkansas presents a paradox. At no time has it been totally 
lacking in Republican strength as Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama 
have, but, on the other hand, it was the last of all the southern 
states to break from the Democratic Party. When much of the rest of
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the Deep South was breaking lose in the 1948 Dixiecrat rebellion, 
Arkansas stayed loyal to the Democratic Party. The Dixiecrats drew 
only 16.7 percent of the vote, less even than the Republicans1 
21.1 percent share.
The strength of the Republican Party in the state has gone 
through two cycles. Thus, Arkansas' sole Republican legislator in 
1950 was joined by another in the elections of that year, and a 
third came in on Eisenhower's coattails in 1952. This delegation 
held together until one of their seats became vacant in 1956. Then 
events transpired to temporarily wipe out all vestiges of Republican 
strength in the state. (See Table 36.) At the beginning of the 
1954-1955 School Year, two Arkansas school systems began to desegre­
gate in accordance with the principles handed down in the Brown 
decision. The next year eight more followed suit. At the same
time, all but one of the state-financed white colleges admitted 
32
blacks.
When Little Rock's Central High School prepared to integrate 
in the fall of 1957, trouble seemed likely. To prevent the possibility 
of violence, and, incidently, to prevent the planned integration, 
Governor Faubus, heretofore considered a "liberal," called out the 
National Guard. On September 13th, Faubus met with President 
Eisenhower, and, although he expressed his willingness to obey the 
Supreme Court's ruling, he did nothing. On September 20th, a federal 
court ordered the admission of blacks. Riots broke out on each of the 
next two days. On the twenty-third Eisenhower issued a proclamation 
demanding that the mob leave the area surrounding the school. On
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TABLE 36
PARTISAN BREAKDOWN 1947 TO 1973 
FOR ARKANSAS
Year
Gov­
er­
nor Senate House
State
Senate
State
House
Total
Repub­
licans
1947 D OR— 2D OR— 7D OR— 35D 3R— 97D 3
1948 D OR— 2D OR— 7D OR— 35D 3R— 97D 3
1949 D OR— 2D OR— 7D OR— 35D 1R— 99D 1
1950 D OR— 2D OR— 7D OR— 35D 1R— 99D 1
1951 D OR— 2D OR— 7D OR— 35D 2R— 98D 2
1952 D OR— 2D OR— 7D OR— 35D 2R— 98D 2
1953 D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 35D 3R— -97D 3
1954 D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 35D 3R— 97D 3
1955 D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 35D 3R— 97D 3
1956 D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 35D 2R— 97D 2
1957 D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 35D 2R— 98D 2
1958 D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 35D 2R— 98D 2
1959 D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 35D OR— 100D 0
1960 D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 35D OR— 100D 0
1961 D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 35D 1R— 99D 1
1962 D OR— 2D OR— 6D OR— 35D 1R— 99D 1
1963 D OR— 2D OR— 4D OR— 35D 1R— 99D 1
1964 D OR— 2D OR— 4D OR— 35D 1R— 99D 1
1965 D OR— 2D OR— 4D OR— 35D 1R— 99D 1
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TABLE 36— Continued
Year
Gov­
er­
nor Senate House
State
Senate
State
House
Total
Repub­
licans
1966 D OR— 2D OR— 4D OR— 35D 1R— 99D 1
1967 R OR— 2D 1R— 3D OR— 35D 3R— 97D 5
1968 R OR— 2D 1R— 3D OR— 35D 3R— 97D 5
1969 R OR— 2D 1R— 3D 1R— 34D 3R— 97D 6
1970 R OR— 2D 1R— 3D 1R— 34D 3R— 97D 6
1971 D OR— 2D 1R— 3D 1R— 34D 2R— 98D 4
1972 D OR— 2D 1R— 3D 1R— 34D 2R— 98D 4
1973 D OR— 2D 1R— 3D 1R— 34D 1R— 99D 3
Democrat. 
^Republican.
the twenty-fourth, Federal troops came in to enforce the decree.
In the 1958 elections Faubus easily won reelection, but not so for
his opponents. Liberal, eight-term, Democratic Congressman Brooks
Hays, who had arranged the meeting with Eisenhower, and whose
districts included Little Rock, lost his bid for reelection. So
34
did all of the Arkansas Republican legislators.
Arkansas1 vote remained remarkably stable in the three 
Presidential elections from 1952 to 1960. The Republican vote 
vacillated between 177,000 votes and 186,000 votes, a difference 
of only 9,000 votes. The Democratic vote varied from 213,000 to
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226,000. Thus, it is clear, if the point needed making, that the 
Republican vote was genuine Republicanism, and not a personal 
tribute to Eisenhower.
The election of 1960, however, was closer than it might have 
been because of a large number of votes for the national States' 
Rights Party (SRP), which drew nearly 7 percent of the vote. These 
defections threatened Kennedy with the loss of a clear majority.
Had this occurred, it would have been the first time the Democratic 
candidate had so failed in modern times. Nevertheless, he managed 
a very slight majority, polling 50.1 percent. The Republican was 
returned to the lower house of the legislature. Another cycle had 
begun.
In 1964 with Senator Goldwater at the head of the party, 
Republicans were coming to life all over the Deep South. Goldwater
i
was to win five of the states in the region with little difficulty. 
Only in Arkansas was he rebuffed. But, look what an effort it took 
to keep Arkansas in the Democratic column. In 1964 Goldwater polled 
243,264 votes in Arkansas--more votes than the Democratic Party was 
to draw in Arkansas in any presidential election, except the 1964 
race. In 1964 Goldwater's vote ran to 43.4 percent of those cast, 
compared to Eisenhower's 1952 mark of 43.9 percent, and Nixon's 
1960 figure of 43 percent. Republican representation in the state 
remained unchanged. (See Table 37.)
Governor Faubus, first elected in 1954, kept right on winning 
until he voluntarily retired in 1966. His organization's candidate, 
Frank Holt, lost the Democratic nomination to James Johnson, an
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TABLE 37 
ARKANSAS PRESIDENTIAL VOTING
Year
Repub­
licans
Demo­
crats
Inde­
pen­
dents
Repub­
licans
(%)
Demo­
crats
(%)
Inde­
pen­
dents
(%)
1948 50,959 146,659 40,068 21.1 62.1 16.7
1952 177,155 226,300 • • • 43.9 56.0 0.0
1956 186,287 213,277 7,008 45.8 52.4 1.7
1960 184,508 215,049 28,954 43.0 50.1 6.8
1964 243,264 413,197 2,965 43.4 56.0 0.5
1968 189,062 184,901 235,627 31.0 30.3 38.6
1972 427,014 190,598 • • • 69.1 30.8 0.0
arch­segregationist and political opponent of Faubus. The Republican
nominee was Winthrop Rockefeller, a resident of the state since 1953.
He had been active in building the state's Republican organization 
since that time. Faubus’ camp, having lost the primary, provided 
only lukewarm support for Johnson. Not only Rockefeller, but also 
Maurice Britt, Republican Lieutenant Governor candidate, proved 
victorious. Nor was that all. Congressman Trimble, long known as a 
prominent southern liberal, met defeat at the hands of Republican 
John Paul Hammerschmidt. As in the presidential elections, it was 
largely the urban Republican rural Democrat split that determined 
the results. Similarly it was the upper- and middle-class precincts
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within the cities that accounted for the majorities. Two new 
Republicans gained state house seats.
With the successes of 1966 under their belt, Republicans 
were confident going into the 1968 elections. The results were as 
mixed as it was possible for them to be. The voters cast their 
ballots for candidates of three different parties for each of the 
three major offices. Wallace, candidate of the American Independent 
Party, won Arkansas' electoral votes by polling 38.6 percent--his 
lowest winning percentage. Senator Fulbright, a Democrat, won 
reelection to the U.S. Senate. Finally, Governor Rockefeller, a 
Republican, won reelection to the governorship. In the presidential 
race, Nixon edged out Humphrey for second place. For the first 
time, Arkansas elected a Republican to the state senate.
In the 1970 elections Winthrop Rockefeller was once again the 
Republican gubernatorial candidate. Sterling Cockerill, one-time 
Speaker of the Arkansas House of Representatives, withdrew from the 
Democratic Party to run as Republican candidate for Lieutenant 
Governor. Rockefeller lost his bid for reelection to Democrat Dale 
Bumpers, a racial moderate, like Rockefeller. Republicans lost one 
seat in the state house.
The omen of 1968 proved truly prophetic for 1972. For the 
second straight election the Republican candidate out-polled the 
Democrat. In 1968, when George Wallace had been on the ballot, it 
had only been by 4,000 votes. Now Wallace was gone, and the margin 
had increased to over 236,000, more than Wallace's entire 1968 
vote in Arkansas. Arkansas had at last gone Republican in a
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presidential election.
Development of the Republican Party in the Deep South has
traditionally lagged behind its development in the Outer South.
Comparing Tables 16 and 38 will show that for the Outer South
and the Deep South, respectively, that the movement to the Republican
Party in the firmer region is running about twelve years ahead of
the movement in the latter region. While it is true that the result
of the Dixiecrat movement seems to have been to have more or less
permanently shifted between 20 and 30 percent of voters away from
the Democrats in the presidential years after 1950, only about
two-thirds of these shifted immediately to the Republican Party.
The others spent several years in experiments with third parties.
Furthermore, while a somewhat smaller shift in the Outer South was
enough to swing most of the states in that region into the Republican
orbit, this shift in the Deep South only resulted in putting the
states of the Deep South on about a par with the level the states of
the Outer South had been on before. (See Table 39.)
Still, the Democrat's victories were not as easy as they
had been used to. In Louisiana, in 1952, Governor Robert F. Kennon,
heading a "business-conservative, neo-bourbon coalition," cited
Stevenson's support for Federal ownership of offshore oil and
FEPC laws as major factors in his support of Eisenhower. He cam-
36
paigned long and hard throughout his state for Eisenhower.
In 1956 Eisenhower slipped somewhat in the voting as a
result of the unpopular, at least in the Deep South, Brown decision.
This did not help Stevenson very much, however, because most of the
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TABLE 38
PARTISAN BREAKDOWN 1947 
FOR DEEP SOUTH
TO 1973
Year
Gov­
er­
nor Senate House
State
Senate
Total 
State Repub- 
House licans
1947 OR—  6D OR— 12D OR— 47D 1R— 257D 5R— 770D 6
1948 OR— 6D OR— 12D OR— 47D 1R— 257D 5R— 770D 6
1949 OR— 6D OR— 12D OR— 47D OR— 258D 2R— 77 3D 2
1950 OR— 6D OR— 12D OR— 47D OR— 258D 2R— 773D 2
1951 OR— 6D OR— 12D OR— 47D OR— 258D 3R— 772D 3
1952 OR— 6D OR— 12D OR— 47D OR— 258D 3R— 772D 3
1953 OR— 6D OR— 12D OR— 45D 1R— 257D 5R— 770D 6
1954 OR— 6D OR— 12D OR— 45D 1R— 257D 5R— 770D 6
1955 OR— 6D OR— 12D OR— 45D OR— 258D 3R— 772D 4
1956 OR— 6D OR— 12D OR— 45D 1R— 257D 5R— 770D 6
1957 OR— 6D OR— 12D OR— 45D 1R— 257D 5R— 770D 6
1958 OR— 6D OR— 12D OR— 45D 1R— 257D 5R— 770D 6
1959 OR—  6D OR— 12D OR— 45D 1R— 257D 3R— 772D 4
1960 OR— 6D OR—  12D OR— 45D 1R— 257D 3R— 772D 4
1961 OR— 6D OR— 12D OR— 45D 1R— 257D 3R— 7 7 2D 4
1962 OR— 6D OR— 12D OR— 45D 1R— 257D 3R— 775D 4
1963 OR— 6D OR— 12D OR— 41D 2R— 256D 7R— 772D 9
1964 OR— 6D OR— 12D OR— 4 ID 3R— 258D 5R— 774D 8
1965 OR— 6D 1R— 11D 7R— 34D 3R— 258D 7R— 772D 18
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TABLE 38— Continued
Year
Gov­
er­
nor Senate House
State
Senate
Total 
State Repub- 
House licans
1966 OR— 6D 1R— 11D 8R— 3 3D 9R— 25ID 28R— 751D 46
1967 1R— 5D 1R— 11D 7R— 34D 16R— 244D 49R— 730D 74
1968 1R— 5D 1R— 11D 7R— 34D 15R— 245D 42R— 737D 66
1969 1R—  5D 1R— 11D 7R— 34D 10R— 251D 32R— 747D 51
1970 1R— 5D 1R— 11D 7R— 34D 12R— 249D 35R— 744D 56
1971 OR— 6D 1R— 11D 7R— 34D 13R— 247D 39R— 738D 60
1972 OR— 6D 1R— 11D 7R— 34D 13R— 247D 39R— 738D 60
1973 OR— 6D 1R— 11D 10R— 30D 12R— 248D 40R— 737D 63
Republican. 
b
Democrat.
TABLE 39
DEEP SOUTH PRESIDENTIAL VOTING
Year
Repub­
licans *
Demo­
crats
Inde­
pen­
dents
Repub­
licans
(%)
Demo­
crats
(%)
Inde­
pen­
dents
(%)
1948 251,666 594,456 771,001 15.5 36.7 47.7
1952 1,113,338 1,648,795 • o • 40.3 59.6 0.0
1956 1,070,191 1,473,356 203,326 38.9 53.6 7.4
1960 1,190,060 1,711,567 319,141 36.9 53.1 9.9
1964 2,513,750 1,691,988 2,965 59.7 40.2 0.0
1968 1,316,209 1,373,665 2,623,681 24.7 25.8 49.4
1972 3,560,904 1,413,152 • • • 71.5 28.4 0.0
vote was drawn off by Andrews' independent candidacy. Nevertheless, 
the fact that Eisenhower's vote did not fall back to pre-1952 levels 
was a hopeful sign for Republicans. It indicated that change was 
there to stay. As Strong mentions:
Residents of suburban Birmingham voted strongly for 
Eisenhower, just as did residents of suburban Chicago. Since 
similarly situated people outside the South are most pronounced 
in their Republican loyalties, it must be concluded that in the 
elections of 1952 and 1956 prosperous Southern urbanites acted 
like Yankees. . . . Moreover, after the 1956 election, even a 
cautious observer might have predicted this vastly expanded 
Presidential Republicanism was here to stay. . . . Presidential 
Republicanism is growing most rapidly where population is 
growing most rapidly.
The Democratic Party had hoped that the "defections" of the
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1950s were just personal tributes to General Eisenhower, a popular
military "hero,” but Nixon's narrow loss of South Carolina and his
ability to actually increase the Republican tally in Mississippi,
" . . .  made it clear that Southern Republicanism was embedded in
something more substantial than charisma, a father image, and
38
military generalship." Even regaining Louisiana did little
to settle Democratic fears.
Just as 1952 was the year Presidential Republicanism began to
move in the Outer South, so 1964 was the year of the Republican
presidential breakthroughs in the Deep South. Goldwater's southern
strength showed itself early when he captured 271 of the 278 votes
of the delegations of the old Confederacy at the Republican National
39
Convention in San Francisco. Senator Goldwater was the first
presidential candidate of the Republican Party to base victory in
the South as the key factor for overall victory. First, Goldwater's
conservatism was expected to be translated into Republican presidential
votes; and second, this victory was expected to sweep many other
40
Republicans into office. The results in the nation as a whole
rj
were bitterly disappointing to Goldwater' s', followers, but in the 
Deep South they were quite satisfactory. As with Eisenhower's first 
race, breakthroughs were made at the congressional level. There 
were seven new congressmen elected by the Republicans from the 
states of the Deep South— the first to represent their party from 
these states since Reconstruction days. In addition, the Republicans 
picked up their first, and, as yet, orily U.S. Senator from that 
region when the old Dixiecrat Strom Thurmond switched parties.
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In the cities, however, 1964 proved a complete reversal of
the previous trend in the South. The GOP had hit rock bottom in
1936 in the southern cities, increased moderately through 1948,
skyrocketed in 1952, went up slightly in 1956, and dipped slightly
in 1960, When Goldwater lost the cities of the South in 1964, he
41
was the first Republican to do so since 1948. What was true of a
part of the South, was not true of all of it. While incumbent
President Johnson was sweeping the rest of the country, Goldwater
cracked the Deep South in a big way by making major inroads in the
South's countryside, and carrying five states. "These states were of
a region that for almost a century had provided the Democratic party
42
with its most reliable bloc of electoral votes. . . . "
Up through 1944 the Democratic Party had been agreeable to
southerners on the question of race. When, in 1948, Truman began to
advocate more for blacks, the Dixiecrats swept the Deep South and
especially its black belts. After their collapse, the black belts
were in search of a home. Kennedy and Johnson's civil rights policies
43pushed them into the waiting arms of the GOP.
Under the Goldwater impetus the Republicans, as Tindall puts 
it, " . . .  for the first time in history played the role of the 
'traditional' party of the South." What had long been the bedrock 
of the Democratic Party in the South gave the Republicans 59.7 
percent of its vote--representing a gain of over thirty percentage 
points over Nixon in the black belt. True, Eisenhower had gained 
as much over Dewey, but then Dewey had had only around 5 percent of 
the vote in the black belts, so that Eisenhower had gotten only to
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4437 percent. . Thus, Cosman summarizes the effects of the 1964
campaign as follows:
One very dynamic element that the Goldwater candidacy left 
behind in the Deep South was a number of state and local Republican 
parties demonstrably stronger than at any time in the past, 
whether measured by votes, contests entered and won, organization, 
money, motivation, or even conversion of Democratic office 
holders to Republicanism. . .
In 1963 Heard could write with honesty that he did not think
the South would become as solidly Republican as it once was Democratic.
The only issue capable of causing the switch, he felt, was "the
Negro problem." For this to have an effect would require " . . .  that
the alternatives offered by the parties be clear cut in the public
eye." Both sides must be "left with no doubt" as to where the
46
parties stand--who is their friend and who is their foe. In 1963 
these conditions were not present. In 1964 one of these conditions 
was met with the Goldwater takeover of the Republican Party; 
southerners of both races knew where he stood. It was not to be until 
1972, with the McGovern seizure of the Democratic Party, that the 
circle was to be completed. Southerners knew where he stood, too.
Between 1964 and 1972 were the events of 1968. In that 
year George Wallace, the Governor of Alabama, ran for president for 
his American Independent Party. He easily carried the total vote 
in the region, winning 49.4 percent, just short of an absolute 
majority, and carried five of the six states in the region, missing 
only South Carolina. He should also probably be credited with making 
sure that many of those voters who bolted the Democratic Party to 
support Goldwater in 1964 stayed away long enough to become somewhat
accustomed to voting for non-Democrats for president. That Humphrey 
did as well as he did is probably due to the 1965 Voting Rights 
Act and the considerable increase in the registered black voters it 
produced. Those black voters will probably guarantee a large enough 
base that the Democratic Party will never be as much of a minority 
party in the South as the Republicans once were.
What caused the trend toward the Republicans in the presiden­
tial elections of the Deep South? That question is, of course, hard 
to answer. However, if the same factors are responsible as in the 
Outer South, i.e., increases in urban population and in wealth, 
the following Tables 40 and 41 may prove instructive.
Table 42 depicts the increase in black registration and 
demonstrates that the tremendous increase in this area would 
probably guarantee a substantial base of support for the Democrats 
in the future--at least enough to prevent them from ever becoming 
as much of a minority party as the Republicans had been.
Turning now to Phillips' breakdown of the patterns of the 
voting in the various areas: black belt, traditional GOP, Deep South
Upcountry, and French Catholic Louisiana, changing party fortunes can 
be seen more clearly. One should pay particularly close attention to 
the movement in the black belts. Notice how the Democratic share, 
after peaking in 1932, begins a slow slide downward until, in most 
cases, it hits rock bottom in 1964. Then, as the effects of the 
1965 Voting Rights Act take hold, the Democratic percentages move 
somewhat up again, in most cases. (See Tables 43, 44, and 45.)
If it can be said truthfully that the Deep South is travelling
TABLE AO
PER CAPITA INCOME IN THE DEEP SOUTH
Percentage 
national i
of the 
average
State 1948 1968 Change
(%) (%) (%)
Alabama 60.5 68.3 7.8
Arkansas 61.1 68.2 7.1
Georgia 67.7 81.2 13.5
Louisiana 72.2 76.9 4.7
Mississippi 55.2 60.8 5.6
South Carolina 62.3 69.6 7.3
SOURCE: Havard, William C. The Changing
Politics of the South. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1972. Pp. 14-15.
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TABLE 41
GROWTH OF URBANISM IN THE DEEP SOUTH
State
Percentage urban
1950
(%)
1960
(%)
1970
(%)
Change
(%)
Alabama 33 48 51 18
Arkansas 10 31 35 25
Georgia 45 48 52 7
Louisiana 38 54 55 17
Mississippi 7 10 18 11
South Carolina 30 42 45 15
SOURCE: Havard, William C. The Changing
Politics of the South. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1972. Pp. 20-21.
159
TABLE 42
VOTER REGISTRATION IN THE DEEP SOUTH
State
Percentage
Black
Percent­
age
White
1960
(%)
1964
(%)
1970
(%)
1970
(%)
Arkansas 37.3 49.3 71.6 80.3
Louisiana 30.9 32.0 61.8 88.2
Georgia 29.3 44.0 63.6 89.6
South Carolina 15.6 38.7 57.3 73.3
Alabama 13.7 23.0 64.0 96.1
Mississippi 5.2 6.7 67.5 86.9
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TABLE 43
DEMOCRATIC SHARE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL 
VOTE IN THE BLACK BELT
1928
(%)
1932
<%)
1948
<%)
1952
(%)
1956
(%)
1960
(%)
1964
(%)
1968
(%)
1972
(%)
Dallas, Alabama 73 97 0 45 40 44 11 32 37
Wilcox, Alabama 79 98 0 58 53 67 8 36 14
Lowndes, Alabama 82 98 0 56 66 67 17 35 23
Lee, Georgia 86 98 46 66 86 68 19 39 30
Burke, Georgia 73 95 24 55 63 53 29 34 27
Miller, Georgia 88 100 79 88 78 95 14 7 8
Terrell, Georgia 93 98 64 79 86 83 22 35 26
Claiborne, Louisiana 86 98 16 35 21 13 11 26 31
Tensas, Louisiana 79 96 23 50 32 20 10 32 48
Sunflower, Mississippi 97 98 5 51 51 30 6 32 25
Holmes, Mississippi 94 97 3 52 41 25 3 52 52
Leflore, Mississippi 95 98 5 43 49 26 6 38 23
Jefferson, Mississippi 
Edgefield, South
93 97 1 47 70 63 5 63 44
Carolina 
Clarendon, South
100 100 2 31 26 37 25 13 32
Carolina 
Dorchester, South
99 98 7 32 25 44 22 45 45
Carolina 97 98 5 27 27 40 24 36 31
161
TABLE 43— Continued
1928 1932 1948 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Crittenden, Arkansas 84 98 25 61 44 52 50 32 28
Saint Francis, Arkansas 69 93 47 58 50 54 52 36 28
TABLE; 44
DEMOCRATIC
IN
SHARE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL 
FRENCH-CATHOLIC LOUISIANA
VOTE
1928 1932 1948 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Assumption 75 80 37 58 41 72 59 34 39
LaFourche 89 88 34 59 36 76 66 26 31
Saint Charles 91 94 43 71 40 71 65 34 31
Saint James 92 88 52 61 49 82 74 45 46
Saint John the Baptist 89 82 53 76 47 80 70 44 44
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TABLE 45
DEMOCRATIC SHARE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE 
IN THE DEEP SOUTH UP-COUNTRY 
AND TRADITIONAL REPUBLICAN
1928 1932 1948 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) <%) (%) (%) (%)
Deep South Up-Country
Itawamba, Mississippi 72 98 37 80 87 63 35 7 10
Limestone, Alabama 82 96 0 87 87 81 56 9 24
Anderson, South
Carolina 98 99 64 78 77 78 58 22 40
Traditional Republican
Winston, Alabama 24 50 36 41 34 33 29 5 11
Fewton, Arkansas 29 64 50 39 36 32 51 30 30
Fannin, Georgia 32 41 43 40 36 34 45 21 19
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along the same path as the Outer South, but about twelve years 
behind it in time, then the retarded development of the Republican 
Party in the Deep South at the local level begins to be under­
standable and somewhat acceptable. There is good reason to make 
this statement. In 1952 Eisenhower broke through in the Outer South 
capturing every state in that region except North Carolina and 
sweeping in several new Republican Congressmen. In 1964, twelve 
years later, Barry Goldwater took all the states of the Deep South 
except for Arkansas, and carried in with him the first Republican 
Congressmen since Reconstruction. In neither case were major' 
breakthroughs achieved on the local level. It was not until 1966 
that the Republican Party began to make noticeable gains in the Outer 
South at all levels. The Republican Party in the Deep South is now 
roughly in the same position as it was in the Outer South in the 
early 1960s. Following the same time frame, the same kinds of 
gains that were made in the Outer South in 1966 should not be 
expected until approximately 1978 in the Deep South.
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CHAPTER IV
SUMMARY
At the beginning of the time period under discussion in 
this thesis, and as can be seen by examining Tables 46, 47, arid 48, the 
Democratic Party was in a near monopoly position in southern politics. 
In 1948 President Truman had carried 61.6 percent of the entire 
southern vote in a three-way race against both a Republican and 
a Dixiecrat opponent. As of 1950 the Republicans had not a single 
governor or U.S. Senator, and only 1.9 percent of the whole region's 
congressional delegation, 1.7 percent of its state senators, and 
3 percent of its members of the lower houses of the various state 
legislatures.
Then came Eisenhower in 1952, and the situation changed 
somewhat. As observed, the first, and as-yet the most impressive 
change, came in the numbers of presidential Republicans. Looking 
at the figures, approximately 30 percent of the electorate shifted 
to Eisenhower. This shift was composed of virtually all of the 
Dixiecrat voters, and about one-sixth of Truman's. Eisenhower 
became the first Republican since 1928 to carry any southern state, 
as he captured four: Virginia, Tennessee, Florida, and Texas.
No new state executives were elected by the Republicans, or U.S. 
Senators, but modest gains were made elsewhere. Thus, the Republican
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Year
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
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TABLE 46
PARTISAN BREAKDOWN 1947 TO 1973 
FOR WHOLE SOUTH
Total
State State Repub-
Senate House licans
0R--11D OR— 2 2D 2R— 103D 10R— 440D 43R— 1,295D 55
OR— 11D OR— 22D 2R— 103D 10R— 440D 43R— 1,295D 55
OR—  11D OR— 2 2D 2R— 103D 9R— 441D 39R— 1,299D 50
OR— 11D OR— 2 2D 2R— 103D 8R— 442D 40R— 1,299D 50
OR— 11D OR— 2 2D 2R— 103D 8R— 442D 40R— 1,299D 50
OR— 11D OR— 2 2D 2R— 103D 8R— 442D 43R— 1,296D 53
OR— 11D OR— 22D 6R— 100D 12R— 438D 48R— 1,290D 6b
OR—  11D OR— 2 2D 6R— 100D 12R— 438D 48R— 1,290D 66
OR— 11D OR— 2 2D 7R— 99D 10R— 440D 43R— 1,295D 60
OR— 11D OR— 22D 7R— 99D 11R— 439D 46R— 1,293D 64
OR— 11D OR— 2 2D 7R— 99D 14R— 436D 51R— 1,289D 72
OR— 11D OR— 2 2D 7R— 99D 14R— 436D 51R— 1,289D 72
OR— 11D OR— 2 2D 7R— 99D 11R— 439D 33R— 1,305D 51
OR— 11D OR— 22D 7R— 99D 10R— 440D 31R— 1 ,307D 48
OR— 11D OR— 21D 7R— 99D 12R— 438D 48R— 1,290D 67
OR— 11D 1R—  2 ID 7R— 99D 12R— 445D 49R— 1,293D 69
OR— 11D 1R—  2 ID H R — 94D 13R— 444D 64R— 1,278D 89
OR— 11D 1R—  21D 11R—  94D 16R— 441D 73R— 1,282D 101
OR— 11D 2R— 20D 16R— 89D 17R— 441D 76R— 1,269D 111
Gov­
er­
nor Senate House
TABLE 46— Continued
Year
Gov-
er-
nor Senate House
State
Senate
State
House
Total
Repub­
licans
1966 OR— 11D 2R— 20D 17R— 88D 23R— 433D 88R— 1,257D 130
1967 2R— 9D 3R— 19D 23R— 83D 48R— 412D 137R— 1,206D 213
1968 2R--9D 3R— 19D 23R— 83D 57R— 403D 165R— 1,178D 250
1969 2R— 9D 4R--18D 25R— 8ID 59R— 401D 165R— 1 ,178D 255
1970 3R— 8D 4R— 17D 26R— 80D 60R— 400D 168R— 1,175D 261
1971 2R— 9D 5R— 16D 27R— 79D 57R— 403D 178R— 1 ,165D 269
1972 2R— 9D 5R— 16D 27R— 79D 57R— 403D 17 8R— 1,165D 269
1973 3R--8D 7R— 14D 33R— 73D 56R— 404D 180R— 1,162D 279
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TABLE 47 
SOUTHERN PRESIDENTIAL VOTING
Year
Repub­
licans
Demo­
crats
Inde­
pen­
dents
Repub­
licans
(%)
Demo­
crats
(%)
Inde­
pen­
dents
(%)
1948 1,161,742 3,716,230 1,154,525 19.2 61,6 19.1
1952 4,113,543 4,428,163
*
• • ' • 48.1 51.8 0.0
1956 4,218,468 3,684,094 280,701 51.5 45.0 3.4
1960 4,723,753 5,185,110 348,614 46.0 50.5 3.4
1964 5,983,400 6,236,004 8,025 48.9 51.0 0.0
1968 5,120,960 4,574,996 5,073,509 34.6 30.9 34.3
1972 10,307,290 4,428,260 • • • 69.9 30.0 G.C
171
TABLE 48 
SOUTHERN BLACK POPULATION
State 1940
<%)
1950
(%)
1960
(%)
Net
loss
(%)
Florida 27.2 21.8 17.9 -9.3
South Carolina 42.9 38.9 34.9 -8.0
Mississippi 49.3 45.4 42.3 -7.0
Georgia 34.7 30.9 28.6 -6.1
Alabama 34.7 32.1 30.1 -4.6
Louisiana 36.0 33.0 32.1 -3.9
Virginia 24.7 22.2 20.8 -3.9
Arkansas 24.8 22.4 21.9 -2.9
North Carolina 28.1 26.6 25.4 -2.7
Texas 14.5 12.8 12.6 -1.9
Tennessee 17.5 16.1 16.5 -1.0
SOURCE: Spengler, Joseph J. ’’Demographic and Economic Change
in the South, 1940-1960," Change in the Contemporary South, ed. Allan 
P. Sindler. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1966.
P. 27.
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congressional delegation increased to 5.7 percent of the regional 
total, the state senatorial delegation to 2.7 percent, and the state 
house delegation to 3.6 percent.
In 1956 Eisenhower was reelected, this time carrying an 
absolute majority of the southern presidential vote, and carrying 
Louisiana in addition to the four states he had carried four years 
earlier. However, little else was accomplished throughout the decade, 
and indeed until the elections of 1962. Still no governors' chairs, 
or senate seats had changed hands. The high point for Republican 
control of the other offices followed the 1956 election, but these 
high points were none too high, only consisting of 6.6 percent of the 
southern members of Congress, 3.1 percent of their state senators, 
and 3.8 percent of the members of the lower houses of the southern 
legislatures. In 1960 the Republicans again fell below the 50 percent 
mark in southern presidential votes, and retreated to their base of 
the Outer South, this time losing Texas, probably due to the presence 
of Texas Senator Lyndon Johnson on the Democratic ticket.
The face of the South had changed a great deal by 1960.
From 1945 to 1960 farm population in the South had declined from 35
percent of the population to about 20 percent.^ In 1960 for the
first time in American history, more blacks lived in the North than
in the South, and more and more of those that were left were becoming
2
concentrated in the cities. Table 48 shows the" decline of Negro 
population in the South from 1940 to 1960.
The 1960 election emphasized the importance of winning every 
state possible. If Nixon had carried the whole South he could have
been President. Eisenhower could have won without the South; Nixon
did not. Thus, the need for active, large grass-roots organization
in every state became visible. Further, to build such an organization
for a fight only once in four years avails little. The more often
it is utilized the better it gets. It is for that reason that
growth of most of the state parties, where they were not already
3
functioning, during the 1960s. The result was a bouncing back from 
the depths of 1958-1959, which had seen the number of Republican- 
elected officials in the region, in the categories under study, cut 
by one-third. Thus, by 1964, though there were still no Republican 
governors, the first U.S. Senator had been elected, the Republican 
congressional delegation had jumped to 10.5 percent of the region's 
total, the Republican state senate delegation had inched up to 3.5 
percent of a larger regional total, and the Republican members of
the state houses had climbed to 5.4 percent.
In 1964 the South turned upside down. The Outer South, 
heretofore the most Republican of the two subregions, went Democrat, 
as did almost all the rest of the country. However, the Deep South 
went Republican for the first time since the end of Reconstruction. 
Overall, Goldwater pulled 48.9 percent of the region's vote, more 
than the 48.1 percent Eisenhower had pulled in 1952. Republicans 
gained another Senator when Strom Thurmond of South Carolina switched.
During the 1950s and early 1960s southern Democratic 
congressmen had been in a serious dilemma. As the people in Congress 
with the most seniority, they had the most to lose by switching 
parties. Moreover, they needed the election of northern Democrats,
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most of whom were liberals, to Congress to be sure their party held 
sufficient strength to assure them chairmanships. But these northern 
liberals were out to defeat their policy goals. To change their party 
would have meant, during the 1965-1966 period, handing over the 
important chairmanships to northern liberals. This factor greatly 
hampered the willingness of southern Democratic congressmen to jump 
parties.
Nevertheless, if the Democratic leaders in the South were in
no position to switch, there were many rank-and-file members who had
already begun to shift party allegiance, first at the presidential
level, more slowly at the congressional level, and only at a snail's
pace on the local level in most southern states. Following the 1966
elections the Republicans had elected their first southern governors
since Reconstruction, controlling 18.2 percent of the southern
governorships, 13.6 percent of the U.S. Senate seats from the
South, 21.7 percent of the House seats, 10.4 percent of the state
senators, and 10.2 percent of the state house seats.
In the 1968 election for president, the South provided an
ominous omen for the national Democratic Party. Hubert Humphrey,
*
the presidential candidate of that party, finished in third place
in the region-wide voting, carrying only 31 percent of the southern
vote, and only 237 of the region's 1,105 counties, and of those
he carried, 154 were in Texas, the only state h e ;carried. Both
Richard Nixon, who carried 35 percent of the vote, 297 counties, and
five states, and George Wallace, who carried 571 counties, 34 percent
4
of the vote, and five states, ran ahead of the Democratic candidate.
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In their book The Real Majority, Scammon and Wattenberg offer 
the following thoughts on the results and meaning of the 1968 
presidential election in the South:
But the handwriting was already on the wall in the election 
of 1964, although it was obscured in part by the strange nature 
of the Goldwater candidacy and the Democratic landslide. . . .
What happened in 1968 confirmed, intensified, and probably 
ended the bulk of the Southern shift. The Democrats received 
only 30.9% of the Southern vote--less than either Republicans 
(34.6%) or American Independents (34.3%).
So, in the course of twenty-four years--from Roosevelt to 
Humphrey--the Democratic vote in the South has plummeted from 
72% to 3 1 7 o ,  a massive party movement in a land where people 
supposedly "vote the party of their fathers" or "vote by 
habit." The era of the Brass Collar Democrat is over.
Of all the states of the Old Confederacy, only Texas and 
its 25 electoral votes were to be found in the Democratic column.
And Texas only gave Humphrey a 4 1 7 o  to 4 0 7 o  margin over Nixon with 
Wallace getting 1 9 7 , .  Had Wallace not been in the race, it is 
likely Texas, too, would have gone Republican. . . .
The defection of the South is clearly a staggering blow to 
the Democratic party of the future. For the "political South," 
defined as the eleven states of the Old Confederacy, is a potent 
bloc of political real estate. In 1 9 6 8  it involved 1 2 8  electoral 
votes and 2 0 7 >  of the popular vote. When we look backward it is 
significant to note that had not at least some of the Southern 
states gone for John F. Kennedy and Harry Truman, they would not 
have gained enough electoral votes to be elected. . . .  In 
a close election even a slight shift can change the result, and 
the South is more than "slight." . . .
When the Democratic vote goes from 72% in 1944 to 31% in 
1968, something has happened, and it has been something tidal.
In the case of the South the basic issue has been racial, 
although the other pressures of the Social Issue have also been 
present. John Kennedy could still take half of the southern vote 
in 1960, when it was Dwight Eisenhower who had sent the troops 
to Little Rock. But when the sixties came, when it was John 
Kennedy who sent the troops to Oxford, Mississippi; when in 1968 
Lyndon Johnson, after passing the Civil Rights and Voting Rights 
bills, could call a group of black lawyers, in honesty, "soul 
brothers," the marriage between the Democrats and the South was 
sundered— and sundered as far ahead as the psephological eye can see.
The Democrats in the South were hurt by being perceived 
(correctly) as a pro-black national party, but they were also hurt 
by the other non-racial aspects of the Social Issue that had 
become identified with liberal Democrats: soft on crime,
"kidlash," moral, and disruption. . . .  In the South today, 
the Democratic Party--in terms of national elections--is most
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often perceived as the party of blacks, plus a comparative 
handful of white Southern liberals. In no Southern state are 
there enough Presidential Democrats to put together a statewide 
majority.
This, then, was the view of the South, as two leading Democratic 
strategists saw it following the 1968 election.
As Havard observed, "V. 0. Key indicated that two major crises
had occurred in Southern politics: one was the Civil War and its
aftermath, the other the populist movement of the 1890's. . . . "  To
the first two, a "third major crisis in Southern politics" must
6
be added: the Civil Rights revolution of the 1950s and 1960s.
This new third crisis led to the adoption of a new campaign 
strategy by the Republican Party, first accepted in 1964, and brought 
to fruition in 1968. Tindall, in his The Disruption of the Solid 
South, describes it thus:
Rutherford B. Hayes had a Southern policy, Richard Nixon 
has . . .  a. Southern Strategy. The Southern Strategy, like the 
Southern Policy, dictated a policy of benign neglect toward 
the aspirations of black Americans. It betokened, therefore, a 
cycle of reaction and repression. It foretokened, moreover, a 
new Solid South, this time Republican instead of Democratic.^
In his The Hidden Crisis in American Politics, Lubell has 
analyzed the goals and methods of the southern strategy of Richard 
Nixon, as it was being played out during the opening period of the 
Nixon years:
The central aim [ of Nixon's strategy ] has remained to 
divide the Democratic party, this time with finality, by 
developing racial policies acceptable to at least the majority 
of white Southerners. While doing this, Nixon has been careful
Q
to keep open the possibility of future gains among Negroes.
Nixon thus hoped to seize the middle ground, leaving the Democrats 
two ways to go. The one way, admittedly highly unlikely, would be
to turn to racial demagoguery in hopes of winning back the white votes 
in the South. No one, with the possible exception of Alabama's 
George Wallace, of prominent Democratic presidential contenders would 
even consider, let alone put into practice, this possibility. It 
would force black voters, the key to any Democratic hopes in the 
northern big city states, into the arms of the Republicans. The 
other course of action is to continue along the path already taken. 
This path is what has so dearly cost the Democrats in the South
. ?
already. The 1972 election indicates that it may have had an adverse
effect on the Democratic hopes for the northern blue collar votes as
well. This, in short, was Nixon's goal.
To carry out this strategy, Nixon nominated Haynesworth and
Carswell, two southerners, to the Supreme Court, thus dramatizing
"one crucial fact"--that he was the one man who could alter the
constitution of. the Court to make its views closer to those of the
9
South. As Lubell argues:
This prospect of a changed Court is Nixon's strongest 
asset in the South. The one battle most white Southerners 
feel they [ have been ] fighting is with the Court, and Nixon 
has effectively identified himself with that cause.
Thus, he predicted in 1970:
In 1972, I believe, most Southerners will vote for the man 
who can change the Court, rather than for any third party 
candidate, even if he puts on a'truly terrific demagogic 
show. . . . H
In a related battle, then Attorney General Mitchell and 
(former) Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) Secretary Robert Finch 
took conflicting stands on school integration, in the summer of 1969. 
In August Finch asked for a delay of desegregation of thirty-three
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Mississippi school districts. Presumably, if enough Nixon 
Administration spokesmen came up with enough differing stands 
on the "civil rights" issue, no one would be able to figure out just 
what the Administration stand was, and everyone would think what he 
chose to believe.
The President, too, surrounded the issue. Lubell states;
In public utterances he stressed consistently the importance 
of the "neighborhood school," with a "minimum" of school busing. 
In private talks with intimates he has also been [ reportedly ] 
inclined to favor "freedom of choice," which, in theory, permits 
white and black students to pick the school they want to 
attend.^
Northern liberals have seemed very happy to oblige Nixon's southern 
campaign. On October 29, 1969, the Supreme Court, in a decision 
written by Justice Black, himself a southerner, but nonetheless 
quite liberal, ordered desegregation of the South's schools "at 
once," thus driving home the need for a reconstituted court in 
southern eyes. Lubell continues:
Much of the pro-Nixon feeling in the South has to be 
credited to the attacks of northern liberals and Negro leaders 
on Nixon's policies, and by the Senate's rejections of the 
nominations of Judges Clement Haynesworth and G. Harold 
Carswell to the Supreme Court. . . .15
At least through the 1968 election, Lubell maintains:
The main thrust of the Republican upsurge in the South 
[ had ] been borne by the expanding, business-minded middle 
class in the cities, the well-educated and generally respected 
management types. . . . Wallace supporters were of the lower- 
income . . . [ Bible Belt populations ].l^
But where would the Wallace voter go was the crucial question to
be answered by the 1972 election. The "anti-tax and anti-government"
thinking of the Wallace followers would seem to be at odds with the
policy directions of the black community. With new black voters 
registering Democratic, the home of the Wallace supporters would seem
to be found in the'Republican camp. As Lubell said:
The pro-Wallace injection would stimulate the acquisitive 
hormones in Republicanism, even perhaps to rejuvenating 
McKinleyism, and weakening the restraining sense of social 
responsibility. . . .17
And Havard adds:
Added to the unrelenting emphasis on the capacity of free 
enterprise and Social Darwinism to provide a naturalistic 
solution to almost all the problems of a contemporary centralized 
society in an attitude which seems almost to deny the need for 
any regulative public institutions or even any concern for the 
general, as opposed to the private, welfare. . . .1®
"The militancy in the South," say Matthews and Prothro,
"is most apparent among the region’s young people--of both races . . ."
the young blacks adamantly for integration balanced by the young 
whites’ intransigence--an intransigence outweighing even that of 
their parents. Thus, they write, in their book Negroes and the 
New Southern Politics:
If the young [ white ] adults of the South represent the 
hope of the future, they may be the hope of the strict 
segregationists rather than anyone else . . . [ for ]
the youngest Southern whites include more segregationists at every 
level of education, . . . [ than the older generation ] .
In a poll of white southern school-age children nearly 60 percent
were unconcerned about the death of Martin Luther King. Some
19
were even reported to be happy about it.
At the outset of the 1940s only about- 5 percent of all 
eligible southern blacks were registered to vote. In 1968 62 percent 
were registered, and 66 percent in 1972. Since 1960 white registra­
tion has increased 5 to 10 percent, hitting the 80 percent mark in
1968. In 1968 52 percent of the southern blacks actually voted;
72 percent of the southern whites did the same. Of the new black
20
registrants, 9 0  percent have registered as Democrats.
Many northern Democratic liberals have seen this rapid 
increase as a-* sign that the South may shortly return to the Democratic 
roost. Dutton, however, warns against this:
First, Negroes make up a declining proportion of the Southern 
populace--one-third at the turn of the century, just under twenty 
percent now. Second, in more specific political terms, in the 
great majority of contests, black voters are not decisive at 
all . . . when strong Negro support for a particular candidate
becomes apparent, more white voters are likely to be driven off 
than black voters gained. . . . 2 1
Dutton's analysis of this is a bleak one for Democratic partisans:
[ T]he Republican party is developing fairly rapidly in the 
South. Its leaders are generally rather young--the average age 
of the Republican state chairmen in the region in 1 9 6 8  . . . was
just under 4 0 .  The Republican party is building a local base 
first of all in the region's growing metropolitan areas, using 
a number of well targeted Congressional districts. It increased 
its hold every two years throughout the sixties. . . . The
Republicans now hold one-fourth of all Southern and Border 
districts and could readily capture 10-20 more during the . . .
seventies. . . .
[ T]he Republican party is building a solid base in more and 
more communities, developing a lengthening roster of regional 
figures . . . [ including both conservative Strom Thurmond, and
"liberal" A. Linwood Holton ]. More important, the economics 
of the area are raising up an ambitious new middle-class which 
is Republican in outlook. The region's per capita income in 1 9 5 0  
was only two-thirds of the national average; by 1 9 6 0  it had 
climbed to three-fourths, and by 1 9 7 0  to 8 0  percent. . . . Even 
among lower-middle-income whites, improving economic levels 
are beginning to provide take off points for GOP converts; and 
the longer the race issue remains agitated, as it likely will for 
the foreseeable future, the less compelling are the group 
Democratic ties. In a region that has always been acutely 
status-conscious and is now most desperately looking for new 
badges of special standing, the Republican party offers a 
refurbished respectability . . . .  [ A ] whole new economic
complex particularly sympathetic to Southern Republicans is 
emerging. . . .
The Northern Democratic Party probably must either write
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off the region in Presidential elections for some years to come 
or quickly help to build a new foundation there. The develop­
ment of a more liberal Democratic Party in the area would almost 
certainly accelerate the emergence of the GOP at the state and 
local level. . . . [ T]he South can look ahead to expanding
influence within the national GOP. . . .
The underlying political reality, nonetheless, is that the 
Republican Party is moving into a position to put together 
a North-South coalition such as the Democrats maintained for 
over a century and a half. In the Presidential politics of the 
early and middle 1970's the principle alternative to 
Republicanism for some of the South will be provided not by the 
Democrats, but by George Wallace's third way. . . . ^ 2
Although the Republican Party had fallen to its lowest point, 
in terms of percent of the vote captured in 1968, gains continued 
to be made so that by 1970 the Republicans could boast 27.3 percent 
of the southern governorships, 19 percent of southern U.S. Senators, 
and 24.5 percent of the southern delegation to the national House 
of Representatives. For instance, at the local level, Republicans 
hit their high point in that year in the number of state senators 
with 13 percent, a figure running ahead of their 12.5 percent of 
the members of the state houses.
As pointed out previously, presidential Republicanism was the 
first to develop in the South with its first real breakthrough in 
1952. Up until that time the Republicans had controlled only 
Tennessee's First and Second Congressional Districts; four more 
congressmen were pulled in on Eisenhower's coattails in 1952, 
but after that little more was achieved for a decade. Congressional 
Republicanism in the South did not really begin until 1962 as 
Table 49 will show. Thus, in a decade the southern Republican 
membership in the house had more than tripled.
But of more interest than the mere growth of southern
Year
1950
1952
1954
1956
1958
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
TABLE 49
SOUTHERN CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANISM
Percentage
of seats Number Number
contested won lost
(%)
27.6 2 27
29.5 6 25
34.3 7 29
39.0 7 34
20.0 7 14
39.0 7 34
50.5 11 42
64.8 16 52
55.2 23 3_5
63.2 26 41
59.4 27 36
67.6 34 39
>
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Republicanism is this growth in the context of the national picture.
In 1968 Phillips, in his Emerging Republican Majority, put forward
his belief that the southern states and the states of the Yankee
Northeast, traditional enemies since at least the Civil War, were
realigning politically. The old New England Republican states were
swinging away from the party of Lincoln, and the southern States
were moving into the Republican orbit according to his thesis.
His hypothesis extended only to presidential elections, but Lubell
demonstrates that although it may be primarily manifested there, it
is by no means restricted to the race for the Presidency.
The East and the South can be seen to have been realigning
for some time, and the process is not yet complete, but the direction
of the movement is obvious. (See Table 50.) Party coalitions are
under continuing stress. Nevertheless, this stress has been in
existence for a long time. As Lubell argues M . . . The conflict that
ultimately breaks apart a majority coalition is present at the very
inception of the coalition." It just takes some crisis to begin the 
23
break.
By 1972 the steady erosion of Democratic presidential 
strength in the South became an avalanche. Nixon's vote in the 
South hit the 69.9 percent level, higher even than the total vote 
for Wallace and himself in 1968. As Schlesinger concedes, "The
24
Wallace vote had obviously moved to the President en masse . . . ."
In 1972 the Republicans picked up six southern house seats, splitting 
these gains evenly between the two subregions, and made strong 
bids at all levels. The cities were especially strong Republican
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TABLE 50
PERCENT OF REPUBLICAN HOUSE 
SEATS BY REGION
Region 1936
(%)
1946
(%)
1952
(%)
1958
(%)
1962
(%)
1964
(%)
1966
(%)
1968
(%)
1972
(%)
Net
East 52 37 34 37 30 27 23 23 24 -28
South 2 1 3 5 6 12 13 14 18 +16
Midwest 38 41 41 39 43 41 42 41 36 - 2
Pacific 6 9 13 14 12 12 11 11 12 + 6
Border 2 8 5 3 4 5 6 6 5 + 3
Mountain and 
southwest 0 4 4 3 4 3 5 6 6 + 3
bastions with Atlanta, Houston, and Miami suburbs turning in top-
heavy Republican majorities. 11# 9 . Nor was there much change,"
25
Schlesinger concludes, "that the trend would be easily reversed."
If some movement could be seen at the lower levels, it is at 
the Presidential level that the movement to realignment is most 
apparent. Table 51 compares the ten best (by percentage) states for 
each party for the following selected years since the formation of 
the Roosevelt coalition in 1936. Observe the change between 1936 
and 1972. Not one of the top ten states for either party is still 
listed in the top ten states of the same party in both years; two 
of the best Republican states of 1936, Massachusetts and South 
Dakota, are now found in the ten best Democratic states (although it
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TABLE 51
TEN BEST STATES FOR EACH PARTY AT 
PRESIDENTIAL LEVEL
Rank Democratic Republican
1936
1 South Carolina Vermont
2 Mississippi Maine
3 Louisiana New Hampshire
4 Georgia Kansas
5 Texas Delaware
6 Alabama Idaho
7 Arkansas South Dakota
8 Florida Indiana
9 North Carolina Massachusetts
10 Nevada Pennsylvania
1948
1 Texas Vermont
2 Oklahoma Maine
3 Arkansas Nebraska
4 Georgia Kansas
5 Missouri North Dakota
6 North Carolina New Hampshire
78
9
10
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1
2
3
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TABLE 51— Continued
Democratic Republican
Rhode Island 
West Virginia 
Kentucky 
New Mexixo
South Dakota 
Pennsylvania 
New Jersey 
Delaware
1952
Georgia Vermont
Alabama North Dakota
Mississippi South Dakota
Arkansas Nebraska
North Carolina Kansas
West Virginia Maine
South Carolina Idaho
Kentucky Iowa
Tennessee Wyoming
Missouri Wisconsin
Rhode Island
1960
Nebraska
Georgia
Massachusetts
Kansas
Oklahoma
TABLE 51— Continued
Rank Democratic Republican
4 Connecticut Vermont
5 West Virginia South Dakota
6 New York Maine
7 North Carolina Iowa
8 Nevada Arizona
9 South Carolina North Dakota
10 Pennsylvania Wyoming
1964
1 District of Columbia Mississippi
2 Rhode Island Alabama
3 Hawaii South Carolina
4 Massachusetts Louisiana
5 Maine Georgia
6 New York Arizona
7 West Virginia Idaho
' 8 Connecticut Florida
9 Michigan Nebraska
10 Alaska Virginia
23
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
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TABLE 51— Continued
Democratic Republican
1968
District of Columbia Nebraska
Rhode Island Idaho
Massachusetts Utah
Hawaii North Dakota
Maine Wyoming
Minnesota Arizona
New York Kansas
West Virginia South Dakota
Connecticut Iowa
Michigan Vermont
1972
District of Columbia
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Minnesota
South Dakota
Wisconsin
Michigan
Oregon
Mississippi
Alabama
Oklahoma
Florida
South Carolina
Nebraska
Gerogia
North Carolina
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TABLE 51— Continued
Rank Democratic Republican
9 New York Wyoming
10 Illinois Arkansas
is possible that South Dakota is only a reflection of the candidacy of 
its own Senator George McGovern). At the same time, no less than 
seven of Franklin Roosevelt’s ten best states of 1936 ranked in 
Richard Nixon's ten best thirty-six years later. Arkansas, for a 
century a hold out from the Republican camp, produced a larger 
percentage than the old faithful Vermont.
Now the Republicans have the South, .at least in terms of 
presidential politics. But what exactly is the significance of 
that? In 1952 Heard asked roughly the same question: the Republicans
wanted the South, but what good, and by itself, had it done the 
Democrats? The first part of Table 52 was his answer, and the 
second part represents the writer's update of it.
Heard did not believe that the South was all that important.
He argued that of the previous eighteen presidential elections, only 
four could have been reversed had the South switched the party it 
was supporting. This was not a particularly high percentage he 
reasoned. Therefore, why should there be so much effort? The second 
half of Table 52 shows why. Gf the six elections since Heard's 
study, two could have been reversed by a switch in the southern vote.
Year
1880
1884
1888
1892
1896
1900
1904
1908
1912
1916
1920
1924
1928
1932
1936
1940
1944
1948
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TABLE 52
EFFECT OF THE SOUTH ON PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTIONS
Southern electoral 
votes
Vote plurality 
of winner
Demo­
crat
Repub- Third 
lican party
Demo­
crat
Repub­
lican
95 0 • • • • • 59
107 0 • • 37 • • •
112 0 • # • • • 65
112 0 • « 110 • • •
112 0 • • • • • 95
112 0 • • • • • 137
120 0 • • 6 * • 196
120 0 • « • • • 159
126 0 • • 347 • • •
126 0 • « 23 • • •
114 12 • « • « • 277
126 0 • « • • • 246
64 62 • ♦ • • • 357
124 0 • ♦ 413 • • •
124 0 e ♦ 515 • • •
124 0 • • 367 • • «
127 0 • • • 333 « • •
88 0 39 75 • • •
Years in 
which 
the south 
could have 
effected
1884
1892
1916
1948
TABLE 52— Continued
Year
Southern electoral. 
votes
Vote plurality 
of winner
Years in 
which 
the south 
could have 
effected 
the outcome
Demo­
crat
Repub­
lican
Third
party
Demo­
crat
Repub­
lican
1952 71 57 • # • • e ' • 353
1956 61 67 • • • • ♦ • 384
1960 95 33 • • • 84 • e • 1960
1964 00 to 46 • • • 434 • • •
1968 25 58 45 • • • 111 1968
1972 0 130 • • • • • • 504
Moreover, recent elections without incumbent presidents seeking 
reelection have proved to be close. Of three such elections since 
1950, two were in a position to be swung around by a reversal of 
the southern vote.
In 1952, it will be recalled, the Republican National 
Committee had called for a determined effort to take the South, vowing 
to fight on for twenty years, if necessary, to achieve the objective. 
In the 1950s the Outer South began to crack loose from the Democratic , 
coalition in response to the economic and social conservatism of the 
Eisenhower presidential drives. The Deep South, although no longer 
being carried by the landslides of old, still held firm behind the 
Democratic candidates. As early as 1962 a change was beginning to 
show up even there. The Goldwater onslaught, though a monumental
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failure everywhere else, swept through the Deep South carrying with 
it every state in the region, except Arkansas. Although Goldwater 
lost the Outer South by narrow margins at the presidential level, 
minor Republican gains were still recorded at the lower levels. 
Nowhere was it the disaster it was in the North. Goldwater, however, 
while gaining the black belts, lost the cities of the South. In 
1968, for the first time, all segments of the South deserted the 
Democrats at once. However, because of the division of the vote 
between Wallace and Nixon, the anti Democratic column split in two 
with Nixon carrying the cities and Wallace the black belt and rural 
areas. By 1972 the twenty-years war was over, and the Republicans, 
at least at the presidential level, which is all that Phillips was 
concerned with, had won. All of the South, city and countryside, was 
pulling in one harness, this time a Republican one. For the first 
time since the Roosevelt years the South was solid again.
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